Strategy for external action by España. Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación & España. Secretaría de Estado para la Cooperación Internacional y para Iberoamérica
-).)34%2)/ 
$% !35.4/3 %84%2)/2%3
9 $% #//0%2!#).
-).)34%2)/ 
$% !35.4/3 %84%2)/2%3
9 $% #//0%2!#).
-).)34%2)/ 
$% !35.4/3 %84%2)/2%3
9 $% #//0%2!#).
GOBIERNO 
DE ESPAÑA
MINISTERIO 
DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES 
Y DE COOPERACIÓN
STRATEGY 
FOR EXTERNAL
ACTION 
www.exteriores.gob.es

STRATEGY 
FOR EXTERNAL
ACTION 
GOBIERNO 
DE ESPAÑA
MINISTERIO DE 
ASUNTOS EXTERIORES 
Y DE COOPERACIÓN
OFICINA DE
INFORMACIÓN
DIPLOMÁTICA
February 2015
www.exteriores.gob.es
NIPO edición en papel: 501-14-001-2
NIPO edición en línea: 501-14-005-4
EDITION
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación.
PICTURES
Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, AECID, Ministerio de Defensa, Secretaría 
de Estado de Turismo, Agencia EFE y www.nolsom.com
GRAPHICS
www.nolsom.com
DESIGN
Oficina de Información Diplomática / www.nolsom.com
5A NECESSARY REFLECTION 
 1. Spain, from the Constitution to the present day  .............................................................................................. 12
  1.1. Spain’s return to world society  .................................................................................................................. 12
  1.2. Spain and the Great Recession .................................................................................................................. 14
  1.3. Spain today, a well-defined international identity: strengths and weaknesses .................. 15
 2. The globalised world  ................................................................................................................................................... 20
  2.1. The consequences of globalisation ........................................................................................................ 20 
  2.2. From a unipolar world to a multipolar one ......................................................................................... 24
  2.3. The crisis of multilateralism  ..................................................................................................................... 26
  2.4. The global financial crisis  .......................................................................................................................... 26
  2.5. Geopolitical changes arising from globalisation  ............................................................................. 29
 3. The creation and evolution of the European Union  ...................................................................................... 32
  3.1. The roots of the European Union  ........................................................................................................... 32
  3.2. From federalism to functionalism .......................................................................................................... 32
  3.3. From the Treaty of Rome to the Single European Act  .................................................................33
  3.4. From Maastricht to the Treaty of Lisbon  ........................................................................................... 34
  3.5. From the Treaty of Lisbon to the present .......................................................................................... 36 
  3.6. Final reflection ..................................................................................................................................................37
A NEW STRATEGY
 4. The priorities of external action  .............................................................................................................................40
  4.1. Coherence, effectiveness and transparency in external action   ................................................ 41
  4.2. Promote and project our values and interests via external action  ........................................ 42
  4.3. Place the citizen at the forefront of external policy   .................................................................... 42
  4.4. Present ourselves globally as an advanced country  ..................................................................... 42
 5. Goals        .............................................................................................................................................................................44
  5.1. Maintain and promote international peace and security  .............................................................44
  5.2. Promote strong, legitimate multilateral institutions  ....................................................................44
  5.3. Promote the rule of law and fundamental rights and civil liberties  ...................................... 49
  5.4. Combat poverty and act in solidarity with developing countries  ........................................... 50
  5.5. Protect the environment and biodiversity and fight climate change   ................................... 54
  5.6. Arms control: eliminate weapons of mass destruction and limit conventional arsenals  ......55
  5.7. Build a Europe that is more integrated, more legitimate
         and a global figure of authority   .............................................................................................................. 58
   5.7.1. Strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union  ................................................................ 59
   5.7.2. Improve the EU’s capacity for internal and external action   ........................................ 61
   5.7.3. Enhance the effectiveness and democratic legitimacy of the institutions  .......... 62 
  5.8. Strengthen the Ibero-American Community of Nations  .............................................................63
   5.8.1. Spain and Latin America, a renewed relationship .............................................................63
   5.8.2. The renovation of the Ibero-American Summits  .............................................................65
   5.8.3. Language, culture, science and innovation  .........................................................................65
   5.8.4. Economic relations  ....................................................................................................................... 66
   5.8.5. Development cooperation  ..........................................................................................................67
Index
6   5.8.6. Spain, the European Union and Latin America  .................................................................67
  5.9. Ensure the security of Spain and its citizens  ....................................................................................68
  5.10. Provide assistance and protection for Spanish citizens abroad  ............................................ 69
  5.11. Promote Spain’s economic interests abroad  ................................................................................... 70
 6. Actions.  ...............................................................................................................................................................................72
  6.1. External action on defence  .........................................................................................................................72
  6.2. External action on human rights  .............................................................................................................73
  6.3. External action on development cooperation  ..................................................................................75
  6.4. External action on taxation  .......................................................................................................................79
  6.5. External action on justice  ..........................................................................................................................80
  6.6. External action on public security and home affairs  ...................................................................... 81
  6.7. External action on research, development and innovation  ........................................................ 82
  6.8. External action on economic, commercial, financial and industrial issues
          and support for the internationalisation of the Spanish economy  ........................................ 83
  6.9. External action on emigration and immigration  .............................................................................86
  6.10. External action on cultural issues ........................................................................................................86
  6.11. External action on education  ................................................................................................................... 91
  6.12. External action on sport  ............................................................................................................................93
  6.13. External action on tourism  ......................................................................................................................93
  6.14. External action on the environment and climate change  ......................................................... 95
  6.15. External action on health  ......................................................................................................................... 95
  6.16. External action on energy  ........................................................................................................................97
  6.17. External action on infrastructure and transport  ...........................................................................98
  6.18. External action on employment and social security . .................................................................. 99
  6.19. External action on agriculture, food and fishing  .......................................................................... 101
 7. Geographic spaces  ...................................................................................................................................................... 102
  7.1. Europe  ................................................................................................................................................................ 102
  7.2. The Mediterranean and the Near East  .............................................................................................. 106
  7.3. Latin America and the Caribbean  ......................................................................................................... 114
  7.4. The transatlantic relation  ......................................................................................................................... 119
  7.5. Sub-Saharan Africa  .......................................................................................................................................121
  7.6. Asia-Pacific  ......................................................................................................................................................123
 8. Instruments  .....................................................................................................................................................................127
  8.1. Marca España  ..................................................................................................................................................127
  8.2. Public diplomacy  ......................................................................................................................................... 128
  8.3. Diplomatic information and digital diplomacy  ............................................................................... 130 
  8.4. Parliamentary diplomacy  ..........................................................................................................................132
 9. The external policy system. Resources  ..............................................................................................................133
  9.1. Strategic Planning  .........................................................................................................................................133
  9.2. The Foreign Policy Council  ......................................................................................................................133
  9.3. Evaluation and democratic control of external action ................................................................134
  9.4. Human and material resources redeployed  .....................................................................................136
 10. One final reflection ....................................................................................................................................................139


9A necessary 
reflection
During the past four decades, since the adoption 
of the 1978 Constitution, Spain has projected itself 
towards the world with self-confidence and a clear 
purpose: to form part of an integrated Europe and 
to regain its place in the international community. 
This was a comprehensive strategy approach, one 
that permeated all our external action, among pu-
blic bodies, private entities and social and econo-
mic organisations. In short, it was a commitment 
by Spanish society as a whole to recover a place in 
Europe and in the world that was theirs by right, but 
for which they would have to work and persevere.
This strategy was unwritten, but ever-present and 
alive in hopes and expectations. Few collective 
ideals have so unanimously mobilised Spanish so-
ciety. Few inquired what the problem was, but there 
was overwhelming assent that Spain’s reincorpora-
tion into the international community was the solu-
tion. Ortega (author of The Revolt of the Masses) 
would have gazed in fascination at the spectacle of 
a self-assured Spain, its population advancing in uni-
son towards a common goal.
The goal was achieved. Spain re-joined the inter-
national community and soon became a country of 
reference in itself. It returned to Europe, and just 
fifteen years later, the idea of the European Union 
without Spain was inconceivable. It was reunited 
with Latin America, to create an Ibero-American 
community which has since flourished without 
stopping. The country looked out over the Atlantic 
and the Mediterranean, with new and fruitful plans. 
It began to look towards Asia and the Pacific, the 
world’s region destined to grow faster than any 
other. External action, in short, reflected the ambi-
tions and sweeping outlook of Spain’s transition to 
democracy.
The strategy of reincorporation and of integration 
then came to a halt, having run out of goals, all tar-
gets having been met. If we seek a landmark mo-
ment, one that marked both resounding success 
and the exhaustion of momentum, this may be 
when the euro arrived, and entered European and 
Spanish pockets simultaneously. Spain’s status as a 
founding member of the Economic and Monetary 
Union, the most important project since the Treaty 
of Rome, symbolised just how far the country had 
come. Mission accomplished. So now what?
A strategy is a universe of ideas and convictions, 
a general reference framework to guide decision 
making. When there is no strategy, there is a cons-
picuous absence of a common thread, there is no 
unifying criterion of behaviour, no balanced logic to 
the decisions taken on all kinds of issues.
Thus, the exhaustion of a model of external projec-
tion is in itself a compelling motive for considering 
how it should be replaced. But in the present case, 
there is another powerful argument in favour of de-
fining a new strategy: the global financial crisis hit 
Spain harder than other countries. Overcoming the 
crisis obliged it to lay the foundations for a diffe-
rent economic model; from one based on a swollen, 
force-fed domestic demand, we have begun to shift 
towards a model driven by foreign trade. This new 
paradigm calls for a stronger presence abroad, and 
for a broader range of actions to be undertaken by 
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all Spanish citizens – and there are many – who are 
active beyond our borders.
If domestic circumstances warrant the redefinition 
of external action, there are also external reasons 
for doing so as a matter of urgency. The strategy of 
integration and of re-joining the outside world has 
achieved its objectives at the very moment when 
the world is beginning to change, rapidly and pro-
foundly. All kinds of international actors – States, 
multinational corporations, international organisa-
tions and pressure groups, both global and regio-
nal – are being forced to conduct a major review of 
their roles, their ambitions and their possibilities in 
this newly emerging world. And Spain is doing so 
too.
Trends such as globalisation, changes in the balan-
ce of power, the growing international influence of 
social groups and of the individual, a multilateral 
system that must be reformed to provide the global 
governance demanded by new times, unpreceden-
ted interdependence… all highlight the need for a 
new model of international community. It is a world 
as yet lacking clear shape, still only vaguely defined. 
We are in a time of transition, from a system with 
two superpowers, followed by a brief interlude of 
single-State hegemony, to a multipolar world that 
may adopt one of many possible configurations, 
each with different consequences, and which has 
yet to materialise.
But as is always the case in transitions, the newly-
emerging world coexists, and will long continue to 
do so, where the traditional model of international 
relations in which the State was the predominant, 
indeed almost the sole, protagonist. Many dispu-
tes and conflicts cannot be properly understood 
without this understanding; others, as well as most 
of the present-day developments in international 
affairs, would be meaningless if not interpreted in 
the light of new trends. Transitions are always com-
plex, risky periods, and should be approached with 
a clear view of the values and interests at stake, 
within a general frame of reference, and conducting 
a strategic reflection.
Is the transition speeding up? Has it been tempora-
rily interrupted? Or diverted? We still do not know, 
due to an economic crisis without precedent since 
the Second World War. The Great Recession, the 
first major crisis of globalisation, has questioned 
the model of global governance constructed after 
the Second World War, and has raised major doubts 
about the viability of the current international mo-
FOREIGN POLICY AND   
STRATEGY FOR EXTERNAL 
ACTION
The Spanish External Action and Service Act 
defines external action as the ordered set 
of actions that constitutional bodies, public 
administrations, and their dependent agencies, 
organisations and institutions conduct 
abroad, in the exercise of their respective 
competencies, in accordance with the 
principles laid down in this Act and observing 
and complying with the guidelines, goals and 
objectives established by the Government 
in the exercise of its competence to direct 
external policy.
The present document, with its annexed 
specific actions, is an External Action Strategy 
in this sense. But as is inevitable in a text that 
is the first of its kind and hence programmatic, 
this Strategy presents Spain’s external policy, 
its priorities, convictions and objectives. To 
determine external policy, we must analyse 
reality, identify options and, in accordance with 
Spain’s principles and interests, decide which 
are best for the country in a complex, always 
uncertain international environment. We 
present this process in the Strategy document. 
Moreover, to determine external policy, we 
must define which bilateral relations are of 
priority concern and which are not, and which 
alliances are in Spain’s interest. It is only then 
that actions can be taken by diverse actors, 
both public and especially and increasingly, 
private, within the framework designed for 
this purpose.
Hence, the above Act defines external policy 
as the set of decisions and actions taken by 
the Government in its relations with other 
actors on the international scene, aimed at 
defining, promoting, developing and defending 
the values and interests of Spain abroad.
This Strategy for External Action, therefore, 
incorporates the foreign policy that inspired it.
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netary order. It has had a profound impact on Spain 
and it is now more necessary and urgent than ever 
to reshape our external positioning, to address a 
problem that the recession has made painfully clear: 
the need for a new economic model.
These internal and external circumstances are ac-
companied by a factor of enormous significance for 
Spain: the drawing up of the European Union. Spain 
is definitively part of a Union that in the next five 
years will be radically overhauled. This process has 
already begun, with developments such as the ban-
king union, fiscal union, economic union and ultima-
tely political union, and it cannot be ignored.
The need for a new strategy for external action, 
therefore, is self evident. However, it is no simple 
matter to define the starting point for such an am-
bitious project. In fact, the strategic redefinition of 
Spanish external policy has been under preparation 
for several years. What our external policy is trying 
to do, however, is formulate ideas on the subject in 
a single document, making Spain’s external action 
clearer in order to define it better and open it up to 
criticism, debate and review. That is the purpose of 
this paper.
The following pages describe, first, the history of 
the strategy implemented during and after the 
democratic transition. It analyses the main trends, 
both global and regional, that are shaping a new 
strategic environment, and considers the effects of 
the recession in Spain and throughout the world. 
As a result of these reflections, we recommend a 
thorough review of our strategic thinking. Our pro-
posals and principles in this respect introduce the 
second part of the paper.
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1.1. Spain’s return     
to world society
It is almost commonplace to say that the 1978 
Constitution marked a historic change in our in-
ternal institutions. But this was also the case, and 
perhaps more markedly so, in our foreign relations. 
For nearly forty years, Spain had been a political 
outsider in Europe. And this uniqueness, with res-
pect to foreign affairs, was devastating. It brought 
isolation and irrelevance. Proof of this can be ob-
tained by seeking a reference to Spain in the mo-
numental Memoirs, by Jean Monnet. The effort 
will be in vain, for Spain does not warrant a single 
mention.
In February 1962, the Foreign Minister, Fernando-
María Castiella, in an attempt to reverse this situa-
tion, wrote to Brussels requesting “an association 
that in due course would lead to full integration”. 
That same year, in the capital of Bavaria and on 
the initiative of the European Movement, a num-
ber of opponents to the Franco regime (some li-
ving in Spain and others in exile) met to proclaim 
the incompatibility of the political nature of the 
regime with European ideals. This episode, termed 
the “Munich conspiracy” by Madrid, showed that 
Europe’s doors would remain closed to Spain until 
it became a democratic country.
The Munich Congress concluded with the beauti-
ful and prophetic words of Salvador de Madariaga: 
"Those of us who once chose freedom at the price 
of our homeland, and those who chose homeland 
and lost their freedom, have come together to 
seek out the path that will lead us all to homeland 
and to freedom”.
Madariaga’s dream of homeland and freedom 
came to pass in 1975, after the death of Franco and 
an exemplary transition to democracy, under the 
stewardship of King Juan Carlos I. By an overwhel-
ming majority, the Spanish people ratified a Cons-
titution that created a framework of coexistence 
within which all Spaniards could find their place. 
Thanks to this Constitution, Spain ceased to be a 
bystander and became a major player on the world 
political scene. Thanks to this Constitution, Spain 
re-joined the world.
The return to normality began rapidly. The Gover-
nment led by Adolfo Suárez negotiated Spain’s 
entry to the Council of Europe five months before 
the first democratic elections were held, and just 
over a year later, in early 1979, negotiations began 
for Spain’s accession to the European Economic 
Community. In December 1981, Suarez’s successor, 
Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, presented Spain’s applica-
tion to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
In the general election of October 1982, the Spa-
nish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) won a historic 
victory. Prime Minister Felipe González concluded 
the negotiations that would produce Spain’s return 
to the European community on 1 January 1986, and 
in the same year, the Government called a referen-
dum to ratify the permanence of Spain in NATO. 
Thus, Spain was now part of European politics, the 
Europe of human rights, economic prosperity and 
security, on an equal standing with her European 
partners.
The normalisation of Spanish foreign policy did 
not end with the admission to international orga-
nisations that took place during this period. Other 
landmark developments included the new outlook 
towards Ibero-America, the Euro-Mediterranean 
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His Majesty the King Juan Carlos, in the presence 
of Antonio Hernandez Gil, President of the Cortes, 
signing the Spanish Constitution on the 27 
December 1978.
Partnership, or Barcelona Process, the new rela-
tionship with the USA, Spanish participation in UN 
peacekeeping missions, development cooperation, 
the expansion of our multinational corporations 
and the departure of students and executives to 
study or work abroad. These, and many more mi-
lestones, illustrate the success of Spanish foreign 
policy since the restoration of democracy.
This process of internationalisation, moreover, 
took place jointly with the development and es-
tablishment of the new territorial structure of the 
State, embodied in the constitutional model of the 
Autonomous Communities. These, too, have par-
ticipated in the normalisation of our foreign poli-
cy, transmitting to the international stage one of 
the assets that defines us, namely our diversity. In 
transmitting this reality, the Autonomous Commu-
nities have also had the chance to exercise their 
Constitutionally-sanctioned powers, carrying out 
foreign policy activities within the framework es-
tablished for this.
Under the Government led by Prime Minister José-
María Aznar, Spain joined the Economic and Mone-
tary Union at its outset. For the first time in many 
years, Spain arrived punctually for its appointment 
with history. In 1815, our presence at the Congress 
of Vienna was irrelevant. We were not among the 
49 founding states of the United Nations. We were 
left out of the Marshall Plan and of the European 
Organization for Economic Co-operation. We had 
no voice in the creation of the Atlantic Alliance or 
of the Council of Europe. We were unable to enter 
the European Coal and Steel Community, the em-
bryo of what is now the European Union. Neither 
were we present at the launch of the European 
Economic Community. Our status as a founding 
member country of the euro breaks that long-
standing curse of absence and isolation.
In an apparent paradox, just when Spain came into 
step with its peers, and was considered an inse-
parable element of the European scene, there oc-
curred what the Elcano Royal Institute, a Spanish 
think tank, has described as “the relative exhaus-
tion, from its own success, of the Spanish foreign 
policy that had been developed since the Transi-
tion. This strategy (one that was never codified 
but was nonetheless relatively clear and implicitly 
agreed upon) sought Spain’s full integration into 
Europe and the world. But once these goals had 
been achieved – and this had unarguably taken pla-
ce by the turn of the century – the policy direction 
was left with no clear strategic points of referen-
ce”.
1. ESPAÑA DESDE LA CONSTITUCIÓN HASTA NUESTROS DÍAS
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The consequence of this story is clear: we need a 
strategy, to be defined and agreed upon by all our 
political forces. Only thus will Spain be able to de-
fend the principles and values that we share with 
the other Western nations: respect for human dig-
nity, freedom, democracy and the rule of law. As 
Rousseau said in The Social Contract, “… the more 
grave and important the questions discussed, the 
nearer should the opinion that is to prevail ap-
proach unanimity”. Foreign policy discussions al-
most always meet these two conditions – they are 
almost always “grave and important” – because it 
is our security, and our interests which are at stake.
Thus, in defining the strategy to be applied, we 
must involve all the stakeholders with a significant 
role to play in the defence and international pro-
jection of Spain’s values and interests. This inclu-
des, primarily, the Government – which is respon-
sible for directing the country’s foreign policy – but 
also Parliament, the Autonomous Communities 
(self-governing regions), local government, diver-
se organisations within civil society and, of course, 
the population as a whole. A discussion is neces-
sary and party positions, in all sectors of the poli-
tical spectrum, must sometimes be sacrificed. The 
effort will be worth it if the outcome is strategic 
coherence in Spain’s external action.
A consensus regarding the broad lines of action to 
be taken in the medium and long term will genera-
te the other two basic qualities of an external poli-
cy: it should be both stable and predictable. Spain 
is a major player in the international community. It 
has numerous partners and allies. This status can 
only be reinforced and enhanced if our policy in-
corporates these three elements: consensus, sta-
bility and predictability.
1.2. Spain and the     
Great Recession
The economic crisis that has swept the world in 
recent years – and which we discuss in greater de-
tail below – has affected Spain more severely than 
other countries, due to the impact of three singu-
lar problems: massive borrowing by households 
and non-financial businesses, an enormous real es-
tate bubble and a significant loss of competitive-
ness, caused by unit labour costs that were higher 
than those of our competitors.
The crisis hit virtually every country in the world, 
but the additional effect of these three singula-
rities meant that in Spain GDP and employment 
fell harder, public finances deteriorated faster 
and the Spanish financial system ran into serious 
trouble.
To address the situation, a programme was laun-
ched based on three lines of action: fiscal consoli-
dation, reorganisation of the financial system and 
the implementation of structural reforms to regain 
lost competitiveness. Three years later, the Spa-
nish economy is recovering, productivity and com-
petitiveness are rising and the balance of public 
accounts is improving.
In the external sector – the area of the economy 
that is most relevant to our study – it can be seen 
that exports of goods and services in 2013 accou-
nted for 34.1% of GDP – 10 points higher than in 
2003 – a figure exceeding that reported by bench-
mark countries such as Italy (30.4%), the UK (29%) 
and France (27.2%). Spanish companies are now in 
a much stronger position in global markets than in 
the pre-crisis years.
One result of the reorganisation of the Spanish 
economy, and a very important one, is the returning 
confidence among analysts, investors and interna-
tional markets. The foreign capital that fled during 
the worst moments of the crisis is now returning, 
the rates of interest we must pay in public and pri-
vate debt markets are now much lower, which is a 
sign of our renewed solvency and wealth-genera-
ting capacity. In short, first the danger of collapse 
was averted, and now we are emerging from the 
recession.
Much remains to be done, of course, and the cou-
ntry is slowly recovering. The main economic indi-
cator, unemployment, remains extremely high, and 
the scars left by the crisis are still deep and visible 
in our social fabric.
The most important aspect of this account, the 
fact spurring us to consider a new strategy for 
external action, is that the crisis has highlighted 
the fragility of a model relying excessively on the 
property sector and on borrowing as a driver of 
consumption and investment. Spain is changing its 
economic model, but this model will only become 
solidly established with a greater internationalisa-
tion of the Spanish economy and its society.
And to change our economic model, we must bring 
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into effect a strategic renewal of our foreign policy, 
because only thus can we stand on the internatio-
nal stage and present a country with an image and 
a project that are attractive and solid and inspire 
confidence. It is rightly said that a good foreign 
policy must be based on sound domestic manage-
ment; but in our case, in Spain’s current situation, 
a domestic management that creates jobs, welfare 
and social trust can only be consolidated by resolu-
tely looking abroad, beyond our frontiers.
1.3. Spain today, a well-  
defined international  
identity: strengths and 
weaknesses
To define an external policy strategy, we must be 
aware of our own history and be coherent with 
our national project and Spain’s real weight in the 
world. The starting point of this endeavour is to 
define our international identity, that of a country 
as ancient as international society itself. On that 
basis, we can determine our real possibilities, opt 
for the scenarios that are most favourable to our 
interests and avoid those which are less favoura-
ble.
Undeniably, Spain is experiencing difficulties, due 
to an economic crisis that originated a long time 
ago. However, contemporary Spain is also the re-
sult of a collective process that has enabled us to 
enjoy the longest period of political stability and 
economic prosperity in our history. To further con-
solidate this process, we must pause and identify 
our strengths and weaknesses. Awareness of the-
se strengths and weaknesses will determine how 
we may define a realistic, consistent strategy for 
external action.
Weaknesses
Demographic weakness
Spain ranks at number 28, in terms of population, 
among the 193 countries that compose the United 
Nations. The problem, and one that is very serious, 
is that we are one of the oldest countries in Euro-
pe, resulting from the combination of two factors: 
one is an undeniable sign of progress that is na-
mely a life expectancy rate that is among the hig-
hest in the world, but which has no straightforward 
solution. The second is the fact that we have one 
of the lowest fertility rates in the world.
If current rates continue, Spain will lose around 2.6 
million inhabitants within the next ten years, the 
number of deaths will outnumber births by 2017 
and, more significantly, people aged over 65 years 
will account for 30% of the total population by 
2050 (compared to 11.8% in the EU).
These figures show quite clearly that, regardless 
of the active policies that should be implemented 
to raise the birth rate, Spain must open itself to 
the outside world and manage migration flows 
more effectively. This new approach should take 
into account factors such as the needs of the la-
bour market and the country’s ability to integrate 
newcomers with dignity and respect. In the long 
run, immigration will play a key role in maintaining 
the welfare state. Therefore, it must be planned, 
thought through and be consistent with our needs, 
not only in numbers but also in skills. This is the 
way in which we shall achieve the best possible 
outcome for Spain, as the host country, and for the 
persons who legitimately seek a new life.
Immigration policy should be structured in accor-
dance with four principles: (1) organise legal im-
migration more efficiently and effectively and pro-
mote well-managed mobility; (2) at the same time, 
take action to prevent irregular immigration, reso-
lutely combating the mafias who trade in human 
beings; (3) cooperate with the economies of emi-
grants’ countries of origin, to raise living standards 
and thus make it more attractive for migrants to 
remain in their countries of origin; (4) integrate mi-
grants in such a way that they retain their dignity, 
thus facilitating social cohesion.
One of the few certainties regarding immigration 
is that the management of migration flows is so-
mething that exceeds the capacities of the nation 
state and requires a Europe-wide response, ad-
dressing the countries of origin, transit and des-
tination. Only through international collaboration 
can immigration be managed coherently and con-
sistently in the era of globalisation.
Natural resources
Spain has few natural resources, especially with 
regards to water and energy. Water resources are 
irregularly distributed in space and time and are 
highly vulnerable to climate change, which may 
produce the desertification of much of the terri-
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tory. To address this weakness, Spain has develo-
ped an ambitious water management policy and 
has strengthened cooperation in this respect with 
Portugal.
The geographic position and peninsular nature of 
the country, with almost 8,000 km of coastline 
bathed by the waters of various seas and oceans, 
is both a comparative advantage and a weak-
ness, due to the fragility of these resources and 
the threat posed by climate change (for example, 
through rising sea levels or acidification) to a coas-
tal and marine environment of priceless strategic 
value. 
On the other hand, Spain has a wealth of natural 
resources linked to biodiversity, especially in com-
parison with other European countries.
Spain has insufficient energy resources, and 70.8% 
of the energy consumed is obtained from abroad, 
a level of energy dependence well above the EU 
average.
If Europe wishes to adopt a comprehensive ener-
gy policy, Spain, which is connected to Algeria by 
two under-used gas pipelines and which has seven 
gasification plants – more than the rest of Euro-
pe combined –, could in the near future become a 
platform from which gas could be exported to the 
rest of the EU.
If electricity generated by solar, thermal and wind 
power stations in North Africa were transported 
across Spain, this would also help assure Europe’s 
energy needs, and at the same time contribute to 
the economic development of the supplier coun-
tries, thus protecting their political stability. The 
existing electricity interconnections with Europe, 
and a new one with North Africa, are essential for 
such a project to be successful.
External presence 
Spain has a very significant economic presence 
abroad and this has grown exponentially in the last 
two decades. Spanish exports have risen sharply, 
accounting for nearly 35% of GDP in 2013, and the 
number of exporting firms has also grown consi-
derably.
However, this strong internationalisation of the 
Spanish economy has some weaknesses, such as 
the concentration of exports among a relatively 
small number of companies. Very few SMEs are 
exporters, although their numbers are rising. The 
geographic diversification of exports is improving, 
but still insufficiently, and their technological con-
tent remains unacceptably low, despite evident 
progress in this respect.
Direct investment abroad has also increased dra-
matically, and Spain is now among the 15 leading 
countries in this field.
From another standpoint, Spanish investments – es-
pecially in Latin America – are concentrated in key 
strategic sectors, such as energy or in sectors that 
provide essential services to consumers, such as fi-
nancial services or the supply of water and energy.
Strengths
Having taken note of our weaknesses, let us not 
forget Spain’s strengths, which are many and solid. 
Strategic position
Spain occupies a strategic position, between two 
oceans and facing two continents. This, together 
with its history, makes it a natural gateway to Eu-
rope and to Africa and Latin America. This cha-
racteristic has contributed substantially to the 
fact that the European Union has signed agree-
ments with a number of countries of particular 
importance to Spain. Thus, Association Agree-
ments have been concluded with various Latin 
American countries, including Chile, Mexico, and 
Ecuador, trade agreements have been signed 
with Peru and Colombia, and other Association 
Agreements have been entered into with the 
countries of the Southern Neighbourhood – Mo-
rocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon 
and Israel – and all of these open up new possibi-
lities for Spain.
Future agreements of this nature with the United 
States and the Mercosur countries will further 
strengthen these possibilities. Spanish policy 
should be aimed at enhancing our relations with 
these countries and at eliminating the obstacles 
and barriers that impede access by our multina-
tional companies. 
Advanced democracy
One of our greatest assets is our political system, 
based on respect for the dignity of human beings, 
their basic rights and the rule of law. In short, we 
have an advanced democracy, in which these prin-
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ciples and values inspire our external action and in 
which our citizens actively participate in creating 
the expression of Spanish intentions abroad. This 
ability to fashion a foreign policy resting upon a 
broad social consensus is another asset provided 
by our constitutional system.
Moreover, Spain is a diverse country, being com-
posed of various communities with their own 
very distinct identities. All have their place within 
a constitutional framework that is very mindful 
of these differences and guarantees the rights 
and obligations of citizens without discrimination. 
The Spanish experience shows that coexistence is 
always possible when there is a collective will to 
make it happen, within the legal and political sys-
tem that we have jointly created.
Open and diversified economy 
Spain is the fourth largest economy in the Euro-
zone, the fifth in the European Union and the thir-
An image of the port of Valencia, the first in the 
Mediterranean in terms of volume of merchandise.
teenth in the world. Spain is the world’s seventh 
largest exporter of services, the eleventh largest 
investor and the eleventh largest recipient of fore-
ign investment. Spain is the second largest country 
as regards tourism revenue and the first destina-
tion for tourists in Europe. We are, therefore, one 
of the most open economies in the world and huge 
efforts are being made to improve this position still 
further. The Unity of Market Guarantee Act, the 
identification of rules and regulations that are an 
obstacle to business, and administrative simplifica-
tion are all important steps in this direction. 
The Spanish market is composed of 46 million do-
mestic consumers, and 61 million foreign visitors 
(with middle-high income levels) are welcomed 
every year.
Infrastructure
Spain is among the ten countries with the highest 
quality infrastructure, according to the Global 
Competitiveness Report of the World Economic 
Forum, and has the second largest high-speed 
rail network, with a large fleet of technologically-
advanced trains; it has an extensive network of 
18
highways, and its ports are among the most highly 
rated in Europe. The hydraulic infrastructure is 
high quality and well maintained. Spain is the third 
country in the continent in terms of air passenger 
traffic and sixth in the world. Spain, moreover, is a 
world leader in renewable energies.
Spanish culture, language and linguistic diversity 
Spain’s culture is one of its most widely-recogni-
sed strengths worldwide. This culture is manifest 
not only through quantifiable data, such as the fact 
that Spain is the second country in the world in 
terms of the number of world heritage sites within 
its borders, or the importance of cultural output 
in its GDP, especially in the field of publishing, but 
also through its powerful, unique identity. Further-
more, Spanish is the second most widely spoken 
language in the world, the world of business and 
in social networks. Today, Spanish is spoken as a 
first language by 37 million citizens in the United 
States. 
Together with Castilian Spanish, our other lan-
guages enrich us with a rich linguistic and cultural 
Spain demonstrates world leadership in the 
area of renewable energies. In the image, the 
thermoelectric plant in Solana (United States), the 
largest solar plant in the world which was installed 
by the multinational Spanish company Abengoa.
CUTTING-EDGE    
MULTINATIONALS
Spanish companies compete in mature 
markets and in technologically advanced 
sectors such as infrastructure, high speed 
trains and renewable energy. 
The largest construction company in the West 
is Spanish, as are the two leading companies 
in transport infrastructure management. Five 
Spanish companies control about 40% of the 
world’s major transport concessions.
A third of the world air traffic is managed with 
Spanish technology.
In renewable energy, the market leader 
is Spanish; this is also the case in water 
treatment, where Spain is at the forefront of 
desalination.
The “best bank in the world” 
(according to Euromoney) is Spanish. In 
telecommunications, we are number one in 
Europe. In biotechnology, the leading producer 
of plasma is a Spanish company, and another 
was the first to develop marine-based drugs 
for cancer treatment. And similar examples 
can be found in many other sectors.
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potential, a multiple identity that defines us and is 
part of our strength and capacity to present our-
selves to others. 
The aforementioned strengths and weaknesses 
define an actor with a very distinct personality 
and identity. As has been the case for centuries, 
we have the potential to occupy our rightful place 
in the emerging international community: that of 
a great, ancient nation, which will adapt, as it has 
done so often before, to the challenges of the fu-
ture.
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The traditional pillars of Spanish foreign policy 
have stood for centuries, but they must now face 
a radically-changing world, in which globalisation, 
changes in the balance of power and the crisis of 
multilateralism call for adequate responses to be 
made.
Changes are occurring at a dizzying speed, partly 
due to rapid advances in technologies. Fidel Castro 
needed three years to take his revolution from the 
Sierra Maestra to Havana, but when a street seller 
in Sidi Bou Said (Tunisia) set himself alight in a dra-
matic act of protest and despair about the future, 
it took just two days for the flame of revolt to race 
across North Africa and the Middle East. 
The speed of change is clearly perceptible: in ni-
neteenth century Britain, per capita income dou-
bled in 155 years; in the twentieth century, this was 
achieved by Germany and the United States in 60 
years. In the twenty-first century, it will be achie-
ved by China and India in only ten years.
2.1. The consequences  
of globalisation
Economic consequences
The world began to change when the economies 
devastated by the Second World War began to rise 
from the ashes in a process of internationalisation 
that marked a new era. The globalisation we are 
experiencing is a revolutionary phenomenon, and 
one that is very different from the two earlier pro-
cesses of internationalisation, namely the disco-
very of America and the Industrial Revolution.
The first globalisation was driven by the compass, 
by caravels and galleons and by the printing press, 
and gave rise to a system of exchanges between 
continents that hitherto had been unaware of each 
other. This historic feat was concluded in about se-
venty years, from the discovery of America (1492), 
via the arrival in India of Vasco da Gama (1498), the 
discovery of the “Southern Sea” by Nuñez de Bal-
boa (1513), the circumnavigation of the world by 
Magellanes and Elcano (1522) and the first Manila 
Galleon (1565) connecting the Philippines to New 
Spain.
The exchanges that took place in this first inter-
nationalisation were human ones, involving the 
transfer of large numbers of people from Euro-
pe to America, Africa and Asia, from Africa to 
America and from America to Asia. Many of them 
were forced removals, in the course of the bar-
baric slave trade from Africa to Asia or America. 
In addition, there were economic exchanges, with 
the multiplication of transcontinental trade rou-
tes, such as the routes to the Indies, the triangular 
trade between Europe, Africa and America, and 
the Acapulco route (or Manila Galleon, or Nao de 
China, route). And finally, there were cultural (in a 
broad sense) exchanges between the continents, 
of food, medicinal remedies, raw materials, lan-
guages, techniques, beliefs and artistic expres-
sions.
Midway through the nineteenth century, the se-
cond technological revolution took place, provo-
king another wave of economic internationalisa-
tion. The steam engine, the railroad, the telegraph, 
and new navigation techniques brought about 
greatly increased wealth among European cou-
ntries, which enabled them to conquer markets 
abroad and thus profit from sharply rising levels 
of production. Capitalist societies expanded and 
2. The globalised world
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became more powerful. The liberal states took it 
as their fundamental mission to protect proper-
ty, ensure economic stability and conquer foreign 
markets. The gold standard promoted internatio-
nal trade by eliminating exchange rate risks and 
reducing speculative activity that was not justified 
by the real economy. However, Spain did not take 
part in this revolution. Some industries were esta-
blished and transport systems improved, but the 
country remained largely agrarian.
Today’s globalisation, driven by new information 
and communication technologies, should not be 
confused with the above processes. Globalisation 
in the twenty-first century is not simply an expo-
nential increase in the trade of goods and services, 
nor is it merely a sharp increase in capital flows. In 
fact, both of these phenomena had already been 
observed, to a considerable extent, in the years im-
mediately preceding the First World War.
What characterises the current episode of glo-
balisation, above all else, is the role being played 
by multinational groups, which are able to relo-
cate their production of goods and services, and 
to fragment the value chain, by just a click of the 
computer mouse. A single mouse click has the 
potential to raise up or to bring down countries. 
Some multinational corporations are more power-
ful than many nominally-sovereign nation-states: 
of the 150 largest economic entities in the world, 
87 are multinational companies, and only 63 are 
countries. Giant corporations can negotiate, often 
as equals, with countries that want to attract or re-
tain them – and their enormous investments and 
labour requirements.
Globalisation has also revealed the ability of emer-
ging countries to occupy ever-larger areas of the 
international economy, and to rapidly climb the 
value added chain. Until very recently, production 
was limited to the bottom of that chain. Today, 
countries like China and India are leaders in high-
tech industries and they are increasingly competi-
tive in the services sector. This is a radical change 
of scenario.
One reason for the success of emerging countries 
is their ability to attract the foreign direct inves-
tment that has traditionally been directed towards 
the developed countries. The emerging world has 
much higher levels of growth than is the case in 
Europe, and capital, by its very nature, flows to 
where profitability is greatest.
NEW FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS
In July 2014, following several years of 
preparation, the Sixth BRICS Summit, 
attended by Brazil, China, India, Russia 
and South Africa, issued the Fortaleza 
Declaration, which announced the creation 
of two financial institutions: the New 
Development Bank and the Contingency 
Reserve Agreement. The first of these 
would be dedicated to funding sustainable 
development projects and infrastructure 
in emerging and developing countries. The 
second would assist countries with liquidity 
and short-term financing problems. The 
parallel with the Bretton Woods institutions 
is quite clear. The Declaration stated that the 
aim of both institutions was to complement 
the instruments available in the existing 
international framework. 
The reasons for creating these two financial 
institutions were related to dissatisfaction 
with the absence of substantive reforms 
in international financial institutions to 
properly reflect the weight of the BRICS 
countries in international relations. This is a 
legitimate concern, to which an appropriate 
response would be to initiate negotiations 
and to consider a reform of the multilateral 
framework. However, it is a principle of all 
multilateral negotiation that none of the 
participants can achieve all of their goals in 
full.
Spain’s position is that the existing 
multilateral framework, with the United 
Nations at its head, has been of enormous 
service to humanity since its inception 
following World War II. It is undeniable, 
however, that this framework no longer 
reflects the realities of the emerging world, 
in terms of the relative influences of States 
or of the UN’s capacity to address certain 
global issues that were not even imagined 
in 1945. The right path to take, therefore, 
is to reform the existing framework and to 
establish within it legitimate and effective 
mechanisms of global governance. This will 
be the aim of our external policy.
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international decisions. These factors all generate 
confidence and establish a reputation. Any strate-
gy that seeks to provide answers to the complex 
world in which we live must take into account the 
importance of generating confidence.
Social and cultural consequences
Although the globalised economy is a game-chan-
ging factor, the most far-reaching impact of globa-
lisation will arise from its social, cultural and ulti-
mately, political aspects. 
For example, globalisation has transformed glo-
bal migration patterns. In the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, migratory flows took place 
from Europe towards countries whose economic 
development was beginning to take off (Canada, 
United States, Argentina, Australia, etc.), whe-
re there were great expanses and limitless natu-
ral resources. Countries, in short, where almost 
everything was yet to be done. Questions such as 
immigration control or the integration of newco-
mers simply did not arise at that time.
In the years following World War II, people emi-
grated in search of better lives for themselves and 
their families, and brought their human dramas 
with them. Immigration contributes diversity and 
dynamism to aging populations, but at the same 
time it presents a huge challenge of integration. 
The fight against people smuggling, the proper 
channelling of legal migration and, above all, the 
integration of immigrants within the host commu-
nity are the challenges we must now resolve. But 
these challenges cannot be overcome by any cou-
ntry acting alone.
A second important consideration is that globalisa-
tion has made terrorism a worldwide threat. Until 
11 September 2001, terrorism was a predominantly 
local phenomenon, one that in Spain we knew very 
well, one that threatened specific countries and 
societies. In a world where borders are increasin-
gly diaphanous, international terrorism, from many 
directions, has become an acute threat to interna-
tional security. Global terrorism can only be fought 
by the combined action of the entire international 
community. Similar considerations apply to issues 
such as organised crime, drug trafficking and, more 
recently, cyber crime. These phenomena can no 
longer be addressed within an exclusively national 
framework and international cooperation is essen-
tial.
Clearly, the competitive advantages that have at-
tracted capital are disappearing little by little, in 
accordance with market logic; inevitably, the heat 
of rising profits causes wage bills to swell. The 
emerging middle classes call for the State to provi-
de services, and so taxes must rise. Newly-present 
environmental concerns also contribute to rising 
costs in the emerging countries. In consequence, 
the competitive advantages that made an initial di-
fference will probably begin to decline. However, 
this does not mean that geopolitical consequen-
ces will take place at the same rate. The emerging 
world has arrived, and is here to stay. Its influence 
in international relations will grow, unstoppably.
We see, in short, that globalisation has led to a sce-
nario in which the financial economy is playing a 
very prominent role. In 2010, the value of transac-
tions in foreign exchange markets was sixty-two 
times greater than that of international trade. The 
assets and mechanisms of the financial economy 
obey very different rules and incentives from those 
of the real economy. By their very nature, asset pri-
ces change much more quickly; they rise and fall, 
swiftly and forcefully. The value of housing fluc-
tuates in accordance with factors that vary slowly 
over time: demographics, the prevailing economic 
situation, social perceptions of the location, etc. A 
stock-exchange listed product, composed of se-
curities representing mortgages on such housing, 
which are traded in real time, depends on instanta-
neous supply and demand, which are determined 
by criteria such as interest rates or the value of 
alternative assets (stocks, public debt, commer-
cial bonds, etc.) and have little relation, apparently, 
with the actual value of the housing (the real eco-
nomy) that generated the securities in question 
(financial economics). And if we contemplate the 
derivatives based on this listed product, options 
and futures, we enter a new dimension that is in-
creasingly removed from the real economy. Volati-
lity – to put it simply, the price variation of an asset 
over time – becomes established and hence risk 
and uncertainty are increased.
In defining a foreign policy, the most significant as-
pect is that perceptions are much more important 
in financial economics than in the real economy. In 
the first case, the situation can change in a mat-
ter of hours, for better or for worse, depending on 
the capability to inspire confidence. And the latter 
will only be present when policies and behaviour 
are predictable and reliable; when the economy 
is integrated into the international community 
resolutely and effectively; when we participate in 
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radical sense of the word. Anthropology studies 
have shown that communication among humans 
can only take place within the framework of a cer-
tain shared cultural arrangement. Globalisation is 
providing such arrangements to billions of people, 
faster than ever before. And in the face of what 
would seem a clear situation of mankind redisco-
vering itself, a cause for celebration and satisfac-
tion, contrary reactions arise, invoking an alleged 
fear of the dissolution of national cultures, and 
becoming ever more strident and, indeed, viru-
lent. The most disturbing part of this situation, 
which is the object of observation and concern 
in our foreign policy, is that these invocations of 
special identity are encouraging the violent ex-
tremist movements that are proliferating in many 
parts of the world.
For many, the future of globalisation rests upon an 
intelligent regulation of the markets, aimed at pre-
venting another Great Recession, a calamity that 
could deal a lethal blow to the ideal of a globali-
sed society. But perhaps the real contest is being 
waged in the field of culture, in a broad sense, to 
determine whether mankind’s potential to join 
together, “irrespective of race, creed or bounda-
ries” will prosper or be truncated. And this time 
the outcome must be a tangible reality, and not 
the rhetorical meaning usually given to this invo-
cation.
Institutional consequences
Globalisation has provoked changes in the global 
scenario that require a complete remodelling of 
the institutions created when the Second World 
War came to an end, and which are now obsolete. 
Changes in the economic structure, as a result of 
globalisation, will require substantive changes in 
our monetary order, in our system of global trade 
and in the concept of development itself.
The new monetary order: The Jamaica Agree-
ment (1973) replaced the fixed exchange system 
with a floating system supervised by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. The instability of exchange 
rates and the volatility of capital flows in certain 
historical periods represent important challenges 
for the future. The G20 and the IMF are expected 
to monitor exchange rates more closely and to 
promote greater international cooperation in the 
management of the International Monetary Sys-
tem.
Third, let us consider climate change, which is pro-
bably the paradigm of a global problem that can 
only be tackled by means of global solutions. The 
emission of greenhouse gases may have a very 
specific territorial origin, but they subsequently 
extend throughout the atmosphere. And the glo-
bal warming these gases bring about affects all 
regions of the globe, although some will be hit 
harder, or at least faster. There are cases in game 
theory in which the only possible solution is one 
achieved through cooperation, and this is a prime 
example of such a case. Here, we all win or we all 
lose. The same is true regarding the management 
of shared assets such as air, water, fish stocks and 
many, many others.
Fourth, the panic unleashed worldwide by global 
pandemics such as swine flu or AIDS shows that 
disease, too, is a globalising force. Obviously, we 
must seek to prevent the further extension of 
Ebola, but even more obviously, it must be fought 
where it has emerged. Here, too, either we are all 
winners or we are all losers. 
Finally, a particularly complex outcome of globa-
lisation is the perception that a uniform cultural 
context is expanding, bringing about impositions 
from abroad regarding criteria ranging from the 
seemingly innocuous, such as what is acceptable 
dress, to crucial issues such as the model of family 
we wish for our society or the relationship bet-
ween individual and group interests.
Sometimes, a contrary reaction to what is consi-
dered a foreign imposition is sincere and repre-
sents a defence of what is claimed to be one’s 
own identity. On other occasions, the reaction is a 
mere excuse to perpetuate models of domination 
by a caste, a social class or a sector of society that 
considers its secular power to be threatened by 
“modern times”. The exclusion of girls from edu-
cation, or the continuing existence of forced ma-
rriages, is not “a sign of ancestral and traditional 
identity”. This claim is as absurd as the invocation 
of “the natural right of the master over the slave” 
in the southern United States in the nineteenth 
century.
It is precisely in this respect that we find one of 
the most fascinating and paradoxical phenomena 
of globalisation. It provides every human being 
with the opportunity, unprecedented in history, 
to relate directly with his or her peers, wherever 
they may be in the world. Never before has man-
kind had the opportunity to be “one”, in the most 
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take generations to take effect, especially as re-
gards its social and cultural repercussions.
Spain is an active member of the European Union, 
and can act as a gateway to Africa and a bridge to 
Latin America. Spain enjoys good relations with 
some countries that have substantial differences 
with certain key Western countries, and therefore 
might play a bridging role, enabling parties to ap-
proach and meet. This could greatly help to reduce 
the international tension that is often produced by 
these differences. 
A strategic reflection of our external projection 
should incorporate these considerations – Spain’s 
open society, her strategic position and ability to 
facilitate understandings – and examine their po-
tential.
2.2. From a unipolar world 
to a multipolar one
Economic phenomena, especially if they are as lar-
ge and far-reaching as those discussed above, will 
sooner or later bring about political change. The 
globalisation we are experiencing has enhanced 
the political power, both regional and global, of a 
number of countries that are large both in size and 
in population. Beyond a doubt, the former unipo-
lar world has become a multipolar one.
The disappearance of the Soviet bloc led some 
to believe that the fall of the Berlin Wall was the 
prelude to a new order, composed of a single he-
gemonic superpower. There was talk of the end 
of history. It was believed that “Pax Americana” 
would open a new era in international relations. 
International conferences were held on a variety 
of topics, including the Rio Summit on Climate 
Change (1992), the Copenhagen Summit for So-
cial Development (1995), the Beijing Conference 
on Women (1995) and the New York Summit on 
the Millennium Development Goals (2000). We 
were thought to be on the verge of creating a 
new League of Nations, capable of generating the 
acceptance of human rights among all mankind.
The attack on the World Trade Centre (2001) 
and subsequent events such as the intervention 
in Afghanistan (2001) and then the invasion of 
Iraq (2003) swept away these illusions. A single 
The new trade system: The expansion of world 
trade in recent years is largely the outcome of the 
liberalisation of economies and the opening up 
of borders. Free trade has long been advocated 
by theoreticians, according to whom exchanges 
should be determined by costs and relative prices. 
When protectionist practices such as dumping 
(social, fiscal or environmental) are adopted, when 
discriminatory policies are urged – “Buy what is 
made in your own country” – or when the rights 
of industrial property are ignored, then free trade 
ceases to function.
Recent news has aroused mixed feelings. On the 
one hand, the World Trade Organization was una-
ble to conclude the Doha round, and we are wit-
nessing a fragmentation of the world into trading 
blocs. But in contrast, there has been a prolifera-
tion of free trade agreements, and it is quite pos-
sible that the EU and the United States will soon 
conclude the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership agreement. This is of enormous im-
portance for Spain, not only because of the impor-
tance of the USA in our trade relations, but also 
because it may advance negotiations on the EU-
MERCOSUR agreement.
Only a return to good practices will assure the ex-
pansion of trade, which is one of the most impor-
tant levers for growth and the welfare of nations. 
Socially and environmentally sustainable economic 
development: Currently, few will dispute that when 
inequality increases, within and between countries, 
their long-term stability is threatened.
And few will dispute, either, that global warming is 
to a very significant extent the result of human ac-
tivity and therefore may be reversed if appropriate 
policies are adopted. 
Reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, comba-
ting biodiversity loss, reviewing systems of energy 
supply and use, agreeing the joint management 
of shared water resources or fishing stocks, and 
achieving a global pact among industrialised and 
emerging countries are fundamental obligations 
that we owe to the world to come.
Spain and globalisation
Spain is an open society, which places it in an exce-
llent position to deal with the momentous impact 
of globalisation, the full potential of which could 
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the emergence of new powers – and the parallel 
relative decline of the old ones – it is historically 
unprecedented.
At the origin of this new status of individuals and 
diverse social groups are technological advances 
and the dramatic fall in the economic cost of sen-
ding and receiving information. Today, a person 
can influence the political process and social per-
ceptions simply by posting an image on global net-
works. What until just two decades ago required 
huge, complex and costly advertising campaigns, 
which only large States and a few transnational 
corporations could afford, can now be done with 
a device connected to the Internet. This ability to 
influence, and to change perceptions, is multiplied 
in social networking sites, creating a form of or-
ganisation that lies beyond traditional structures 
such as borders and States.
power, however powerful, cannot by itself sha-
pe the destiny of the world. The proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, terrorist threats, and the tur-
bulent processes of transition convulsing many 
countries, among many other challenges to peace 
and security, proved once and for all that the po-
les of instability are not static, or limited to any 
given geographic location. They have direct con-
sequences for the safety of us all, however dis-
tant we may be.
Global changes have continued unceasingly during 
the transition to multipolarity. The second pheno-
menon underlying the remodelling of our world 
is derived from another singular fact: that power 
and influence are changing hands, and with every 
day that passes, non-State actors acquire a grea-
ter capacity to influence the international situa-
tion. This phenomenon, which has been called the 
diffusion of power, is completely new, and unlike 
THINKING IN TIMES OF CRISIS
When a crisis occurs, one that is profound and 
painfully long-lasting, it makes us reconsider 
beliefs that had previously been held as 
unshakable truths, and reassess prospects 
that had previously been taken for granted. In 
other words, a crisis makes us think, it invites 
reflection. Nothing disquiets us so much as 
absolute uncertainty about our future. 
The  outcome of effective reflection is a call to 
action, to reform, to change whatever it is that 
the crisis is telling us, loud and clear, that which 
is no longer valid or no longer works. In other 
words, “Never let a good crisis go to waste”. 
Spain seems to have followed this advice; the 
crisis that began in 2007 spurred us to engage 
in high-quality reflection, and the conclusions 
reached should be considered and discussed. 
As the fruit of these debates and discussions, 
let us highlight two Spanish projects and a 
European initiative. 
The Elcano Royal Institute report "Towards 
a strategic renewal of Spanish external 
policy” was published in December 2013. 
Commissioned by the Foreign Ministry, this 
Report contained much profound thinking, 
offered by contributors of intellectual renown, 
and its ideas underlie many of those set out in 
the present document. 
The PwC Spain report, “Spain in the world of 
2033. Four scenarios calling for  immediate 
action”, which appeared in April 2014, was 
prepared by the ESADE Business School 
under the direction of Javier Solana. This 
text provides an excellent introduction to 
global strategic thinking, describing how 
it may impact on reality in our country and 
offering recommendations for the future. 
It hypothesises four possible scenarios 
for the world of 2033, identifies the one it 
considers most likely and on this basis makes 
recommendations to the Government, to 
business and to Spanish society. 
vESPAS (European Strategy and Policy Analysis 
System) is a gigantic project by the European 
Union, to which over 1,500 people have 
contributed. Its purpose is to  reflect on what 
kind of world we will live in in 2030, and on the 
position of the European Union in particular. 
Its recommendations were presented to the 
new President of the European Council, to the 
new Commission and to the new Parliament. 
The Spanish think tank FRIDE participated 
significantly in this project, which has given rise 
to three main reports (geopolitical, economic 
and social trends), each providing invaluable 
insights.
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The outcome is that although the world is beco-
ming increasingly multipolar, it has not yet obtai-
ned multilateral governance mechanisms capable 
of managing this new reality, that might transform 
zero-sum policies seeking power and influence into 
win-win systems based on collaboration and joint 
satisfaction.
Geopolitical changes have been accompanied by so-
cial ones, with global repercussions, which also con-
tribute to shaping the new international community. 
Of these, demographic trends are the most signifi-
cant, but we should also consider processes such as 
the rising middle class presence in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America, and increasing urbanisation. These 
are positive developments that improve the lives of 
millions of human beings, but at the same time they 
exert great pressure on scarce basic resources such 
as water. Trends such as the exacerbation of social 
inequalities or the appearance of pockets of struc-
tural unemployment, due to mismatches between 
new technologies and the renewal of the producti-
ve fabric, are also disturbing elements in the world 
that is emerging.
2.4. The global   
financial crisis
Another element to be kept in mind when defining 
a strategy for external action is that of the pro-
found changes, worldwide, that have followed the 
financial crisis. 
The present crisis, from which we are only now 
emerging, bears some similarities with that of 
1929, but it is important to emphasise the diffe-
rences between the two in order to diagnose the 
situation correctly. The 1929 crisis arose in the 
United States and took two years to reach Euro-
pe; in 2008, only a few weeks passed from the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers until the collapse 
of Iceland. The 1929 crisis affected only the deve-
loped countries, but the present one has shaken 
the entire planet. It can safely be said that we have 
witnessed the first crisis of globalisation.
Genesis and evolution of the crisis 
The Great Recession began in a sub-sector of the 
US financial market, that of the subrogation of 
mortgage loans previously granted to customers 
Finally, another consequence of globalisation is 
the existence of higher levels of interdependence. 
Firstly, among States. This is not just an econo-
mic issue, but is primarily a political phenomenon. 
It has resulted in a profound change in relations-
hips between the States themselves, who are now 
obliged to work together in order to resolve global 
problems, in a world in which real sovereignty is 
increasingly limited,
But together with this classical interdependence, 
there is a new form of interconnection and mu-
tual dependence, among devices and processes, 
and this is a completely new phenomenon, which 
has been termed the “internet of things”. Its con-
sequence is that the interconnection of many 
systems, which previously functioned in isolation, 
which increasingly operate automatically, has led 
to a dramatic and global dissemination of events, 
positive or negative, that had previously remained 
at the local level. This interdependence, as regards 
future developments and their implications, is 
changing the strategic environment in a way that 
is hard to predict.
2.3. The crisis of   
multilateralism
The third radical change, after globalisation and 
multipolarity, is the crisis of multilateralism. The ins-
titutions that have been operating since the end of 
World War II are increasingly powerless to respond 
in a satisfactory way to the major challenges of the 
present; this has been the case, for example, of the 
Security Council in relation to conflict resolution, 
and of the IMF and the World Bank in their reactions 
to recurrent financial crises or to world poverty.
The crisis of multilateralism involves a fundamental 
dilemma: legitimacy versus effectiveness; inclusive 
bodies, representing the international community 
as a whole, versus more functional, but restricted 
instances. The G-20 provides greater representa-
tivity and a more appropriate size; these advances 
may help it overcome the shortcomings suffered by 
the above-mentioned agencies, especially as a fo-
rum for cooperation, mainly concerning economic 
matters, but only time will show whether it is ca-
pable of addressing the challenges facing the world 
today.
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with no credit rating. In other words, this was a 
mortgage crisis, and one that affected some, but 
not all, US States. The crisis would have remained a 
local one if we were not living in a highly intercon-
nected world. But we are, and the mortgage loans 
were securitised into bonds or complex financial 
instruments and sold on to investors around the 
world.
When interest rates began to rise, and real esta-
te values fell, the crisis emerged. Nobody seemed 
to know for sure what percentage of toxic assets 
had infected the financial system. Credit stopped 
flowing, global trade stalled and unemployment 
soared. 
Central banks around the world came to the aid of 
struggling financial institutions, lowering interest 
rates, injecting massive liquidity and even adopting 
unconventional measures such as relaxing rules on 
collaterals or purchasing bonds – in other words, 
they adopted the hitherto taboo policy of moneti-
sing the debt.
When the central banks’ intervention proved in-
sufficient, governments, too, were obliged to come 
to the rescue of the systemic financial institutions, 
which were famously “too big to fail”, with massive 
monetary injections that provoked substantial im-
balances in public finances. 
Thus the crisis, which began as a localised problem 
in the housing sector, mutated into a global ban-
king crisis, and finally became a sovereign debt cri-
sis, the effects of which are still being felt.
The causes of the crisis
Looking back at the start of the crisis, it would be 
a mistake to think that it was all due to malfunctio-
ning financial markets. In fact, the bursting of the 
housing bubble was only the symptom of a disea-
se that had been affecting asset markets in gene-
ral and that had long been incubating, due to the 
simultaneous influence of the following factors, 
among others:
• Excess liquidity. Many exporting countries with 
current account surpluses – mainly the oil produ-
cing countries – had accumulated large sums, re-
sulting in excessive liquidity, which they deposited 
in Western markets.
 
• Low interest rates. The Federal Reserve em-
barked on a policy of very low interest rates to 
FOUR SCENARIOS,   
ACCORDING TO THE REPORT 
"SPAIN IN THE WORLD OF 
2033"
Scenario One: Global governance. 
The world evolves towards a multilateral 
governance where different organisations, 
including political institutions, govern in a 
coordinated and constructive way. Meanwhile 
Europe progresses towards the construction 
of a United States of Europe. This is the 
scenario which leads to the greatest 
economic growth, at both world level and for 
Spain, but in this scenario inequality within 
and between nations may rise.
Scenario Two: Regional blocks.
Regional blocks compete against each other, 
increasing protectionist tendencies in the 
world economy. An economically cohesive 
Europe, with Germany in the driving seat, 
is one of them. Global growth is limited by 
protectionist measures, but the European 
social model is under less pressure and the 
redistribution of wealth is safeguarded. Spain 
grows in parallel with Europe. 
Scenario Three: National protectionism.  
A clear backwards shift in the process 
of globalisation and the strengthening 
of national political power, in line with a 
smaller “a la carte” Europe. This is the most 
redistributive scenario, but with the weakest 
global economic growth. For Spain it is 
without doubt the worst scenario as, with no 
employment creation, it would only lead to 
the redistribution of poverty.
Scenario Four: Economic interests take the 
lead. National and global political institutions 
are increasingly powerless against the forces 
of economic globalisation. Global economic 
growth is somewhat slower than in the 
best scenario and the growing inequality 
is exacerbated. A two-speed Europe takes 
shape. 
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The financial crisis, the first major crisis of globali-
sation, which is still afflicting us, is provoking chan-
ges in the global financial system, in institutions 
and in the rules governing global finance. Globali-
sed problems call for equally global solutions.
The global presence of financial institutions is now 
so great that rules to the same scale must be de-
signed. In recent years, the countries hit by the 
crisis and EU institutions have taken urgent and 
extraordinary measures to prevent the situation 
from becoming even worse. But evidently the coo-
peration of all concerned is a vital factor.
To prevent further financial crises such as the pre-
sent, the following measures are needed: a mo-
netary policy to prevent excesses; new regulatory 
frameworks; global financial supervision to over-
see organisations operating in various countries; 
the reform of international financial institutions; 
and the strengthening or, in their absence, creation 
of appropriate multilateral organisations that truly 
represent all economies and can take effective ac-
tion.
What the European Union must now do is to resha-
pe its regulatory framework so that financial activi-
ties benefit growth and to ensure that the financial 
economy is based on the real one. Specifically, four 
major proposals have been put forward.
•	 Achieve	further	integration	of	European	finan-
cial markets in order to attain a critical size that 
allows us to compete successfully with the United 
States. The wholesale markets are now quite well 
integrated but much remains to be done in the re-
tail markets. 
•	 Implement	 a	 real	 euro	 diplomacy.	 By	 not	 ex-
pressing themselves as one, the Europeans are re-
nouncing all the advantages that could be gained 
from controlling the world’s second most impor-
tant currency.
•	 Reform	 the	 regulatory	 framework	 to	 resto-
re the transparency of products, institutions and 
financial markets. Reaffirm the responsibility of 
managers in order to avoid the blunders of recent 
years. Strengthen the supervisory powers of regu-
lators. 
•	 Establish	early	warning	mechanisms	and	crisis	
committees composed of the key international 
players so that timely and urgent measures can be 
taken when a crisis arises.
overcome the crisis that followed the attack on the 
World Trade Centre. This was the stage that Alan 
Greenspan, one of those responsible for the policy, 
later termed “irrational exuberance”.
 
• Leverage. Money was so plentiful and so cheap 
that nobody put up a cent of their own. Everything 
was done on credit – as leveraged investment – 
which multiplied the effects: greater profit if things 
went well, but greater losses if they didn’t. And 
things began to go very wrong.
• Lax regulation. The regulation of certain areas 
of the financial market was very deficient, espe-
cially as regards hedge funds – which were not 
subject to legal limits to their exposure, and thus 
constituted extremely high-risk instruments – and 
venture capital, or private equity funds. The virtual 
absence of market supervision poured gasoline on 
the speculative fire.
•  Failures of the credit rating agencies. Risk ra-
ting agencies failed to meet their responsibilities. 
Highly complex financial products, the profitability 
of which depended on speculative sectors of the 
market, obtained investment ratings reflecting 
maximum security and confidence and were mar-
keted without any difficulty.
 
It is a golden rule in economics that when the avai-
lability of investment capital outweighs the needs 
of well-founded investment projects and wealth 
creators, the money ends up inflating asset prices 
far beyond their real value, whether they are ho-
mes, listed shares, debt securities or commodities. 
A combination of excess liquidity, low interest rates 
and the absence of productive investment oppor-
tunities led to a gigantic misdistribution of resour-
ces. When that happens, sooner or later, the situa-
tion must explode. And when the problem swells 
up to the dimensions that were visible in the 1990s 
and the first years of the new century, the even-
tual, inevitable outcome is collapse into a profound 
crisis, one from which there is no easy escape or 
recovery.
Lessons from the financial crisis 
Globalisation portends the reform of many institu-
tions that have been prominent in global economic 
relations. Changes are imminent in the financial or-
der, in the trade order and in the very concept of 
development. 
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THE (UNFINISHED) REVOLUTION 
IN THE REALM OF IDEAS
In the years that followed the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, it became generally believed that the 
free market economy was the most civilised 
form of competition, ultimately making it 
possible for the most able to reach the top. 
These ideas were put into practice through 
the “Washington Consensus”, based on the 
reduction of public expenditure, tax reform 
to broaden the tax base, the liberalisation 
of finance, competitive exchange rates, 
import liberalisation, the promotion of 
foreign investment, the privatisation of state 
enterprises, the deregulation of the economy 
and the protection of property rights.
Subsequent events have weakened the initial 
optimism that globalisation based solely 
on this model had generated. As empirical 
evidence shows, there is no real alternative 
to globalisation, but the application of 
globalisation as described above has produced 
“collateral damage” and, quite clearly, has not 
benefited everyone equally. 
Movements contesting the globalisation of 
the economy are appearing; their proponents 
advocate a different world order, but do not 
clearly define the shape it must take. These are 
expressions of protest but they do not present 
realistic alternatives.
On the other hand, such alternatives are 
posed by those who wish to make economic 
competitiveness compatible with social 
inclusion and environmental protection. They 
argue, firstly, for an economic model based on 
two pillars; the proper functioning of markets 
and the principle of social compensation. 
The first aspect means, on the one hand, 
combating monopolies and abusive practices 
and, the second, promoting small and medium 
enterprises to ensure fair competition. 
Furthermore, economic development should 
be harmonised with environmental protection, 
restraining the extreme liberal individualism 
that conceives man as king of creation, and 
nature as a mere object to be transformed by 
his labour.
Alternatives are also offered to ultra-liberal 
globalisation by those who believe that the 
market economy should be subject to order – 
an order that would include the rules applicable 
to companies, i.e., corporate governance, 
national rules to restrain those who act within 
a country’s borders, rules regulating the 
European market and also the rules adopted by 
the WTO to organise international trade.
The crisis has emphasised the difficulties 
that will be encountered in applying the same 
principles to the real economy as to the 
financial economy. The factors that motivate 
one and the other are quite different. This 
may be the only certainty to be drawn from 
the present crisis, with all else remaining to be 
determined.
2.5. Geopolitical changes 
arising from globalisation
The phenomena discussed above have radically 
changed the world stage. And, as with any change, 
there are winners and losers. 
The situations and standpoints of the different cou-
ntries are discussed in the chapter on geographical 
areas. At this stage, however, it will be useful to take 
note of certain aspects that will help guide Spanish 
foreign policy in the coming years, particularly as re-
gards the redeployment of our foreign service.
The situations of the European Union and of Latin 
America are addressed in detail in discussing the 
objectives of Spanish external action. In conse-
quence, the description given in the following pa-
ragraphs is merely a brief overview.
In comparison to Europe, the United States has a 
younger population. Unemployment is lower and 
productivity is higher, due to more investment, 
more technological innovation and higher spen-
ding on education and training. 
In the coming years, the United States will achieve 
energy self-sufficiency, and soon after this could 
become a net exporter of energy. Then, US inter-
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Latin America has enjoyed sustained growth since 
the 1990s, having controlled the inflation that had 
marked previous decades (in several years bet-
ween 1986 and 1994, inflation in Brazil exceeded 
40%), and having maintained debt at low levels and 
increased exports of raw materials (which, accor-
ding to the OECD, rose from representing 40% of 
exports of goods in 2000 to 60% in 2011). The de-
mographic factor may be another strength, with a 
significant percentage of the population being of 
working age in all these countries.
At present, economic growth in Latin America has 
slowed, although this is probably only temporary, 
with GDP for the continent as a whole expected 
to grow at 2% in 2014 and 2.6% in 2015. This slow-
down is the result of five main factors: raw mate-
rial prices, which have moderated; the decline in 
world trade; the global financial climate, which is 
beset by uncertainties (the slowdown in the Chi-
nese economy, doubts about US monetary policy, 
the situation in the Eurozone); fragile structural 
reforms; and insufficient investment in infrastruc-
ture.
In political terms, Latin America, which for histori-
cal and linguistic reasons is the most unified region 
from a cultural standpoint, has taken enormous 
strides towards democracy in the last thirty years. 
Its status as a natural boundary between the Paci-
fic and Atlantic Oceans makes it an obvious plat-
form for interactions between Asia Pacific, Wes-
tern Europe and Africa.
Growth in the Middle East and North Africa is 
hobbled by political instability, which has dragged 
down private investment and the production and 
exploitation of energy resources, especially in Arab 
countries undergoing political and social transition.
In non-oil-exporting countries, unresolved structu-
ral problems, social tensions (high unemployment, 
particularly) and governance issues are blocking 
access to potential benefits from tourism, foreign 
direct investment and exports.
In the oil-exporting countries of the region, the 
challenge is to reduce their excessive dependen-
ce on revenues from hydrocarbons. Factors such 
as the emergence of unconventional sources of oil 
and increased energy efficiency are reducing the 
upward pressure on oil prices. Accordingly, these 
countries need to implement structural reforms, 
diversify their economies and contribute to job 
creation in the private sector.
est in oil-producing areas such as the Middle East 
would probably be less acute than it is now.
Its privileged geostrategic position, facing both the 
Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, will enable 
the USA to remain the world’s leading power for 
many years. However, after a decade of major in-
volvement and of military and economic efforts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the American public appears 
reluctant to embark on further adventures abroad. 
This should not be interpreted as a return to isola-
tionism but rather as a reorientation of priorities. 
The USA must face the challenge of maintaining 
its traditional influence in Asia. Its interest in Eu-
rope and in the transatlantic relationship could 
be strengthened in this context and in that of the 
ever-complex dialogue with Russia. 
The European Union has not grown enough in 
recent years to reduce unemployment, which re-
mains unacceptably high, or to catch up with its 
competitors. Demographic tensions will be grea-
ter than in North America or Australasia. Europe 
is also energy dependent. The design flaws of the 
Economic and Monetary Union, highlighted by the 
global economic crisis, constitute another key 
weakness, one that is a key factor in explaining the 
EU’s poorer performance. 
Nevertheless, Europe remains one of the most 
prosperous areas of the world with a large, well-
integrated market of over 500 million consumers 
and high purchasing power (mean GDP per capita 
is about $25,000). Moreover, it has very good in-
frastructure and a diversified productive structure.
These factors provide institutional stability and the 
ability to compete relatively effectively, as reflec-
ted by the fact that Europe’s share of world trade 
has remained at around 33% over the past decade.
In political and geostrategic terms, Europe must 
continue to exercise its historic role as a point of 
connection between regions. Its influence will con-
tinue to be linked to the concept of “soft power”, 
in areas such as setting agendas, its influence in 
technological, cultural and academic fields, and 
the robustness and credibility of its think tanks. 
Neither should we underestimate Europe’s situa-
tion as the natural centre of networks such as the 
Commonwealth (54 countries), La Francophonie 
(31 countries in Africa), or the 400 million Spanish 
speakers in the world, 37 million of them in the 
United States.
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The Middle East and North Africa is perhaps the 
region that is most directly affected by the challen-
ge of globalisation, which is provoking a clash bet-
ween the modernity of the twenty-first century – 
for example, via the diffusion of new technologies 
in one of the youngest populations of the planet 
– and the lost opportunity for political and econo-
mic development in the twentieth century. This 
conflict between modernity and backwardness, 
between urban youths, anxious for change, and ru-
ral masses subject to the influence of radicalism is 
at the heart of much tension and many disputes.
Sub-Saharan Africa has enjoyed one of the world’s 
highest rates of GDP growth in recent years, se-
cond only to Asia. According to IMF forecasts 
(World Economic Outlook, July 2014), growth in 
the region will be 5.4% in 2014 and 5.8% in 2015.
This rise can be explained by a combination of five 
factors: strong demand for raw materials in emer-
ging countries (China's presence in this sector is 
particularly striking), a population boom, a rising 
middle class presence, an internal market that is 
increasingly dynamic, and growing foreign inves-
tment. The population structure makes this the 
youngest continent in the world, with 200 million 
people aged between 15 and 24 years.
Africa was the last continent to join the global 
geopolitical map. But it has done so robustly: 
despite conflicts, tensions and threats, most Afri-
can countries have adopted democratic systems, 
and authoritarian regimes are in retreat. The 
continent’s wealth of natural resources and its 
growth rate have made it the object of interests, 
ambitions and expectations for many stakehol-
ders, particularly the emerging powers. In 2000, 
a headline in The Economist read “Africa, the Ho-
peless Continent”, but in 2013, this judgment was 
reversed in a special report headed “Africa Rising: 
A Hopeful Continent”.
The Asia-Pacific region is growing at a very ra-
pid pace, driven by China and India, which have 
almost tripled their share of the global economy 
in the past two decades. By 2025, this region will 
account for half of the world’s economic output. In 
consequence, Asian economies will require more 
energy, more drinking water and more food, which 
will make a serious impact on global supply and de-
mand.
Uncertainties about the “new world order” are rife 
in Asia-Pacific, a region that has enjoyed over six-
ty years of peace and stability, which have enabled 
the economic development first of Japan, then of 
South Korea, followed by China and India and many 
other countries in Southeast Asia. The absence of 
a well developed structure for regional security, 
together with difficulties in the negotiation (mul-
tilateral or bilateral) of territorial aspirations, is a 
potential source of conflict.
The Asia-Pacific region is largely responsible for 
what has been called "the rise of the South", a tur-
ning point in world history. 
According to the 2013 UNDP Human Development 
Report, for the first time in 150 years the combined 
economic output of the three main economies in 
the South – Brazil, India and China – is approaching 
that of the six largest economies in the North, in 
terms of purchasing power parity.
By 2020, according to the Report, “the combined 
economic output of three leading developing cou-
ntries alone—Brazil, China and India—will surpass 
the aggregate production of Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United 
States”.
A significant proportion of this dynamism is due to 
international trade, foreign direct investment and 
South/South technology alliances in the context 
of globalisation: the proportion of South/South 
exchanges in the world trade of goods increased 
from less than 8% in 1980 to over 25% in 2011, with 
significant growth in the last decade.
This changing situation will bring about a substan-
tial increase in living standards among these po-
pulations: in 2030, more than 80% of the world's 
middle class will be living in developing countries. 
This brief sketch of the economic changes arising 
from globalisation would be incomplete without 
a mention of Australia, a country which due to its 
geographic position, regional leadership and solid 
economy – which has enjoyed over two decades of 
sustained growth – is very well placed to take ad-
vantage of the opportunities present in the Asia-
Pacific region, especially as regards dialogue with 
China, a country it supplies with raw materials and 
energy resources.
32
In addition to the three reasons discussed above 
for developing a new strategy for external action 
– the exhaustion of the strategy applied during 
and after the Transition, the need to transform 
the economic model through a greater interna-
tionalisation of Spanish society, and the profound 
changes taking place in the world – there is a four-
th one. Europe must recreate itself, politically and 
institutionally. It must do so because a poorly de-
signed euro currency system, the greatest error 
to come out of Maastricht, has led the Union into 
a political crisis without precedent. No regional 
trend as directly and significantly affects the in-
terests of Spain and its strategic situation as the 
evolution of the European Union.
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty was the 
institutional response to the new strategic envi-
ronment. The euro crisis, which was essentially a 
political one, has shaken this response to the core 
and has presented the process of European inte-
gration with its greatest challenge. The coming 
years will be crucial and Spain must have a clear 
idea of where the Union should aim to be in the fu-
ture. Much is at stake. Quite simply, it is impossible 
to conceive of Spain without Europe or of Europe 
without Spain. 
A brief reflection on the history of the European 
Union will reveal the key aspects of the problem 
and highlight the fissures currently present in Eu-
ropean integration, which will require far-reaching 
political and institutional remodelling.
3.1. The roots of    
the European Union
The construction of Europe was the response to 
the three issues that were starkly apparent at the 
end of World War II: 
• How to end the cycle of civil conflicts that had 
ravaged the continent. The Great War (1914-18) 
annihilated a generation. And World War II was 
even more murderous.
• How to regain a front-ranking position on the 
world stage. The countries of Europe, which in 1884 
had gathered in Berlin to divide Africa amongst 
themselves, now attended the division of the world 
between the United States and the Soviet Union as 
mere spectators.
• How to achieve the economic growth needed to 
ensure the survival of a stable democracy. As an indi-
cation of the scale of the disaster, we need only ob-
serve that in 1945 the GDP of most European coun-
tries was less than half what it had been in 1938.
3.2. From federalism   
to functionalism
To address these issues, it was decided to create a 
genuinely federal union. If the causes that had led 
to the two European wars were political in natu-
re, it seemed logical that the solutions should also 
be political. Accordingly, it was held that “only a 
strong Federal Union can ensure the protection 
3. The European Union,   
 past and present
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on difference from others, if not outright opposi-
tion to them. When that occurs, nationalism re-
presents the greatest obstacle to any project for 
European construction, federal or otherwise. This 
is what happened in the 1950s; over half a century 
later, it seems that the lesson has still not been 
learned. The withdrawal into a populist form of 
nationalism, as has been generated by the political 
and economic crisis in some European countries, is 
undermining not just “a model of integration” – it 
is undermining any possible project by which the 
peoples of Europe can share their lives.
The failure of the federalist experiences made a 
change of course inevitable, and attention turned 
to economic functionalism, through the integra-
tion of European economies, as a prior step to po-
litical integration. “Europe will not be made all at 
once, or according to a single plan. It will be built 
through concrete achievements which first crea-
te a de facto solidarity” (Robert Schumann, 9 May 
1950).
3.3. From the Treaty   
of Rome to the Single   
European Act
The European Economic Community, created by 
the Treaty of Rome, established a single market 
among member countries, and a common external 
of freedom and civilization in Europe and achieve 
economic reconstruction, enabling the political 
participation of the German people in the cons-
truction of Europe”. (Declaration of the European 
Resistance Movements, Geneva, 1944).
However, the federalist option collapsed in the 
1950s, when Gaullists and Communists in the 
French Assembly joined forces to oppose the Eu-
ropean Defence Community (EDC). Moreover, the 
fallout from the rejection of the EDC was not limi-
ted to the military context; its disappearance from 
the scene led to the parallel abandonment of a po-
litical initiative: the European Political Community 
project. These failures reflected the existence of 
a nationalism that was basically incompatible with 
integration. Nevertheless, nations, their existence, 
their development, and their very identity, are not 
obstacles to the construction of Europe; on the 
contrary, they provide its raw material.
The problem arises when nationalist sentiments 
seek to erect an ideological barricade, asserting 
that the only possible national definition is based 
Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
France, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy 
and the Federal Republic of Germany signed in 1957 
the founding Treaties of the European Economic 
Community and the Euratom in Rome. This was the 
beginning of our European Union as it is today.
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tariff. The principle of the free movement of goods 
was extended to capital, labour and services, be-
cause the arguments in favour of the free move-
ment of goods are almost automatically applicable 
to the factors of production.
The most original feature of the Treaty of Rome, 
in contrast to other processes of integration, both 
historical and contemporary, was that it was not 
limited to mere intergovernmental cooperation, 
with no transfer of decision-making capability; 
on the contrary, the signatories to the Treaty of 
Rome undertook to seek a form of integration in 
which powers were transferred and common insti-
tutions created. One of the first successes of this 
model came in 1967, when three countries that 
had previously opted for the simple reduction of 
internal customs barriers, as embodied in the Eu-
ropean Free Trade Association – UK, Denmark and 
Norway, later followed by Ireland– were encoura-
ged to seek membership. This first expansion set 
off a wave of euro-optimism across the continent.
BUILDING A
COMMON MARKET
The construction of the common 
market would take shape through the 
implementation of the following instrumental 
measures: 
- The  elimination of customs duties on 
imports and exports between Member 
States, and any charges having equivalent 
effect. 
- The  establishment of a tariff (the Common 
External Tariff) and of a common commercial 
policy towards third countries. 
- The  free movement of factors of 
production, which is specified in the Treaty as 
the free movement of workers, services and 
capital, and the right of establishment. 
- The establishment of a system to ensure 
fair competition – the inspiring principle of 
the Treaty. 
- The  harmonisation of tax legislation, 
starting with indirect taxes, as these create 
most distortions in international trade, 
and continuing with direct taxes, which, in 
principle, have no knock-on effect on prices.
- ‘Open’ coordination, i.e., on an indicative 
basis, of the remaining economic policies.
European integration came to an abrupt halt with 
the oil crisis of 1973, when Europeans opted to 
withdraw behind national borders to defend their 
markets from foreign competition. Instead of 
trying to overcome the crisis together, by reinfor-
cing their integration, they became progressively 
entrenched in their differences; in other words, 
they chose the path of “neotribalisation”, having 
apparently learned nothing from their own his-
tory.
When things finally begin to improve, and in the 
light of harsh experience, a process was begun 
that led to the Single European Act (1985), which 
incorporated three ideas crucial to the process 
of European integration: completing the internal 
market, underpinning economic and social cohe-
sion as a cornerstone of European integration, 
and setting in place the mechanisms for a future 
economic and monetary union. The possibility of 
Europe becoming a global player was anticipated 
with the creation of European Political Coopera-
tion, the forerunner of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.
3.4. From Maastricht  
 to the Treaty of Lisbon
Maastricht was both the zenith and a turning 
point in the process of European integration. The 
Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force on 2 
November 1993, introduced into the Communi-
ty frame of reference areas of competence that 
since time immemorial had belonged to the area 
of national sovereignty: issues relating to foreign 
policy, security and defence, as well as justice and 
home affairs.
The Maastricht Treaty, moreover, was a milestone 
in its recognition of a principle that is very impor-
tant to Spain, namely that the territorial diversity 
within the Member States is a factor to be taken 
into account in the construction of Europe. In line 
with this conviction, institutionally represented in 
our case by the Autonomous Communities, Maas-
tricht created the Committee of the Regions and 
introduced the possibility of the regions participa-
ting in the Council.
Maastricht saw the creation of the euro, a logical 
consequence of the maturing process of inte-
35
gration. But, in Maastricht, too, a cardinal sin was 
committed: that of not creating an economic union 
at the same time and in parallel to the monetary 
union. In Maastricht, for the first time in European 
integration, the dictates of economic logic were 
violated, and this was done because of political 
weakness. The consequences of this approach 
would be dramatic.
The creators of the euro believed that currency 
union could function without an economic gover-
nment. They believed that this deficiency could 
be overcome by means of a common monetary 
policy implemented by the European Central 
Bank, in conjunction with the Stability and Growth 
Pact (to which national budgetary policies were 
tightly bound) and with “light” coordination, that 
is, without incentives for compliance or penalties 
for non-compliance, of all other economic poli-
cies. These three pillars were complemented with 
three deterrents: “no bail-out, no default, no exit”.
A crucial factor is that none of the three reforms 
made to the Founding Treaties after Maastricht 
DEEPENING AND
WIDENING THE UNION
Under the Treaties, any European State that 
respects and is committed to promoting the 
values of the Union has the right to apply 
for admission. Today, the European Union 
consists of 28 members, and Turkey and 
the countries of the Western Balkans are 
candidate members. As Bronislaw Geremek 
said: "We have managed to stitch together the 
two Europes. We have reunited Europe and 
democracy now rules the fate of all Europeans”.
Each enlargement has posed a major 
institutional challenge regarding the 
proliferation and composition of EU 
institutions, the decision-making process and 
the distribution of powers between the Union 
and the member states. 
In the latter respect, not all member states 
have made the same commitments. Not all 
are part of the Schengen area; some member 
states have exercised their right to “opt out” 
in the field of freedom and justice, others have 
done in the field of social policy and yet others 
do not fully participate in the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. The United Kingdom and 
Denmark do not form part of the Economic 
and Monetary Union, membership of which is 
obligatory for all other member states when 
they meet the Maastricht criteria (inflation, 
interest rates, public deficit, public debt and the 
independence of the Central Bank). 
These differences have led many to speak of a 
“multi-speed” Europe or a Europe of “variable 
geometry”. Such expressions seem to anticipate 
that in the coming years there will coexist, 
on the one hand, a confederal framework 
applicable to all EU members, together with 
a hard core federal structure, grouping those 
which choose to adopt the entire Acquis 
Communautaire. 
Obviously, the ideal is that all States should 
participate fully in all EU policies, but it is 
equally desirable that those who seek a higher 
level of integration should not be hindered by 
the reluctance of those who wish the bar to be 
set lower.
changed this state of affairs. Only the crisis would 
do that.
Thus, the Treaties of Amsterdam (1997), Nice 
(2001) and Lisbon (2009) brought about insti-
tutional and political progress; in short, “more 
Europe”. The European Union today not only gua-
rantees peace, values and welfare, but it offers 
an area of freedom, security and justice without 
internal borders, an internal market, an econo-
mic and monetary union and European policies 
in areas such as foreign affairs and security, agri-
culture and fisheries, employment, transport, the 
environment, energy, and economic, social and 
territorial cohesion. But none of them addressed 
the design flaws of the EMU, which were at the 
root of the profound crisis that has jeopardised 
one of the most successful political projects in 
the history of our continent.
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3.5. From the Treaty of   
Lisbon to the present
When the euro crisis erupted, there was no option 
but to undertake profound reforms, in order to 
make the euro a stable, effective currency. This re-
form process was inspired by the report “Towards 
a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union”, which 
was presented in June 2012 and stressed the im-
portance of establishing four pillars in support of 
a reinforced EMU: Banking Union, Fiscal Union, an 
integrated economic policy framework and greater 
democratic legitimacy. These reforms were aimed, 
in the first place, at achieving a Banking Union, on 
the basis of the three pillars that had already been 
approved, namely the supervision of all eurozone 
banks by the European Central Bank (the 128 lar-
gest banks, directly, and the rest, indirectly by na-
tional authorities), the creation of a single dispute-
resolution authority and a greater harmonisation of 
the regulations applicable to all banks in the Euro-
pean Union, not only in the eurozone.
As regards the Fiscal Union, progress has been 
much slower, although none will have failed to ob-
serve the political significance of the ‘European 
Semester’, under which all national budgets must 
be subjected to European supervision before being 
submitted to their respective Parliaments. Parlia-
mentary democracy came into being, essentially, 
so that citizens could decide the financing of pu-
blic affairs. The involvement of the Union in this 
process advances us towards a supranational pro-
ject that Spain wishes to see come to fruition. A 
related consideration, and one that is a necessary 
condition for the single currency status to become 
consolidated, is the progress that has been made in 
the coordination of economic policies.
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3.6. Final reflection
The model drafted in Maastricht worked relatively 
well while Europe was enjoying its boom years, 
although even then the first cracks were beginning 
to appear in the edifice.
 The first of these was the result of applying a 
single interest rate to countries whose economic 
circumstances were very different. Thus, the sa-
vings of the core countries were displaced to the 
peripheral ones, achieving greater profitability, but 
at the same time fuelling a real estate bubble. 
 The second fissure arose from the failure by 
the majority of member states to observe the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact. When France and Germany 
also failed to comply, it was decided not to impose 
sanctions, but to decree a general amnesty and a 
change in the rules.
 The third problem was a direct consequence of 
the weakness of the “open coordination” of eco-
nomic policies, which was based on no more than 
moral admonition. Five years after the launch of 
the Lisbon Strategy (in 2000), the divergences 
between the different countries remained practi-
cally unaltered.
Little attention was paid to these cracks and fis-
sures, until the crisis shook the euro to its founda-
tions, together with the three deterrents that were 
supposed to safeguard it. 
The European response to the crisis was weaker 
than that of our most direct competitors, simply 
because its institutional structure was not strong 
enough:
 The European Central Bank was much less ac-
tive than the US Federal Reserve, or the Bank of 
England, in combating the crisis. 
 The bail-outs of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Cyprus were delayed, thus making the operation 
more costly and increasing the hardship imposed 
on the population. 
 The Financial Perspectives for 2014-2020 are 
less expansive than those for the preceding period, 
although in the circumstances, just the opposite 
was called for.
The outcome of this lack of resolution is plain to 
see: the European Union took longer to emerge 
from the crisis than did other regions, and did so 
with less vigour. In fact, the present combination 
of weak growth and low inflation may place the 
eurozone in a delicate situation for some time. 
And it obliges us to reflect on the suitability of the 
Union’s institutional structure in this rapidly-chan-
ging world.
Serious though these issues may be, more serious 
still is the fact that the concerted effort to overco-
me the crisis has concealed demographic, econo-
mic and political deficiencies that may weigh down 
the project of European integration for many years 
to come. These deficiencies are among the most 
important challenges to be faced by the newly in-
augurated European institutions.
 Europe’s demographic weakness is probably 
the biggest challenge it must face. Europe is much 
older than the United States or Japan, not to men-
tion the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin Ameri-
ca. This demographic weakness threatens the very 
foundations of the welfare state; it is one of the 
most important indicators of the European model, 
and if the present structure remains unaltered, 
THE EVOLUTION OF 
THE EU BUDGET
As a result of the enlargement of the Union 
and the assumption of new powers by its 
institutions, substantial changes have taken 
place in the Community budget. 
Until 1989, the budget was basically intended 
to finance the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), which accounted for up 60% of the 
total. 
After the major enlargement of 2004, the 
structural and cohesion funds acquired 
greater prominence (30% of the EU budget 
in 2006). 
From 2006, policies were increasingly aimed 
at promoting competitiveness through R&D, 
investments in infrastructure and support for 
SMEs, and the CAP budget was reduced.
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there will be fewer workers in active employment 
and more beneficiaries of pensions.
 Low productivity, in comparison with our com-
petitors, is the second factor underlying the rela-
tive weakness of the European Union. Prior to the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, the United States 
created 1.2 jobs for every job lost due to offsho-
ring to emerging countries; in the European Union, 
however, only 0.8 were created. And this problem 
persists today in the EU, with respect to the world’s 
most important economic areas.
 But the main weakness of the European Union 
is not economic, but political. The external balan-
ce and the public accounts of the eurozone are 
healthier than in the USA, the UK and Japan, but 
nevertheless, investors looked first to other re-
gions. The explanation is simple: investors doubt 
our willingness to stand together to defend the 
common currency. They suspect that we actually 
have a reversible fixed exchange rate zone, rather 
than a monetary union with no return ticket.
The conclusion to be drawn from this account is 
clear. The long-term solution to the crisis must in-
volve strengthening the institutional architecture 
of the Union, with an economic government that 
pursues three objectives: macroeconomic discipli-
ne, a certain degree of financial solidarity and the 
implementation of structural reforms. This is the 
best way to definitely establish the credibility of 
the Union. Spain must be at the forefront of this 
reform process, and an essential element of our 
commitment is the formulation and application of 
a new strategic approach to our changing environ-
ment.
39A new strategy
Defining a strategy for external action requires us 
to establish a set of priorities, of a political natu-
re, to guide our new strategic thinking, to identify 
goals, to reflect on the human and material instru-
ments needed and to analyse the decision-making 
process with respect to external action.
The principles underlying this action will remain 
unchanged, as they are derived from our status as 
a democratic country and from the principles and 
values of our constitutional system. These princi-
ples and objectives are formulated in the External 
Action and Service Act, which also stipulates the 
actions to be carried out, in virtually all areas of pu-
blic government.
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The above reflections lead us to advocate a re-
newal of strategic thinking and indicate the main 
considerations to be borne in mind. Our analysis 
highlights the importance of the following three 
elements:
• We live in a globalised, interdependent world. 
Rejection of this fact (or attempting to ignore 
it) is not an option. Indeed, it would be suicidal. 
Globalisation is the competitive global integra-
tion of economies, resources and technological 
solutions. In all these processes there are win-
ners and losers, this is immediately apparent. 
Our aim is that Spain should place itself among 
the winners.
• The economic crisis. The collapse of Lehman 
Brothers precipitated an economic crisis, but 
what followed was above all a political crisis, 
one that has highlighted the limitations and 
weaknesses of our economic model, and those 
of the political and institutional framework of 
the world, of Europe and of Spain. As has hap-
pened before in our history, and as is inevitable 
at certain stages in the evolution of all societies 
and countries, Spain needs to regenerate itself. 
External action must be one of the instruments 
of that task, and the greater internationalisation 
of Spanish society is a highly significant part of 
the solution.
• New actors. In the emerging world, social 
groups and individuals have the opportunity to 
develop projects – collective, inter-professio-
nal and even individual – as if borders did not 
exist. To do so, they organise themselves into 
networks, with diverse purposes and variable 
geometries. An open society such as we have 
in Spain has much to gain from developments 
of this type. The different levels of governance 
are no exception to this reality, especially in the 
case of Spain, where the Autonomous Com-
munities have high levels of self-governance in 
the domestic sphere, as well as varying areas of 
activity with respect to external action. And in 
this respect, too, our external action should be 
equipped to take full advantage of its potential.
In short, the essential, ultimate goal of Spain’s stra-
tegic renewal is to enable the country and its ci-
tizens to respond to challenges in a world that is 
becoming more complex, is changing very quickly, 
and is quite unlike anything we have known before. 
Strategic renewal must help resolve what Keynes 
described as “the political problem of mankind: 
how to combine three aims: economic efficiency, 
social justice and individual freedom”. 
The task is not an easy one, because the world is 
still taking shape, its contours have yet to be de-
fined, and new and traditional elements must be 
blended. Therefore, our ideas regarding renewal 
should be aimed at these focal points: 
• Making Spain more outward looking, civil so-
ciety more internationalised and the economy 
more interdependent – in the view that this is 
the best response possible to meet the needs of 
our country in response to social, economic and 
technological change. 
• Equipping our citizens to seize the opportuni-
ties offered by globalisation; this will require our 
External Service to place specific emphasis on 
this issue.
A strategy for foreign policy that aims to reflect 
these broad lines should set out priorities that ad-
dress these questions: 
4. The priorities 
 of external action
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• The defence of Spain’s values and the promo-
tion of its citizens’ interests, within a new, more 
complex strategic environment. 
• The global projection of the image of Spain 
as an advanced, competitive and reliable coun-
try.
• Enabling citizens to develop their personal 
projects in a globalised world.
• The need to respond to the complexity of 
the strategic environment by means of a more 
coherent, effective and transparent decision-
making process for external action.
In consequence, the following foreign policy priori-
ties have been established.
4.1. Coherence,   
effectiveness and   
transparency in    
external action
In an increasingly complex and interdependent 
world, external action takes diverse forms; it is 
performed by many different public and private ac-
tors and presents itself and overlaps in society in 
rich and complex ways. If this diversity of external 
actions is to produce the desired results, our exter-
nal action must be coherent. This is the only way 
to make it effective. And this is the only way that 
citizens’ demands for transparency by their public 
authorities can be met.
Coherence is acquired, firstly, by aligning the ac-
tions of a general or strategic nature taken by all 
the actors involved in applying the foreign policy 
defined by the Government, which represents the 
principles guiding Spain’s behaviour in the interna-
tional community.
Secondly, coherence is obtained from the posses-
sion of timely, accurate information on all aspects 
of Spain’s external action, information that may be 
received and considered by all interested parties, 
of whatever rank – in other words, by a conside-
rable proportion of Spanish society. Good infor-
mation and sufficient transparency will eliminate 
deceit and contradiction. 
These ideas for a more coherent external action 
are at the heart of the External Action and Ser-
vice Act, and this Strategy document highlights 
their fundamental importance to our foreign po-
licy. Another significant aspect, in view of the im-
portance of development cooperation in external 
action, is the principle of ensuring coherence and 
consistency in our development policies.
In addition, foreign policy should respond posi-
tively to public demand for greater effectiveness 
and transparency. The best way to do so, and at 
the same time to satisfy the requirements of a 
renewed policy instrument, is to obtain and apply 
new mechanisms for decision taking and new tools 
for action. These should be designed, as stipulated 
in the statute cited above, to meet criteria of effec-
tiveness and legitimacy, and to produce added va-
lue in the emerging strategic environment. In this 
respect, the following lines of approach should be 
undertaken:
• Work to achieve the full development of the 
new foreign policy system, thus enabling better 
and closer coordination among the many actors 
involved in external action. Strengthen the role 
of the Prime Minister. Incorporate different so-
cial and territorial sensitivities in formulating fo-
reign policy. Address the question of the quality 
of democratic control over this policy.
• Redistribute human and material resources, 
in order to situate our external networks closer 
to the new centres of power and influence in 
the world.
• Enhance the existing instruments and the 
tools of public diplomacy (including Marca Es-
paña and digital communication and diplomacy) 
that are necessary elements in our renewed, 
and radically changing, policy for external ac-
tion. Among other aspects, this policy must take 
into account the management of networks and 
the continuing existence of traditional relation-
ships with authorities and civil society in other 
countries.
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4.2. Promote and project 
our values and interests 
The global projection of Spain is the best way to 
promote our values and to protect our vital stra-
tegic interests. This projection should achieve the 
following goals:
• Contribute to building a model for legitima-
te, effective global governance. Spain’s values 
and interests will be better protected within 
a rules-based international community with 
broad-based, legitimated organisations. A new 
governance model is needed to help ensure the 
peace, security and prosperity of the internatio-
nal community and the management of global 
challenges such as poverty, the environment, 
climate change, migration and food security.
 
• Contribute to the economic progress and 
modernisation of Spain. Both of these goals 
depend on a greater internationalisation of the 
Spanish economy, on the full incorporation of 
its companies, including SMEs, within the glo-
balised world, on greater efforts in scientific 
research and technological innovation, and on 
a greater international projection of its executi-
ves and entrepreneurs. Only thus can the neces-
sary changes be made to the economic model 
and thus determine our future well-being.
• To do so, our human and material resources 
will be redistributed,  bringing our external 
networks closer to the new international cen-
tres of economic power.
 
• Make Spain more influential and more secure, 
enhancing bilateral relations and strengthening 
our presence in multilateral forums. Promoting 
the global role of the EU is crucial to this effort. 
In addition, ties with Latin America should be 
consolidated and the transatlantic relationship 
made even more substantive. 
4.3. Place the citizen at the 
forefront of external policy
Public policies are increasingly oriented towards 
citizens, their needs and aspirations. External po-
licy used to be an exception to this, albeit only in 
part, when government activity was mainly focu-
sed on managing bilateral relations with other 
states and on participating in multilateral forums 
in which, again, the state was the only conceivable 
actor.
The world now emerging, as we have seen, reflects 
a progressive loss of state power and influence to 
private social groups and, in many cases, to indivi-
duals. This transformation is imposing a paradigm 
shift, the consequences of which are only begin-
ning to become apparent. However, it is quite plain 
that any renewal of external policy must place ci-
tizens at the forefront, and include the following 
measures and priorities.
• Encourage citizens to take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by a world undergoing 
profound changes, facilitating access to net-
works and initiatives that incorporate and re-
flect these changes.
• Promote opportunities for participation, to 
incorporate the wishes and preferences of civil 
society into our external action, in particular as 
regards solidarity and the projection of our civic 
values.
• Provide as much information as possible, to 
facilitate the achievement of personal or pro-
fessional projects involving travel or long-term 
displacement beyond our borders. 
• Protect citizens’ security, an essential precon-
dition for any individual or collective initiative.
• Work to promote the social rights of the two 
million Spanish citizens working abroad, under 
very diverse systems of social protection.
4.4. Present ourselves   
globally as an advanced  
country
In the emerging international community, the old 
and the new will coexist. Relations will be based on 
networks and on complex processes, as well as on 
traditional alliances and bilateral relations. And in-
terdependence will be present in all these relation-
ship models, bringing about rapid transformations.
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In this context, the ability to influence, to bend 
wills, goes far beyond what has traditionally been 
associated with “international power”. Military pre-
valence, the ultimate expression of the imposition 
of will, will continue to be important, and will so-
metimes be decisive. But the experience of recent 
decades has revealed the increasingly limited abi-
lity of this option to attain political objectives. The 
reason for this incapacity lies in the ever-greater 
complexity of problems, conflicts and social pro-
cesses, which are seldom amenable to solutions 
imposed by a single instrument, however powerful 
it may be. In such a complex international system, 
power must also be able to persuade, rather than 
impose, and to influence perceptions, instead of 
exerting a direct influence.
During the next four years, external action will be 
increasingly directed towards providing our cou-
ntry with the capability to influence, by shaping 
and improving people’s perceptions of us and our 
actions. The national image is an asset and an ins-
trument of enormous potential, that should be ad-
dressed in the following areas.
• Politics: Spain should seek to be perceived as 
a predictable, reliable, country, one that takes 
its commitments and alliances seriously and is 
committed to an advanced model of internatio-
nal community.
 
• The economy: we need to develop our ima-
ge as a country that produces quality goods and 
services; as a country that is competitive, yet 
committed to a green, low-carbon economy, 
and is at the forefront of the knowledge eco-
nomy.
 
• Social issues: we must develop the external 
view of Spain as a cohesive, well-structured so-
ciety, which is open to the world and prepared 
to face the enormous challenges to come in the 
emerging international community.
 
• In the cultural sphere, it is necessary to re-
inforce the perception of our country as one 
that produces culture, ideas and new creations, 
at the forefront of innovation and at the same 
time committed to the preservation and trans-
mission of our priceless heritage.
The most visible and emblematic part of this 
effort, although by no means the only one, is the 
Marca España project, an instrument designed to 
impact directly on the world of perceptions, both 
at home and abroad, and thereby enhance our abi-
lity to influence. 
These four priorities are accompanied by a set of 
objectives that form the core of the external ac-
tion.
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Article 1 of Spanish External Action and Service 
Act 2/2014, of 25 March, states the following:
"The guiding principles of Spain’s external policy 
are respect for human dignity, freedom, democra-
cy, the rule of law and human rights. Spain’s ex-
ternal policy is to defend and promote the obser-
vance and development of international law, and 
in particular to defend and promote respect for 
the principles of the United Nations Charter. Spain 
will promote projects for European integration 
and projects developed within the Ibero-American 
Community of Nations and multilateralism, as well 
as those of the international community."
These principles inspire and underlie all Spanish 
external action. They also constitute the basis for 
the political priorities listed above. They reflect the 
model of international community that underlies 
the political ideology of our country, which origi-
nated in our Transition to democracy and is shared 
by the vast majority of political and social forces.
Article 2 of the same Act sets out the following ob-
jectives for Spain’s foreign policy:
1.- Maintain and promote international peace 
and security; 
2.- Promote strong, legitimate multilateral ins-
titutions; 
3.- Promote and consolidate political systems 
based on the rule of law and respect for funda-
mental rights and civil liberties; 
4.- Fight against poverty, and express solidari-
ty with developing countries and the economic 
and social development of all States; 
5.- Defend the environment and protect biodi-
versity, combating climate change and reflec-
ting concerns for food security;
6.- Eliminate weapons of mass destruction and 
chemical weapons, and to actively commit to 
progressive disarmament worldwide;
7.- Create a Europe that is more integrated and 
more legitimate before its citizens, and which 
sets standards as a global player;
8.- Strengthen the Ibero-American Community 
of Nations;
9.- Ensure the safety and welfare of Spain and 
its citizens;
10.- Provide assistance and protection to Spa-
nish citizens, and protect Spain’s economic in-
terests abroad;
11.- Promote Spain’s economic interests abroad.
Foreign policy operates in various scenarios to 
achieve these priorities and objectives: in multi-
lateral forums and also in bilateral relations with 
countries and groups of countries; through very 
general actions, such as negotiation on the mana-
gement of global warming, and also via concrete 
ones, such as defending the rights and physical in-
tegrity of a Spanish national imprisoned in a fore-
ign country.
Such widely varying policy concerns and areas of 
intervention call for a strategic vision to inspire and 
provide a common denominator to these contras-
ting factors. The priorities and detailed objectives 
set out above form the framework for this strate-
gic vision.
5. Goals
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5.1. Maintain and    
promote international  
peace and security
Preserving peace and security should be the first 
goal of the international community. Nothing can 
be achieved without this supreme good, and so 
this must be the overriding concern of the multila-
teral system, and of all international actors, States 
or otherwise. 
Spain is in favour of peace and security throughout 
the world, but pays particular attention to the risks 
and threats most likely to affect this country and 
its partners and allies.
Since December 1988, more than 138,000 Spanish 
military and civilian personnel have participated 
in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian aid 
missions, in over fifty countries. 
Each Spanish participation in an operation has a 
clear strategic goal. Thus, the operations Atalan-
ta and Ocean Shield contribute to the freedom of 
navigation in the Indian Ocean; Sangaris, MINUSMA 
and EUTM in Mali; EUTM in Somalia; and EUFOR 
RCA in Central Africa all correspond to Spain’s in-
terest, and that of our partners in Europe and the 
Maghreb, in preventing the establishment of a 
band of jihadist territory from the Atlantic to the 
Indian Ocean that could destabilise North Africa.
Spain’s presence in UNIFIL (Lebanon), EUFOR 
ALTHEA (Bosnia Herzegovina), ISAF (Afghanistan), 
UNOCI (Ivory Coast), as well as the deployment of 
Spanish troops in the Baltic region, in Poland and in 
Romania, all reflect Spain’s resolute solidarity with 
our partners and allies. 
Spain’s participation in international missions is 
governed by the following basic principles:
• Internal consensus, which is secured by three 
elements: a UN resolution or one adopted by an 
international organisation to which we belong, 
or at the express request of the Government of 
the country in question; a decision by the Coun-
cil of Ministers; and the approval of Parliament. 
• Strict adherence to the mandate and to the 
mission objectives;
• Coordination and the fulfilment of underta-
kings given to our allies;
• In carrying out the mission, the Spanish force 
must have sufficient resources to ensure the sa-
fety of our personnel; this is our first operating 
condition. In this regard, let us recall that, tragica-
lly, 166 soldiers and 3 civilians have lost their lives 
in fulfilling their duty.
It should be noted that Spain's contribution to in-
ternational peace and security is not limited to mili-
tary missions, it also extends to multilateral action, 
preventive diplomacy, post-conflict efforts and the 
institutional and administrative capacity-building 
of the most vulnerable countries, to fight against 
transnational threats such as terrorism and orga-
nised crime, whatever form they may take. Special 
mention should be made of the construction and 
entry into operation of the UN Support Base at 
Quart de Poblet (Valencia), which is responsible for 
assuring telecommunications and IT services for UN 
missions.
In the next four years, Spain’s contributions to pea-
cebuilding will continue, especially through UN, EU 
or NATO-coordinated operations that contribute 
to our security or our foreign policy objectives. We 
are also firmly committed to working with the Or-
ganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), whose geographic scope and approach to 
cooperation on security are fully in line with Spain’s 
priorities.
5.2. Promote strong,   
legitimate multilateral   
institutions
The international community is faced with the pa-
radox that many of the problems to be solved, and 
many of the challenges to be faced, are global, but 
the legitimacy to do so and the means available re-
main national. 
In the absence of the effective mechanisms of glo-
bal governance that Spain favours, multilateralism 
remains the best instrument for dealing with this 
paradox.
Multilateralism is not a foreign policy objective. It 
is a means to achieve higher goals of this policy: a 
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world that is prosperous and at peace, in which ba-
sic human rights are protected and development 
compatible with social cohesion and environmen-
tal conservation is encouraged.
The multilateral institutions inherited from the 
twentieth century, designed in the 1940s fo-
llowing the Second World War, must be reformed 
if we are to respond successfully in the twenty-
first century to the needs of a rapidly changing 
world, in which countries like China and India are 
making remarkable progress, lifting hundreds of 
millions of people from grinding poverty. Another 
country that has been transformed is Brazil, 
which has implemented ambitious programmes 
to combat poverty. These countries are now ca-
lling for multilateral institutions to be more repre-
sentative of the new situation. At the same time, 
representation in these institutions should reflect 
the realities of the international arena, taking into 
account the substantial importance of countries 
like Spain.
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But the rise of the South is a much larger pheno-
menon. Other countries, such as Indonesia, Mexi-
co, Thailand, Nigeria and South Africa, are coming 
to be important players on the world stage. The 
emergence of these countries reinforces the ar-
guments for undertaking the necessary reform of 
multilateral institutions. 
Accordingly, Spain advocates a form of multilate-
ralism that combines legitimacy and effectiveness. 
This principle has led us to define different objecti-
ves for different multilateral forums, always taking 
into account the ultimate goal of achieving a legiti-
mate, effective and comprehensive mechanism of 
international governance.
The United Nations
The highest level of global legitimacy continues 
to be the United Nations, which is crucial to peace 
and international security, the promotion and pro-
tection of human rights and sustainable develop-
ment. 
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The UN system mobilises about $40 billion a 
year and employs some 80,000 people. Almost 
100,000 UN peacekeepers are deployed in seven-
teen operations on four continents; the UN provi-
des food to 90 million people and assistance to 36 
million refugees; it actively combats poverty and in 
the last 30 years has helped 370 million people to 
escape from poverty and obtain a better life.
But the UN was born and came to maturity in a 
world that was substantially different from the one 
now emerging. It has rendered very important ser-
vices to hundreds of millions of people, but to keep 
doing so, it must be reformed. 
Spain believes the organisation must be realigned 
to equip it to face the new challenges that are ari-
sing. Such a reform would involve the following 
fields in particular:
The Security Council. Our aim is that the Security 
Council should be made more effective, represen-
tative, balanced and accessible, as well as more 
accountable and transparent. Its reform should be 
comprehensive and take into consideration all five 
issues that are currently being debated: the right 
of veto, regional representation, size, working 
methods and the relationship with the General As-
sembly.
Spain is in favour of increasing the number of non-
permanent members, in an equitable geographical 
distribution and with long-term mandates, with 
the possibility of re-election. However, Spain does 
not believe the number of permanent members 
should be raised. 
Neither does Spain accept the extension of the 
right of veto; its use should be limited to certain 
situations such as to prevent or combat heinous 
crimes. We believe the reasons for making use of 
the veto should be explained and that the number 
of vetoes required to block a decision should be 
increased.
The instruments of preventive diplomacy. 
Among other aspects, the reform we propose 
would promote mediation as an instrument to be 
applied in the cause of peace; the concept of the 
responsibility to protect should be developed and 
the Alliance of Civilizations strengthened as a fo-
rum for dialogue and understanding among diffe-
rent cultures, religions and ideologies.
The institutional framework of the United Na-
tions. There must be greater consistency among 
the various UN agencies, funds and programmes 
related to development and to other policies such 
as human rights. Moreover, the UN presence must 
be made more effective, efficient and coherent in 
all countries where it operates. To this end, Spain 
has co-sponsored a UN resolution on system-wide 
coherence and will continue to work to achieve this 
goal and thus achieve an effective, flexible system.
Specialised UN Agencies
Another pillar of the United Nations is that of its 
specialised agencies, funds and programmes set 
up to address global challenges in fields such as 
finance (IMF), trade (WTO), health (WHO), social 
issues (ILO), education (UNESCO), telecommuni-
cations (ITU) and agriculture (FAO). 
Spain wants these agencies to be more effective, 
more transparent and better oriented towards 
their goals; to achieve this, they must be provided 
with new capabilities, both technological and ad-
ministrative.
New international forums
In conjunction with the UN system, our globali-
sed, interdependent world uses various forums 
to tackle global problems more effectively. One 
such is the G-20, which has been instrumental in 
managing the response to the international finan-
cial crisis, enabling consensus to attain short and 
medium-term solutions, in areas such as economic 
growth, financial regulation, taxation and the need 
to preserve and promote international trade and 
investment flows. 
The leading role of the G-20 reflects the change 
that has taken place in the institutional architectu-
re, which is now more representative and includes 
the major emerging powers. Spain considers that 
the G-20 should focus on the important work it 
performs as the world’s major forum for interna-
tional economic cooperation.
Regional organisations 
Among the most significant regional organisations 
are the Council of Europe and the OSCE. The first 
of these supervises various international agree-
ments to which Spain attaches the utmost impor-
tance. The OSCE must work for a careful balance 
between its three fundamental dimensions – poli-
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tical-military, economic-environmental and human 
affairs – in order to fully realise its potential.
Spanish presence within multilateral  
institutions
Finally, the question of Spain’s representation 
within international organisations has been a mat-
ter of constant concern. Although the numbers of 
Spanish nationals employed in multilateral institu-
tions have increased in recent years, and moreover 
within an environment of a generalised reduction 
in staffing levels, their presence still does not co-
rrespond, in number or level of responsibility, to 
the international role played by this country.
Our aim, therefore, is to increase the number of 
Spanish citizens in international organisations, and 
for them to occupy positions of responsibility. To 
this end, a global action plan, taking into account 
the particular characteristics of each international 
organisation, will be drafted.
5.3. Promote the rule of law, 
fundamental rights and  civil 
liberties
Within the international community, promoting 
democratic political systems based on the rule of 
law is a fundamental, almost natural, reflection of 
our constitutional model as part of our foreign po-
licy. It transmits the conviction that democracy is 
the best possible system of government, and the 
one best suited to meet the aspirations of the ci-
tizens of any country, regardless of their cultural 
identity. It also reflects the conviction that an in-
ternational community made up of democratic 
systems is one that is more stable, more peaceful 
and more secure.
Using foreign policy as a means of promoting the 
democratic ideal is a task for the long haul. There 
is no question of applying “institutional enginee-
ring”, which experience over the last two decades 
has proved to be futile, if not actually counterpro-
ductive. Less still do we seek to interfere in other 
countries’ affairs – such an action is hardly ever 
understood. The promotion of democracy is quite 
distinct from policies and actions adopted in res-
ponse to humanitarian crises or situations in which 
human rights are being massively violated. Essen-
tially, it means providing resolute support for the 
construction of democratic systems where this is 
the choice of the citizens of a particular country. 
And it means offering our institutional support and 
counsel in situations of transition towards demo-
cracy. Finally, it means opting for a particular type 
of international governance, that which is based on 
the greatest possible legitimacy.
A parallel issue, but one that must be clearly dis-
tinguished, is that of foreign policy regarding the 
promotion and defence of human rights and basic 
freedoms. This is quite a different question from 
the promotion of democracy. Here, what is at is-
sue is the situation of human beings in particular 
and the belief that these rights are universal, and 
should be respected regardless of the constitutio-
nal choice of political system in which they live.
Therefore, the promotion and defence of human 
rights are included in our foreign policy for a two-
fold reason: ethical and political. On the one hand, 
external action projects an identity, which in our 
case is based on the conviction that human beings, 
and their inherent dignity, are inviolable. On the 
other hand, experience has shown that situations 
of systematic violations of basic rights usually de-
generate into violent conflict and endemic instabi-
lity. In other words, the promotion of respect for 
these rights within the international community 
promotes our own security, prevents and anticipa-
tes crises and armed conflicts, and, ultimately, en-
hances our situation by enhancing that of others.
The importance of human rights in foreign policy 
was evoked by the Congress of Deputies in Fe-
bruary 2012, when it approved a non-legislative 
proposal that committed the Executive to imple-
menting the Second National Human Rights Plan, 
with concrete measures of foreign (and domestic) 
policy concerning the promotion and protection of 
human rights.
The concept of human rights has evolved consi-
derably since the adoption of the Universal De-
claration in 1948, and the idea has been raised 
that successive “generations” of rights should be 
recognised and protected. Spain’s foreign policy 
reflects these evolving perceptions and, together 
with the promotion and protection of basic rights, 
sets out the following priorities:
•	 Opposition	to	capital	punishment	
•	 Action	to	combat	discrimination	based	on	gen-
der, sexual orientation and gender identity
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•	 The	rights	of	persons	with	disabilities
•	 The	human	right	to	drinking	water	and	sanita-
tion
•	 Business	and	human	rights
•	 Defenders	of	human	rights.
5.4. Combat poverty and 
act in solidarity with   
developing countries
Poverty affects more than 2.2 billion people. It is 
the world’s major problem and is at the heart of 
many of the problems facing humanity. To give just 
one example, irregular immigration is mainly the 
outcome of people seeking to escape from the po-
verty in their home countries.
Let us make it clear: poverty is not only an econo-
mic problem; it is, above all, a political one. For a 
country to emerge from poverty, there must be 
conditions of peace, security and good govern-
ment, and these must be achieved through policies 
to promote education, health and empowerment, 
thus enabling the emergence of a middle class, so-
mething that has hitherto been absent from most 
poor countries. 
Does globalisation lead to growth?
In recent years, the world economy has undergone 
a substantial process of deregulation and liberali-
sation. Unlike what happened immediately before 
the First World War, this process has affected not 
only the industrialised countries but also the deve-
loping ones, although not all have advanced to the 
same degree.
Some emerging countries have grown faster than 
the advanced economies. Thus, China, India, the 
former ‘Asian Tigers’ (South Korea, Singapore and 
the territories of Hong Kong and Taiwan), and 
other countries in this region (such as Vietnam, 
Philippines and Malaysia) have grown substantially. 
This is also true of Latin American countries such 
as Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru.
Unfortunately, other developing countries – grea-
ter in number but smaller in population – are fur-
ther behind the richer ones than ever. In most of 
them, life expectancy is falling, due to pandemics, 
vulnerability to adverse climate events and a re-
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The manipulation of religious sentiment 
and belief is a factor of conflict in the 
international community, as is the exclusion 
or marginalisation of non-majority faiths. 
Only religious freedom, respect for diverse 
beliefs, and inter-faith dialogue can lay a 
sound foundation to address and resolve this 
problem. 
In Spain, the 1980 Religious Freedom Act 
created a framework for promoting values 
associated with tolerance and respect for 
religious beliefs. This framework inspires our 
international action in this area and contains 
the following main elements:
•	 If	they	wish,	religious	organisations	may	
have legal personality. 
•	 The	Advisory	Committee	on	
Religious Freedom, in which Government 
representatives, religious groups and experts 
in the field have equal representation. The 
Government may submit any issue for its 
consideration. Through this advisory body, 
the religious denominations are actively 
involved in the management of religious 
freedom. 
•	 The	Foundation	for	Pluralism	and	
Coexistence. This agency funds projects 
aimed at the social, educational and cultural 
integration of religious denominations. 
•	 The	Observatory	of	Religious	Pluralism	
in Spain. This internet portal (www.
observatorioreligion.es) has been hailed by 
the European Commission as an example 
of best practice in the fight against 
discrimination on the grounds of religion 
or belief. Its aim is to provide tools for 
the management of religious diversity, 
particularly at the local level. Participation 
in international initiatives such as the King 
Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Centre 
for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue 
(KAICIID), based in Vienna and promoted by 
Austria, Spain and Saudi Arabia. In addition, 
Spain maintains a permanent position in 
various international forums in defence of 
religious freedom.
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duced ability to recover from natural disasters. 
Most of these countries are in sub-Saharan Africa, 
although they are also present in Asia, Latin Ame-
rica and the Caribbean.
The developing countries that have grown most 
are those which have most rapidly become inte-
grated into the global economy, while those which 
have achieved least growth have done exactly the 
opposite. In recent years, foreign direct investment 
has been directed towards the most open coun-
tries, while those which have chosen the contrary 
option remain without access to this source of fun-
ding.
It should be noted that the growth in the global 
economy has increased employment by less than 
might have been expected: for each added percen-
tage point of GDP, employment has increased by 
just 0.3%, according to the UNDP. This correlation 
is very worrying, in view of the fact that over 200 
million people worldwide have no work of any kind, 
according to the International Labour Organiza-
tion, while many millions more, who are statistica-
lly “employed” are in fact working in very preca-
rious situations.
Does globalisation increase world poverty? 
It is commonly claimed in the anti-globalisation 
discourse that globalisation has made the rich ri-
cher and the poor poorer.
The statistics do not support this view. According 
to Srjit S. Bhalla, director of Oxus Research and In-
vestment in Delhi, the poverty rate fell from 56% 
in 1950 to 9% in 2000. In the 1990s alone, global 
poverty decreased by 25.6%. According to the 
World Bank, between 1990 and 2010, the percen-
tage of the world’s population living on $1.25 a day 
fell from 43% to 20% and by 2015 it will have been 
reduced to 16%.
Poverty and quality of life 
The above statistics define poverty in terms of a 
certain income level. It is clear, however, that mo-
netary income is not the most significant index for 
measuring human welfare; the most important in-
dicators are those reflecting the quality of life.
Some years ago, the UN popularised the use of the 
Human Development Index (HDI), based on three 
key indicators: per capita income, longevity and li-
teracy. According to its 2013 HDI report, The real 
wealth of a nation is its people, Norway, Australia 
and the United States head the ranking of 187 cou-
ntries and territories, while the Democratic Repu-
blic of the Congo, ravaged by conflict, and Niger, 
affected by drought, recorded the lowest values.
According to the same report, “Over the past de-
cades, countries across the world have been con-
verging towards higher levels of human develop-
ment…. All groups and regions have seen notable 
improvement in all HDI components, with faster 
progress in low and medium HDI countries. On this 
basis, the world is becoming less unequal”.
When the HDI is adjusted for internal inequali-
ties in health, education and income, some of the 
wealthiest nations drop sharply in the rankings: the 
USA falls from third to sixteenth, while Korea falls 
from twelfth to number 28. Sweden, by contrast, 
rises from seventh to fourth place.
An even more comprehensive indicator is the In-
ternational Human Suffering Index, which incorpo-
rates ten variables: life expectancy, calorie intake, 
drinking water, infant immunisation, secondary 
schooling, per capita income, inflation, commu-
nication technologies, political freedom and civil 
rights. 
The data show that, in the last forty years, in the 
poorest countries, longevity has increased, infant 
mortality has decreased, literacy rates have risen 
and there is more generalised access to clean drin-
king water. 
Poverty and inequality 
As a result of globalisation, the poor are better off 
than a few years ago, but the rich have become 
even more affluent. The income of the relatively 
well off sectors of the population has increased 
faster than that of the poor, thus increasing in-
equality both in advanced economies and in deve-
loping countries.
What has happened in the world in terms of inco-
me distribution? What about fairness? Has inequa-
lity increased or decreased? The answers to these 
questions are more complex than those relating to 
poverty because they involve three different con-
cepts of inequality: among countries, among the 
world’s citizens as a whole and among those from 
a single country.
Inequality among countries is measured by the 
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Obviously, a certain degree of inequality reflects 
different levels of effort and productivity, but it is 
equally obvious that excessive economic dispari-
ties result in economic inefficiencies that prevent 
countries from taking full advantage of economic 
integration. When disparities between different 
population groups are too large, citizens cannot 
take full advantage of the country’s investment in 
education, health and social services.
Inequality hampers development, and govern-
ments that are unresponsive to the needs of their 
citizens and to opportunities to achieve inclusive 
growth, with political participation, risk losing their 
legitimacy.
The international fight against poverty
In 2000, the UN member countries pledged that by 
2015, specific targets termed the Millennium Deve-
lopment Goals (MDGs) would be achieved.
UN member states are currently negotiating the 
Post-2015 Development Agenda, which includes 
new goals, the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) which will replace the MDGs, and is expec-
ted to be approved by the General Assembly in Sep-
tember 2015. 
The main aim of the MDGs was to achieve the re-
duction of extreme poverty, and they were focused 
inequality of the average income in each coun-
try, regardless of its population. When measured 
this way, inequality among countries has increa-
sed in recent decades. The average income of the 
advanced nations has continued to rise in recent 
years, while that of the poorest countries has de-
clined. 
The index measuring inequality among countries 
is useful for calibrating development cooperation 
policies because it reflects the use made by be-
neficiary countries of the resources they receive.
The fact that inequality among countries has in-
creased does not necessarily mean that it has also 
increased among the world’s citizens. The first 
case has been described as that of “divergence, 
big time", but one may also talk in terms of con-
vergence, because income distribution worldwide 
has become more equal than in the 1970s, spu-
rred by the economic growth of a few very popu-
lous countries such as China, India and Vietnam.
Inequalities within individual countries have in-
creased in recent years, both in developed and in 
developing countries. In other words, the benefits 
of growth, even in countries that have chosen di-
fferent models of development, have widened the 
gap between rich and poor, both in the USA and in 
Nigeria, to give two extreme examples.
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT 
GOALS
Goal 1: To eradicate extreme poverty & hunger
- Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion 
of people whose income is less than $1.25 a day.
- Achieve full and productive employment and 
decent work for all, including women and young 
people, and forthrightly reject child labour.
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education.
- Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys 
and girls alike, will be able to complete a full 
course of primary schooling.
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower 
women
- Eliminate gender disparity in primary and 
secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in 
all levels of education no later than 2015.
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality.
- Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, 
the under-five mortality rate.
Goal 5: Improve maternal health.
- Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 
2015, the maternal mortality ratio.
- Achieve, by 2015, universal access to 
reproductive health.
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other 
diseases.
- Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the 
spread of HIV/AIDS
- Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment 
for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it
- Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the 
incidence of malaria and other major diseases.
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Workshop in Comayagua (Honduras), financed by the AECID.
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability
- Integrate the principles of sustainable 
development into country policies and 
programmes and reverse the loss of 
environmental resources
- Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a 
significant reduction in the rate of loss
- Halve, by 2015, the proportion of the 
population without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water and basic sanitation
- Achieve, by 2020, a significant improvement in 
the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for 
development.
- Develop further an open, rule-based, 
predictable, non-discriminatory trading and 
financial system
- Address the special needs of least developed 
countries
- Address the special needs of landlocked 
developing countries and small island developing 
States (through the Programme of Action for 
the Sustainable Development of Small Island 
Developing States and the outcome of the 
twenty-second special session of the General 
Assembly).
- Deal comprehensively with the debt problems 
of developing countries
- In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, 
provide access to affordable essential drugs in 
developing countries
- In cooperation with the private sector, make 
available benefits of new technologies, especially 
information and communications.
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exclusively on developing countries. The SDGs also 
incorporate the objectives of development coope-
ration and have a more universal scope.
The MDGs were structured into 8 goals, 21 tar-
gets and 60 indicators to be achieved by 2015. The 
SDGs will follow a similar approach, with a short 
list of goals (ideally no more than 10), that are easy 
to communicate and with different commitments 
for different countries, with an initial horizon of the 
year 2030.
The SDGs include the MDGs in which least pro-
gress has been made, together with new areas 
such as inequality, governance, human rights, in-
clusive economic growth, access to energy and en-
vironmental sustainability.
In this context, Spain is committed to an ambi-
tious, balanced agenda that incorporates elements 
of the MDG programme and addresses the new 
challenges that have been identified, seeking to 
ensure that no one is left behind and to reconcile 
human development – as part of comprehensive 
sustainable development – with the ultimate goal 
of eradicating poverty and ensuring environmental 
sustainability.
Spain has made a key contribution to this new 
agenda, emphasising the issues that Spanish so-
ciety holds especially dear: human rights, gender 
equality, food security, water and sanitation. At the 
same time, we have advocated the idea that con-
tinuing efforts should be made to meet the Millen-
nium Development Goals by 2015, even as the new 
agenda is being established. Only thus can real, 
comprehensive sustainability be achieved. 
The Sustainable Development Goals will be funded 
by Official Development Assistance, together with 
domestic resources and private contributions.
5.5. Protect the    
environment and    
biodiversity and fight   
climate change
Among other objectives, Spain’s foreign policy 
must include environmental protection and the 
fight against climate change, in order to help achie-
ve items of global public good, which by their very 
nature, are the responsibility of the international 
community. These are global challenges and an 
adequate response can only be found in the global 
context.
Responding effectively to environmental challen-
ges is also essential if sustainable social and eco-
nomic development is to be achieved. The basic 
framework in which to undertake such a response 
must be that of the United Nations, through its nu-
merous programmes, conventions and other inter-
national instruments, on a sectoral basis, addres-
sing problems associated with the protection of 
biodiversity, air quality, waste management, water 
supply and distribution, etc. Our aim, therefore, is 
to promote the effective performance of the envi-
ronmental commitments made within the United 
Nations.
In this regard, Spain must act within the context 
of the European Union, which leads international 
negotiations on environmental issues. 
Climate change is the paradigm of the global cha-
llenge we must face, both in its causes and its 
effects. The main framework for action in this res-
pect, once again, must be the UN, and in particular 
its Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
Again, Spain’s natural area for action in this matter 
is the EU, which is very active in addressing sus-
tainability and climate change, setting targets for 
reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases, pro-
moting energy efficiency, low-carbon sources of 
energy, etc.
Spain has endeavoured to meet the targets set in 
the UN Convention on Climate Change and in the 
Kyoto Protocol, and to promote the development 
of renewable energy. 
At the international level, Spain has positioned 
itself as a major player in the field of alternative 
energy, with various world-leading companies in 
this area. Furthermore, the Spanish economic mo-
del is being reoriented towards a less energy inten-
sive and more sustainable approach.
One of the cornerstones of European and Spanish 
policy to reduce emissions is the development of 
international carbon markets. Setting a price on 
the emissions of greenhouse gases, and relating 
this to different reduction obligations, is a useful 
and effective means of encouraging emissions re-
duction.
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Accordingly, Spain has turned to the internatio-
nal carbon markets in order to reduce the overall 
balance of our emissions. In return, and in coope-
ration with various international financial institu-
tions, we have promoted “green projects” in third 
countries. This new scenario in the international 
fight against climate change requires the develop-
ment of new instruments for external action in this 
regard, as well as the enhancement and strengthe-
ning of existing ones.
In addition, Spain must pay very careful special at-
tention to the coastal effects of climate change. 
This threat is directly associated with rising sea 
levels, increased water temperature, acidification 
and changes in tide and wave patterns. Another 
question of great significance for our country is 
the threat of desertification, with the associated 
loss of biodiversity.
5.6. Arms control:    
eliminate weapons of mass  
destruction and limit   
conventional arsenals 
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) – nuclear, chemical and biological – and 
their delivery systems poses a serious threat to in-
ternational peace and security. The proliferation of 
these weapons is at the root of many conflicts and 
intensifies their danger. By definition, WMD cons-
titute a global risk, threatening the world’s order 
and stability. 
The threat posed by this proliferation is characte-
rised by its complexity and its ability to self-trans-
form in response to actions taken by national go-
vernments. This adaptability is the result of factors 
such as technological developments, the possibi-
lity of dual use of materials and technologies, the 
exploitation of trafficking routes, the difficulty of 
identifying the origin of the actors, the use of new 
information technologies and social networks and 
the appearance of sources of proliferation other 
than the traditional superpowers, particularly in 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTER-
NATIONAL COOPERATION
Spain plays an important role in international 
cooperation on climate change, especially 
in its relations with Latin America through 
the work of the Ibero-American Network 
of Climate Change Offices (RIOCC). This 
network provides an informal, technical 
space for exchanging experiences and 
an opportunity to identify synergies and 
opportunities for support among all countries 
promoting North-South and/or South-South 
cooperation and triangular cooperation on 
climate change. 
In association with UNEP, Spain is promoting 
the REGATTA project (Regional Gateway for 
Technology Transfer and Climate Change 
Action), aimed at capacity building and the 
promotion and exchange of knowledge 
in Latin America and the Caribbean on 
technologies and experiences concerning 
climate change.
flashpoint areas where regional rivalries are inten-
se. Proliferation poses a threat to diverse actors 
and structures within a State, which are especially 
vulnerable because of their dependence on new 
technologies in the management of infrastructu-
re, or because of global characteristics of logistics, 
transport and trade.
For all these reasons, a global, regional and natio-
nal strategy of response must be established, ba-
sed on international cooperation and multilateral 
action. In consequence, Spain’s foreign policy re-
presents an essential element of the global stra-
tegy to combat the proliferation of WMD and con-
ventional weapons.
Global, regional and national strategies.
The system established to ensure the non-prolife-
ration of WMD rests upon a series of international 
1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con-
vention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, among others.
2. Resolution 1540 against the proliferation of WMD to non-State actors, Resolution 2117 (2013) against the illicit trade in small arms and light 
weapons, and resolutions imposing sanctions on countries such as Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran.
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treaties1 , together with UN Security Council2 and 
General Assembly3 resolutions, and other agree-
ments and legal instruments that may not be spe-
cifically designed to combat proliferation but which 
contain relevant provisions4.
Regionally, the European Union has adopted two 
specific strategies. In 2003, the “EU Strategy aga-
inst Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion” set out a list of measures to be adopted in 
the EU and in third countries to combat such pro-
liferation. This Strategy was updated in 2008 by 
the document entitled “New lines for action by the 
European Union in combating the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery 
systems”, which declared that non-proliferation 
is an essential part of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. In 2005, moreover, the European 
Council adopted the “EU Strategy to combat the 
illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms 
and light weapons and their ammunition”.
Spain is actively engaged in international forums 
and systems for arms control and disarmament5, 
and participates in structures created to control 
the transfer of weapons and other defence equip-
ment and of dual-use products and technologies6. 
Spain also participates in initiatives and interna-
tional forms of international cooperation to com-
bat the proliferation of WMD7. Spain is also party 
to various international conventions to eradicate 
weapons that violate international humanitarian 
law and human rights8.
Spain’s National Security Strategy policy docu-
ment views the proliferation of WMD as a major 
threat to national security and defines it as an area 
of priority attention, setting out policy objectives 
and the corresponding lines of strategic action.
The transformative nature of this threat requires 
us to design a foreign policy strategy for non-pro-
liferation and disarmament that can be adapted to 
changing circumstances and security contingen-
cies, and to the different strategic environments 
faced, in Europe, the Mediterranean, Latin America 
and North Africa. Furthermore, Spain’s members-
hip of various security organisations9 that are ac-
tive in this field entails responsibilities and duties, 
both internationally and on the domestic stage.
Strategic goals and actions
The main aim of Spanish foreign policy in this area 
is to prevent the proliferation of WMD and to pro-
mote disarmament and arms control. To achieve 
this goal, strategic lines of action must be establis-
hed and put into practice.
Strategic goals
Three strategic goals have been identified:
Goal 1: In accordance with the National Security 
Strategy, to prevent the proliferation of WMD, 
to prevent terrorist access to chemical, biolo-
gical, radiological and nuclear materials and to 
protect the population.
Goal 2: To promote international peace and sta-
bility through the promotion, adherence to and 
implementation of treaties and other internatio-
nal instruments for disarmament and weapons 
control, including weapons that violate interna-
tional humanitarian law and human rights (Arms 
Trade Treaty, Convention on the Prohibition of 
Anti-Personnel Mines, Convention on the Prohi-
bition of Cluster Munitions, Convention on the 
Prohibition of Certain Conventional Weapons.)
3. United Nations Programme of Action against Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Light weapons, and the International Tracing Instrument 
on Small Arms and Light Weapons.
4. 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, the 2010 Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (the Beijing Convention) and the UN Protocol against illicit 
manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, adopted in Resolution 55/255 of the General 
Assembly in 2001 and which entered into force in 2005.
5. 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, which entered into force in 1992; the 2011 Vienna Document (the Open Skies Treaty), 
which entered into force in 2002.
6. The Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology 
Control Regime.
7. Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Wea-
pons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Global Health Security Agenda and the system of Nuclear Security Summits.
8. Such humanitarian disarmament agreements include the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines, the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions and the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed 
to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
9. OTAN and OSCE
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Goal 3: To reinforce systems of arms control 
and disarmament in regions of strategic impor-
tance for Spain, such as Europe, Latin America, 
the Mediterranean and North Africa. 
Líneas de Actuación 
Actions
To achieve these strategic goals, different lines of 
action are proposed, setting out the actions to be 
taken by the External Service in this respect. These 
actions will be carried out in accordance with the 
priority assigned to each goal and the resources 
available.
Prevent the proliferation of WMD, prevent terro-
rist access to chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear (CBRN) materials and protect the popula-
tion. To do so, we must:
•	 Strengthen	 international	 treaties	 subject	 to	
international law, and treaties with related clau-
ses, through full national implementation and 
the promotion of multilateral cooperation.
•	 Actively	participate	in	relevant	organisations,	
forums and international systems, and collabo-
rate in programmes to control the transfer of 
arms and dual-use technology and equipment.
•	 Cooperate	with	other	States	and	major	stra-
tegic partners in working to prevent, deter, halt 
and, where possible, eliminate the proliferation 
of WMD, and support preventive and punitive 
measures to combat the illegal financing of pro-
liferation.
•	 Promote	 the	 full,	 effective	 implementation	
of UN Security Council Resolutions, in particu-
lar Resolution 1540, against the proliferation of 
WMD and their delivery, to prevent them from 
being acquired by non-State actors.
•	 Actively	 participate	 in	 initiatives	 to	 combat	
the proliferation of WMD and CBRN risks.
•	 Support	 international	 efforts	 to	 limit	 the	
proliferation of long-range missiles, capable of 
being used to launch WMD.
•	 Enhance	Spain’s	coordination	with	other	de-
partments and stakeholders to combat the pro-
liferation of WMD. In particular, this means:
- Heightened commitment to and active par-
ticipation in policies and practices aimed at 
controlling the export of dual-use products 
and technologies, including the transfer of 
knowledge, technology, goods and equip-
ment.
- Support for actions to locate, control and 
intercept illegal traffic in such products and 
technologies, whether national or internatio-
nal.
- Improve national and international capacity 
to prevent and respond to possible terrorist 
attacks with CBRN materials, in cooperation 
with our partners, allies and other countries 
of strategic interest.
- Develop and update National Plans for pre-
venting weapons proliferation and alleviating 
CBRN risks.
- Foster strategic information disclosure 
in civil, scientific and academic society and 
awareness-raising programmes for all stake-
holders in the fight against weapons prolife-
ration.
To promote international peace and stability 
through the promotion, adherence to and imple-
mentation of treaties and other international ins-
truments for disarmament and weapons control, 
including weapons that violate international huma-
nitarian law and human rights. To do so, we must:
•	 Strengthen	 multilateral	 treaties	 and	 agree-
ments on disarmament and non-proliferation, 
ensuring their full implementation at the natio-
nal level, and promote multilateral, regional and 
bilateral cooperation, working for full imple-
mentation worldwide.
•	 Promote,	 support	 and	actively	participate	 in	
treaties, conventions, agreements and multila-
teral initiatives to combat the illicit trafficking of 
small arms and light weapons, a common factor 
underlying the threats posed by terrorism and 
transnational organised crime.
•	 Reinforce	 humanitarian	 disarmament	 agree-
ments and cooperation aimed at restricting or 
eliminating especially harmful or indiscriminate 
weapons, which hamper the development of 
societies and inflict grave damage on civilians in 
armed conflict, in violation of international hu-
manitarian law.
•	 Support	 humanitarian	 actions	 related	 to	 se-
curity, such as programmes to eliminate explo-
sive weaponry, to clear areas contaminated with 
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mines or other explosives, to destroy weapons 
arsenals and to support the victims of mines, 
cluster munitions and other explosive remnants 
of war.
•	 Remain	 committed	 to	 international	 and	 re-
gional initiatives on demining and to providing 
care for victims of antipersonnel mines, through 
trust funds to support demining and disarma-
ment initiatives, and through regional or bilate-
ral agreements.
Reinforce systems of arms control and disar-
mament in regions of strategic importance for 
Spain, such as Europe, North Africa and the Me-
diterranean. To do so, we must:
•	 Promote	 stability	 by	 compliance	 with	 the	
applicable arms control treaties in the Euro-At-
lantic area and by promoting their implementa-
tion by other countries, with particular respect 
to sub-regional conflicts10 where an excessive 
accumulation of weapons may have major im-
plications for Spanish and European security.
•	 Strengthen	measures	to	build	confidence	and	
security in the Euro-Atlantic area, increasing 
transparency and predictability through coope-
ration with partners and allies in regional orga-
nisations such as NATO and OSCE.
•	 Promote	stability	in	North	Africa,	the	Medite-
rranean and Latin America through multilateral, 
regional and bilateral cooperation to strengthen 
arms control capabilities, regarding both con-
ventional weapons and WMD and related tech-
nologies.
5.7. Build a Europe that 
is more integrated, more        
legitimate and a global  
figure of authority
The European Union is our natural vocation, the 
best way to make Spain more prosperous and se-
cure. This is why Spain should actively contribute 
to building an ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe.
Within the Union, this priority is reflected in our en-
deavours to make Europe more integrated, more 
legitimate, more approachable and more accoun-
table to its citizens. Opinion surveys show that Eu-
ropeans are less confident than before that the EU 
can meet their daily needs, reduce unemployment, 
raise their standard of living or secure their future 
pension. At the same time, they believe that Euro-
pean institutions are too remote from citizens and 
that their situation is one of “democratic deficit”.
The process of European integration also requires 
the Union to become a global player. Tomorrow’s 
world will be a better one with a Europe that is 
united. In the coming international community, any 
European country acting alone is predestined to 
irrelevance – although perhaps seeking comfort in 
the belief that all is “relative”. Only by ensuring that 
the Union becomes a truly global player, with poli-
tical weight and world influence, will we be able to 
make a difference in the world to come.
The outcome of our process of European integra-
tion should be political union, a federal union, the 
United States of Europe, and not a mere union of 
sovereign states. This process is one to be carried 
out in phases or stages, but the ultimate goal must 
be clearly defined at the outset.
Each of these phases calls for important reforms, 
as detailed below. Some may be made in accor-
dance with the legal basis established under the 
existing Treaties, while others will require changes 
to primary legislation. But what is most important 
now is not whether the treaties should or should 
not be reformed. The crucial point is to reach an 
agreement on the process, the timing and the pace 
of reform, and to maintain sufficient flexibility to 
respond appropriately to changing circumstances.
In any case, we have already advanced so far that 
backtracking is not an option. Few dispute whether 
or not we should integrate more; the real debate 
revolves around how and when. Only integration 
enables us to foresee a future of growth, stability 
and the creation of a favourable climate for busi-
ness.
10. This is one of the main sources of illicit arms movements towards organised crime and terrorist groups, including small weapons and 
WMD and related technologies. Subregional conflicts also generate humanitarian crises, provoke military interventions and lead to uncon-
trolled migratory flows.
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5.7.1. Strengthen the Economic   
and Monetary Union
The economic crisis in Europe has also been a poli-
tical one, a crisis of confidence. And we will only be 
able to prevent such crises in the future if we fina-
lise certain capital projects that have only got half 
way, such as the Economic and Monetary Union, to 
get Europe really working and to be viewed, once 
again, as a source of prosperity.
The way forward calls for a complete system de-
sign, to obtain a stable, prosperous Economic and 
Monetary Union and an institutional architecture 
that is consistent with the changes that have taken 
place in our economic structure since the creation 
of the single currency.
But having a clear idea of the final design does 
not mean it need be activated in a single step. 
The European Union, since the Schuman Decla-
ration, has been built step-by-step, in stages. 
And crucially, this final design must conform to 
rock-solid economic criteria, complementing the 
convergence criteria set out in the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
Henceforth, the process of European integration 
should proceed in three respects, to be addressed 
in successive phases:
•	 The	 first	 phase	would	 consist	 in	 eliminating	
past excesses and establishing monitoring and 
control mechanisms to ensure that such exces-
ses are not repeated. Thus, work must be conti-
nued within the framework of the European Se-
mester to ensure the homogeneous application 
of the Excessive Deficit Procedure and of the 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, and to 
perform systematic reviews of compliance with 
the specific recommendations made for each 
country and for the eurozone. 
 
It is also necessary to secure the proper applica-
tion of the specific supervision mechanisms for 
the eurozone. 
Finally, within the Banking Union, the Single Su-
pervisory Mechanism must be properly imple-
mented.
•	 A	second	phase	would	consist	 in	creating	fi-
nancial mechanisms and an economic agree-
ment that would allow a limited degree of so-
lidarity, strictly conditional on the existence of 
control mechanisms to ensure fiscal and budge-
tary discipline.
•	 The	 third	 phase	would	 lead	 to	 the	 establis-
hment of a genuine fiscal and economic union 
governed by a body endowed with real powers. 
Obviously, this would require amendment of the 
Treaties.
The so-called sovereign debt crisis was essentia-
lly a crisis of confidence in the euro. Strengthe-
ning the Economic and Monetary Union was a key 
element in restoring confidence, but the process 
must be continued in order to achieve a genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union, one that is a sou-
rce of growth and prosperity and ensures that a 
crisis of this nature cannot reoccur.
The member states of the eurozone have most to 
gain from achieving a stable and effective EMU. 
However, its existence will affect all, including 
those which have not yet adopted the single cu-
rrency, but intend to do so, and also those which 
have no such plans. For this reason, the reforms 
should be undertaken, whenever possible, within 
the framework of the 28 EU Member States.
Reinforce the role of the European Central Bank
The main goal of the European Central Bank is to 
maintain price stability. In recent times, in order 
to ensure the smooth operation of mechanisms 
for the transmission of monetary policy, it has re-
sorted to programmes of purchasing government 
bonds in the secondary market, and is now imple-
menting a covered bonds purchasing and securi-
tisation programme. In addition, it has conducted 
special three-year liquidity injection operations.
In the medium term, and without prejudice to its 
main goal of assuring price stability, the ECB could 
assume the role of lender of last resort, under si-
milar conditions to those applied by other central 
banks, in order to support “the general economic 
policies contributing to the achievement of the 
Union's objectives as laid down in Article 3 of the 
Treaty on European Union” (Art. 127 TFEU).
An integrated financial framework
European financial markets must become more 
efficient in the allocation of credit and in making 
resources available to businesses and families. 
Therefore, steps must be taken to improve the 
performance of these markets, and the first of 
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these steps is to achieve a genuine banking union. 
Apart from the decisions that have already been 
taken, the following six steps are necessary:
•	 Complete	the	drafting	of	a	“single	regulatory	
system” to definitively harmonise European re-
gulations for financial markets, facilitating their 
integration and making the rules applicable to 
them genuinely equivalent.
•	 Reinforce	the	ECB,	so	that	it	may	properly	su-
pervise the banking sector.
•	 Ensure	 that	 the	 Single	 Resolution	 Mecha-
nism is fully operational as and when provided 
for in Regulation 806/2014, establishing this 
Mechanism. With the approval of this Mecha-
nism, which complements the provisions of the 
Directive for the Recovery and Resolution of 
Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, a very 
significant step has been taken to ensure that 
the taxpayer ceases to bear the burdens of a 
resolution, and the situation becomes, instead, 
one in which the risk is borne by investors and 
by the creditors of the entities; in international 
financial terminology, bail-in rather than bail-out 
will be installed.
•	 Advance	towards	a	common	deposit	guaran-
tee system that is pre-funded by the financial 
institutions themselves, in order to obtain a spe-
cific financial instrument, at the European level, 
to protect depositors in the event of an entity’s 
liquidation. 
•	 Constitute	the	European	Single	Bank	Resolu-
tion Fund, also to be pre-funded by the financial 
institutions themselves, in the timeframe esta-
blished in Regulation 806/2014, constituting 
the Single Resolution Mechanism.
•	 Create	a	common	support	mechanism	to	en-
sure that the European Single Bank Resolution 
Fund has access to additional funding if neces-
sary, and to secure systems of bridging finance 
in the transitional period.
An integrated budgetary framework
In recent years, important measures have been 
adopted to reinforce budgetary discipline and to 
correct macroeconomic imbalances. What is now 
needed is to ensure their proper implementation 
and in the case of the Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Procedure, to ensure, moreover, that it is a true 
early warning mechanism, alerting us to the risk of 
future imbalances.
A very appropriate instrument for reinforcing bud-
getary discipline is provided by the Common Provi-
sions Regulation 473/2013, by which the European 
Commission may review draft budgetary plans be-
fore they are sent to national parliaments, and may 
request the inclusion of additional measures if the-
re is a risk of non-compliance with fiscal targets. 
The proper implementation of this coordination 
mechanism and its uniform application throughout 
the eurozone should be ensured, without distinc-
tion, in order to maintain the effectiveness of the 
Stability and Growth Pact.
Once strict budgetary coordination has been 
achieved, then the expression of financial solidari-
ty through the issuance of euro bonds can be con-
sidered.
Progress towards formulas for the mutualisation 
of debt should in any case be progressive, and 
conditional on the existence of stringent fiscal 
controls to prevent countries with slack fiscal dis-
cipline from benefiting unfairly from the solidarity 
of others.
If such fiscal controls are properly constructed, 
and strictly applied, the above-mentioned moral 
hazard problem will be avoided. In this context, a 
mutualisation of debt would strengthen the role of 
the euro in the financial markets and reduce finan-
cing costs in the eurozone. In turn, debt mutualisa-
tion with ex ante and ex post budgetary controls 
could also provide an important stimulus to fiscal 
and budgetary discipline among EU Member Sta-
tes.
An integrated framework for economic policy
The only way to overcome the fundamental flaw 
of the EMU – that of monetary union without full 
economic union – is through greater coordina-
tion. This does not mean that all policy measures 
should be decided at the European level. But there 
are fundamental issues in which we need an appro-
priate combination of effective, binding European 
coordination, with a margin of decision in which 
national systems may be overruled. This new fra-
mework for coordination, convergence and the 
application of structural policies could be based on 
contractual arrangements, backed with financial 
support to implement the reforms.
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More effective governing institutions for the 
Economic and Monetary Union
Such a major extension of the Economic and Mo-
netary Union must be accompanied by greater 
effectiveness and legitimacy. In this respect, we 
have two suggestions:
•	 It	would	be	desirable	for	the	currency	of	the	
entire Union to be the euro and for its parlia-
ment to be the European Parliament. Any future 
architecture for the EMU should recognise that 
this is where the ultimate responsibilities reside.
•	 However,	 if	 a	 decision	 is	 to	 be	 applied	 only	
to the eurozone – and to other member states 
that choose to participate in it – we must seek 
ways to involve the parliaments of these states 
in the decision, and this must be done whilst 
maintaining full respect for the integrity of the 
Union and of its Parliament.
5.7.2. Improve the EU’s capacity for internal 
and external action
Having overcome the euro crisis, the challenge 
now is to make the EU function better, and one as-
pect of this challenge concerns the action of the 
Union in the world.
Europe, a global player
The Union makes use of instruments such as tra-
de policy, development aid, enlargement policy, 
neighbourhood policy, the management of migra-
tion flows, policies regarding the environmental 
and climate change, and energy policy. These are 
all internal policies but they also have an important 
external dimension and therefore can have a major 
impact on the Union’s external action. 
But we must make them more coherent, and view 
them as tools with which the EU can increase its 
influence in the world.
Moreover, the coordination of foreign policy must 
be enhanced, by increasing the frequency of in-
formal meetings in the Gymnich format, ensuring 
greater interaction with the European Council and 
dedicating a biannual meeting of the European 
Council to external policy.
The Common Security and Defence Policy should 
be more ambitious than the simple “pooling and 
sharing” of capabilities. We must take advantage 
of all the possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty. 
Specifically:
•	 The	 institutional	 structure	 of	 the	 CSDP	
should be complemented by the creation of a 
permanent system for the planning and conduct 
of military operations, similar to that employed 
for civil missions. 
•	 Crisis	 management	 should	 be	 enhanced,	
through the more effective combination of civil 
and military mechanisms. 
•	 Capabilities	 must	 be	 developed,	 in	 areas	
such as improving tactical battle groups and 
enhancing the role of the European Defence 
Agency.
In short, with respect to the external policy and 
the security of the Union, Spain has the same level 
of ambition as it has expressed with regard to all 
other policies for European integration. The above 
actions should be accompanied by greater collabo-
ration with our strategic partners, with the twofold 
aim of tackling global challenges (such as climate 
change, terrorism, drug trafficking, development 
and migration) and of strengthening the role of the 
EU as a global partner. 
The High Representative should play a leading role 
in these relationships; Spain attaches particular 
importance to those with Brazil and Mexico, two 
of our most important two strategic partners.
Reinforce internal policies
If Europe wants to be a global player, in a new glo-
bal order, it must go further in other policies, too. 
•	 Phase	out	barriers	to	intra-Community	trade,	
the regulatory, administrative and even physical 
barriers that hamper the internal market. 
•	 Create	a	true	internal	energy	market	with	in-
frastructures designed for the European space, 
achieving greater energy efficiency and a com-
mon European definition of external energy re-
lations.
•	 Pay	 more	 attention	 to	 small	 and	 medium	
enterprises, providing them with more flexible 
access to European funds. In this regard, the Eu-
ropean Investment Bank can play a more signifi-
cant role. 
62
•	 Place	 job	 creation,	 especially	 for	 young	
people, at the centre of all Community policies. 
•	 Go	further	to	create	an	area	of	freedom,	se-
curity and justice without internal frontiers, 
based on the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
developing a common policy on asylum, immi-
gration and external border control, including 
the creation of a European border police; this 
policy should assure a high level of security 
and promote the judicial protection of citizens’ 
rights.
•	 Promote	 a	 comprehensive	 plan	 to	 address	
the severe demographic problem affecting Eu-
rope, a loss of population that is endangering 
the very future of the continent.
5.7.3. Enhance the effectiveness and demo-
cratic legitimacy of the institutions
Institutional reforms
In the short to medium term, our actions should be 
based on two principles: institutional balance and 
respect for the Community method. 
 European Parliament
European political parties need to develop a genui-
ne “European political space” with which citizens 
can identify; and they will only do so when the is-
sues of most concern to people’s daily lives and to 
their future are discussed in such a space.
Among numerous proposals that have been advan-
ced in this regard, it has been suggested that trans-
national European lists should be introduced, that 
elections to the European Parliament should be 
held on the same day in all member states, and that 
the candidate of the political group receiving most 
votes, and who obtains the approval of Parliament, 
should be appointed President of the Commission, 
as was the case with Jean Claude Juncker.
Cooperation between the European Parliament 
and national parliaments must be reconsidered and 
strengthened, particularly as concerns economic 
and fiscal policy, with the creation of a conference 
of representatives of the relevant committees of 
the European Parliament and of the national parlia-
ments. 
 The Commission
In the short term, it is urgently necessary to rein-
force the principles of collegiality and indepen-
dence so that the Commission can perform its role 
as the driving force of the Community method.
Louise Weiss building, headquarters of the 
European Parliament in Strasbourg.
63
It is equally imperative to improve the Commission’s 
internal organisation and its procedures. One pos-
sibility would be to confer greater powers on the 
Vice-Presidents, thus enhancing the coherence of 
the action taken by the College of Commissioners. 
In the medium term, a decision must be taken on 
reducing the number of Commissioners, for imple-
mentation in 2019. In this context, the President of 
the Commission should have greater autonomy to 
form his/her cabinet.
 The Council of the European Union and 
the General Affairs Council 
The General Affairs Council should fully assume 
its coordinating role. 
More frequent use should be made of the pos-
sibility that Heads of State or Government may 
be accompanied by a member of their cabinet, 
and in particular, by the Foreign Minister. 
An important step would be to expand the num-
ber of areas in which decisions can be taken by 
qualified majority.
In the long term, the EU must have an effective 
system of separation of powers, so that it may 
acquire the necessary democratic legitimacy. 
We have three proposals in this regard: 
•	 Combine	the	responsibilities	of	the	President	
of the European Council and of the President 
of the Commission, to be performed by a single 
person, who is directly elected and who may ap-
point the members of his/her College of Com-
missioners. 
•	 Introduce	 a	 single	 reading	 procedure	 for	 le-
gislation. 
•	 Constitute	two	parliamentary	chambers:	 the	
Council, representing the member states, and 
the European Parliament, representing the citi-
zens.
Multilevel governance. The Committee of the 
Regions.
Multilevel governance, or “the coordinated action 
of the European Union, the Member States and 
the regional and local authorities, based on the 
principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and as-
sociation”, enables proximity to society, and thus 
grants greater legitimacy to the institutions. In this 
framework, we favour the active participation and 
heightened support for the activities of the Com-
mittee of the Regions.
5.8. Strengthen the  
Ibero-American Community 
of Nations
“Spain is an American nation”, said the Prince of As-
turias (now, King Felipe VI), in a speech at Harvard 
University. The reality of America cannot be fully un-
derstood without its Spanish presence, and Spain’s 
identity, too, is bound up with its Ibero-American 
background. This historically strategic relationship 
is extraordinarily important to Spain and to all the 
countries making up the Ibero-American Communi-
ty of Nations.
The Cádiz Summit, held in November 2012, set up a 
committee made up of Ricardo Lagos (ex-President 
of Chile), Enrique Iglesias (Secretary-General of the 
Ibero-American Community) and Patricia Espinosa 
(ex-Foreign Minister of Mexico) to draft a report 
with proposals for the renovation of the Ibero-
American Conference and the restructuring of its 
General Secretariat. 
The report, “A reflection on the future of the Ibero-
American Summits”, extends far beyond what its 
title suggests, and provides an in-depth analysis of 
the relations between Spain and Portugal, on the 
one hand, and Latin America, on the other.
5.8.1. Spain and Latin America, a renewed 
relationship
The Ibero-American identity has developed over 
500 years, following the encounter of Europeans 
and native peoples, and with the contributions 
made by African slaves and large-scale migration 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. La-
tin America is a mixed space, a cultural and human 
patchwork, an environment that is uniquely recog-
nisable but ever-evolving, continually offering fresh 
opportunities and addressing decisive challenges.
A few years ago, the European Union was growing 
at a good pace, while Latin America suffered what 
was called the lost decade. Then, the European 
project was progressing rapidly, while integration 
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processes in Latin America were hampered by in-
ternal conflicts. In consequence, these countries 
sought to reach a strategic alliance with the Euro-
pean Union in order to counterbalance the influen-
ce of the United States.
This is no longer the case. The countries of Latin 
America are growing faster than those in Europe, 
and the generalisation of democracy, with a few 
notable exceptions, has made them more pros-
perous and stable. Latin America bubbles with all 
kinds of projects for integration. Moreover, their 
geostrategic and commercial priorities are begin-
ning to change, and many countries are now loo-
king towards to the Pacific.
Latin America is experiencing changes that some 
consider comparable to those experienced in Eu-
rope when the Berlin Wall fell. “The effects of the 
financial crisis of 2008-2009, which provoked se-
vere economic problems in the USA and Europe; 
the consolidation of Asia and China as key econo-
mic actors; the political, social and economic chan-
ges experienced in Latin America since 2002; all of 
RENOVATE THE SUMMIT  
SYSTEM
The Resolution on the Renovation of the Ibero-
American Conference, adopted by the Heads of 
State and Government at the Panama Summit, 
approves the following measures, inspired by 
the Lagos Report: 
• The Summits will be held every two years, 
alternating with the EU-CELAC Summit. 
• The Foreign Ministers will meet annually 
to monitor the agreements reached at the 
Summits.
• More space will be dedicated to informal 
meetings of Heads of State and Government, 
so that they may freely and confidentially 
discuss the issues raised by the Pro Tempore 
Secretariat. 
• Annual policy statements will be replaced 
by a brief Statement to be issued following 
the discussions of the Heads of State or 
Government or by a rapporteur of these 
discussions. 
• More attention will be paid to aspects 
of cooperation regarding, in particular, 
knowledge, culture, social cohesion, economy 
and innovation, as these areas are considered 
to best define what is meant by the Ibero-
American spirit.
• The organisational structure of the Ibero-
American General Secretariat (SEGIB) will be 
reformed to strengthen aspects of culture and 
cooperation. 
• Cooperation with many countries will be 
reoriented towards the transfer of knowledge 
and technology and towards the exchange of 
experiences. 
 
The forthcoming Veracruz Summit will adopt 
the following reforms: 
• There will be greater integration between 
the following Ibero-American organisations (as 
well as the SEGIB itself): the Organisation of 
Ibero-American States for Education, Science 
and Culture, the Ibero-American Organisation 
for Social Security, the Ibero-American 
Organisation for Youth Issues and the Ibero-
American Conference of Justice Ministers), 
to be achieved by means of a Committee for 
Strategic Coordination, which will be headed by 
SEGIB. 
• The SEGIB offices in the Latin American 
countries will be decentralised, to perform 
executive and representation functions. 
• A new distribution of quotas will be 
approved for 2015 and 2016. The share 
allotted to the Latin American parties will be 
increased by 5% and the Iberian quotas will be 
reduced by the same proportion. From 2017, 
a new distribution will be applied for the Latin 
American countries, whose share will increase 
by another 5%, thus producing overall quotas of 
60% for the Iberian Peninsula and 40% for Latin 
America.
• New Financial Regulations and accounting 
standards (IPSAS) will be adopted, to provide 
more information and greater transparency 
about the activities of the SEGIB.
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these factors have changed the parameters within 
which the Ibero-American Community operates” 
(Lagos Report).
Spain cannot limit its relations with Latin America 
to the regional context. Spain has concrete, very 
specific ties with each and every one of the La-
tin American nations. Therefore, strategies must 
be defined for each one, taking into account its 
own special characteristics. This question will be 
addressed below, in the chapter on geographic 
areas.
Today, more than ever, Spain must make use of its 
comparative advantage and added value as a na-
tural gateway to the European Union and to North 
Africa, and reinforce its status as a reliable, lasting 
partner for all the nations of Ibero-America.
5.8.2. Renovate the Ibero-American   
Summits
The changes that have taken place in Spain’s re-
lations with Latin America have long called for 
corresponding changes to be made to the Ibero-
American Summits, which began in 1991, to bring 
them into line with these new times. Accordingly, a 
change was initiated at the Cádiz Summit in 2012; 
this was continued in Panama in 2013 and will be 
completed in Veracruz next December.
5.8.3. Language, culture, science and  
innovation
From a cultural standpoint, there is no region in the 
world as homogeneous as Latin America. Moreover, 
the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America 
are the world’s largest linguistically homogeneous 
group of nations. The countries of Ibero-America 
should jointly present their language and culture to 
the world. 
The rise of the Internet and new technologies has 
brought new opportunities to promote our langua-
ge and common culture. The Cervantes Institute 
should remain the flagship of Spanish language and 
culture and continue its work as an outstanding 
example of the indissoluble ties between Spain and 
Latin America.
As part of the renovation of the Ibero-American 
Conference, the following proposals from the Lagos 
Report are being implemented: 
•	 The	creation	of	an	 Ibero-American	scholars-
hip system, the Paulo Freire mobility program-
me, modelled on the Erasmus programme.
•	 Increased	 resources	 to	 facilitate	 the	 acade-
Group photograph of the XXII Ibero-American 
Summit of Heads of State and Government in Cadiz 
in November 2012. 
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mic mobility of teachers and researchers. Joint 
Declarations of Intent have been signed with 
Peru and Mexico.
•	 Wider	 recognition	of	university	degrees	and	
credits. 
•	 Support	 for	 the	 cultures	 of	 the	 region	 as	 a	
means of strengthening Ibero-American ties 
within our borders. 
•	 The	joint	promotion	of	knowledge	and	disse-
mination of the Spanish and Portuguese langua-
ges, in collaboration with the Cervantes Institu-
te and the Camöes Institute. 
•	 Promotion	and	protection	for	cultural	activi-
ties.
5.8.4.  Economic relations
Trade relations between Spain and Latin America 
are less important than is commonly believed and, 
beyond a doubt, less important than they should 
be. 
In the period 1995-2013, Spain’s imports from Latin 
America accounted for between 3.5% and 7.8% of 
total annual imports. The share of exports, mean-
while, ranged from 4% to 6.4% during the same 
period. The trade balance has always been favou-
rable to Latin America, due to Spain’s imports of 
commodities, among other reasons, although sin-
ce 2007 the trade deficit has gradually declined.
In contrast to the scant importance of our trade 
relations, Spain’s investments in Latin America are 
extremely significant and represent almost 30% of 
our total foreign investments. Spain is second only 
to the USA as the largest investor in the region. 
The sectors where Spanish investments are most 
highly concentrated are financial services, energy 
(electricity and gas), telecommunications and the 
extraction of oil and gas. These sectors accounted 
for over 60% of total investment in Latin America 
during the period 1993-2013. However, their activi-
ties are largely directed towards domestic consu-
mers and have not resulted in substantial purcha-
ses of goods from Spain.
By countries, Spanish investments are concentra-
ted in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Chile, which 
received more than 85% of total Spanish inves-
tments in the region during the above period. 
Economic relations among the countries of the 
Ibero-American Community have changed in re-
cent years. In the 1990s, the economies of Latin 
America attracted foreign investment, including 
considerable Spanish investment. However, the 
dynamic role now being played by Latin American 
multinationals (termed ‘multilatinas’) has made 
the relationship more symmetrical.
In order to further strengthen the economic rela-
tions among the countries of our Community, the 
document coordinated by Ricardo Lagos suggests 
promoting cooperation in the following areas:
•	 	Create	technology	platforms	to	boost	com-
petitiveness and productivity. 
•	 Mobilise	support	for	the	establishment	of	La-
tin American multinationals, especially SMEs. 
•	 Support	investment	in	infrastructure.	
•	 Promote	youth	entrepreneurship.	
•	 Create	 an	 Ibero-American	 system	 of	 com-
mercial arbitration.
SPAIN AND THE REGIONAL  
ARCHITECTURE OF LATIN 
AMERICA
Spain is actively present in the regional 
architecture of Latin America, from the 
Organization of American States, through 
which we channel significant resources 
for the promotion of democracy and for 
institution building, to the Central American 
Integration System (SICA), in which we 
are working to promote a broad concept 
of security in the subregion. The Pacific 
Alliance is an innovative and attractive 
environment, in which our observer status 
offers great potential. We are also following 
with interest certain new mechanisms for 
regional integration or coordination, such as 
the Union of South American Nations and the 
Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States, which are providing a new dimension 
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5.8.5.  Development cooperation
Development cooperation with Latin America is 
of special importance and presents certain unique 
characteristics. The Fourth Master Plan highlights 
this region as the preferred geographic area for 
Spanish cooperation. Beyond the obvious logic of 
this fact, a reflection as to how and why Spain’s 
cooperation policies have evolved is very illustra-
tive of the changes that have taken place in the re-
gion and of the maturity that has been reached in 
this relationship.
The most important reason is that the reality of 
the region has indeed advanced. In the first place, 
there has been widespread, if uneven, economic 
growth. “Today, almost all Latin American coun-
tries are classified as middle income countries, 
and this fact has significantly changed the as-
ymmetry that existed 10 years ago. What is now 
at issue is how we can work together to resolve 
common problems and build a shared future” 
(Lagos Report). This development has changed 
perceptions of the relation between security and 
development. As regards the content of coope-
ration programmes, the reality of some, finan-
cially stronger, Latin American countries means 
that their cooperation needs are less weighted 
towards the transfer of financial resources and 
more towards scientific research, the circulation 
of knowledge and support for institutional trans-
formation, together with assistance in the design 
of public policies, in respect of which support for 
R&D&I should play a leading role to favour deve-
lopment.
Economic prosperity has transformed formerly 
underdeveloped countries into middle and even 
high-income ones. The strength revealed by Latin 
American countries during the financial crisis that 
began with the collapse of Lehman Brothers has 
consolidated the region into one presenting great 
potential.
From a regional standpoint, Ibero-American coo-
peration is based upon the intense activity of four 
institutions that have been operating in this area 
for decades: the Ibero-American Organisation for 
Education, Science and Culture, the Ibero-Ame-
rican Organisation for Social Security, the Ibero-
American Organisation for Youth Issues and the 
Conference of Justice Ministers of Ibero-Ame-
rican Countries. Another outstanding program-
me in this respect is CYTED, the Programme for 
Science, Technology and Development, which has 
been operating for over thirty years and has re-
corded major achievements in its area of activity.
Ibero-American cooperation has a unique feature 
that distinguishes it from the traditional ways in 
which cooperation is organised and administered: 
its projects are selected, managed and financed 
by the member countries, participating on equal 
terms, and thus overcoming the traditional donor-
recipient relationship.
5.8.6. Spain, the European Union and  
Latin America
Parallel to the bilateral relationship, and in accor-
dance with its dual status as a European and as an 
Ibero-American country, Spain should continue to 
promote the EU-Latin America and the Caribbean 
agenda, and to complement this by promoting and 
advocating within the Union initiatives of interest 
in this region.
In the context of the EU-CELAC (Community of 
Latin American and Caribbean States) Summits, 
Spain should use its strategic position as a bridge 
between Europe and America to expand the con-
tents of the bi-regional agenda, and complement 
its progress in significant areas such as skills mo-
bility, investment, development, the promotion of 
trade among SMEs and legal security. In addition, 
the Madrid Action Plan should be extended, with 
new chapters on inter-university cooperation and 
public safety. Finally, Spain should contribute to 
the promotion and consolidation of the EU-LAC 
Foundation based in Hamburg and contribute to 
its playing a leading role as a supplier of content 
and actions for the bilateral relationship. Moreover, 
we should exploit its potential for promoting the 
presence of SMEs.
Spain will contribute to efforts to update the fra-
mework of relations between Mexico and the Eu-
ropean Union, which are currently regulated under 
the 1997 Economic Partnership, Political Coordina-
tion and Cooperation Agreement. This is also the 
case of Chile and its Association Agreement with 
the EU.
With respect to MERCOSUR, Spain will continue 
to promote, both within the European Union, and 
at the bilateral level, the conclusion of a regional 
agreement that we consider to be very beneficial 
to both parties.
Spain should also take advantage of the opportu-
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External action with respect to security issues 
takes place within two main areas: the European 
Union and NATO. In addition to these two instan-
ces, Spain also participates in UN peacekeeping 
operations and is a member of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In view of 
the latter’s geographic scope and approach to coo-
peration on international security, Spain is firmly 
committed to its support.
For Spanish foreign policy, the EU and NATO are 
complementary institutions as regards achieving 
our priority objective, namely the security of the 
Spanish people. Equipping the European Union 
with an effective security and defence policy is a 
direct outcome of the European project, and in this 
context, our long-term goal is to create a European 
defence force.
NATO represents the transatlantic dimension 
without which our security cannot be preserved in 
the new world that is emerging. NATO is not only 
crucial to the security of the region of which Spain 
forms part, but also represents its resolute will to 
play a significant role in international affairs. In this 
respect, Spain has the following aims:
•	 To	 continue	 the	 renovation	 and	 transforma-
tion of the Alliance, completing the reforms to 
its structures and capabilities, as announced. 
•	 To	 renew	Alliance	 associations	 and	 in	 parti-
cular, the Mediterranean Dialogue, which is of 
the utmost importance to the allies’ security. It 
should be promoted and enhanced as a respon-
se of cooperative security and also as a subs-
tantial benefit to the security of our southern 
neighbours. 
•	 To	promote	the	return	of	Russia,	which	should	
be NATO’s most important strategic partner, 
towards the principles that shape the architec-
ture of European security.
The disappearance of boundaries between inter-
nal and external security has made it essential to 
optimise cooperation with international agencies 
and police and security institutions of other coun-
tries. Therefore, in matters concerning public secu-
rity and home affairs, Spain will support initiatives 
and policies to strengthen institutional capacities 
to achieve a greater degree of bilateral, regional 
and multilateral cooperation in all aspects related 
to the prevention and control of major threats to 
security.
nities offered by the Multi-Party Agreement bet-
ween the European Union and Peru, Colombia and 
Ecuador, which is currently being applied provisio-
nally.
The Association Agreement between the Euro-
pean Union and Central America is the first such 
agreement between the EU and an entire region. 
The commercial aspects of this Agreement are al-
ready being applied, on a provisional basis.
In addition to the above, we must seize the oppor-
tunities offered by the EU’s newly-renovated fi-
nancial instruments, and make use of the potential 
offered for Latin America. Spain’s efforts to ensure 
that the new development cooperation instrument 
takes into account our interest in cooperation pro-
grammes with the Andean middle-income cou-
ntries (Colombia, Peru and Ecuador) have so far 
obtained good results. We must now ensure that 
this instrument is properly implemented, and that 
a ‘soft’ exit of these three countries may be achie-
ved in the future. Application of the cooperation 
projects addressed within this framework should 
be optimised, essentially by means of delegated 
cooperation.
Finally, we must ensure that the principle of agre-
ement for exemption from the requirement of 
short-stay visas for citizens of Colombia and Peru 
is implemented as soon as possible. In parallel, 
consular cooperation mechanisms must be esta-
blished with both countries to prevent refusals, re-
turns or expulsions at the border, which are much 
more damaging to bilateral relations and have a 
greater impact on public opinion than the rejection 
of a visa application.
5.9. Ensure the security of 
Spain and its citizens
The National Security Strategy specifies foreign 
policy as a priority area for action to preserve the 
security of Spain and its people. This consideration 
is based on two convictions: that the boundaries 
between internal and external security have beco-
me so blurred as to be almost unrecognisable; and 
that the security of Spanish citizens sometimes 
begins very far from our own borders.
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SERVICES?
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In this respect, it is of essential importance to con-
clude bilateral legal agreements on cooperation 
in security issues and on combating crime, and to 
adopt the recommendations of international trea-
ties, in order to promote the exchange of informa-
tion, knowledge and xperiences, thus consolida-
ting our mutual existence.
The European Union is of vital importance in pro-
moting security against terrorism and organised 
crime. Therefore, we will continue to enhance 
the role of the Union in the creation of common 
tools and in achieving a genuine area of justice and 
home affairs. We will also work to promote coope-
ration within the Union in areas of special interest 
to Spain, such as th  Mediterranean, the Maghreb 
and the Sahel.
Finally, we will maintain our commitment and acti-
ve participation in global cooperation institutions 
such as Interpol and the Financial Action Task For-
ce.
5.10. Provide assistance  
and protection to Spanish  
citizens abroad
The promotion and defence of Spanish interests 
abroad is a fundamental objective of foreign poli-
cy. Over two million Spaniards live outside our bor-
ders and some ten million travel abroad each year. 
Some have been living abroad for decades, while 
others have recently acquired Spanish nationality 
or have moved abroad recently as a result of the 
internationalisation of the Spanish economy, or 
are in search of new job opportunities. In addition, 
millions of Spaniards travel abroad every year as 
tourists or for short stays. All of these persons re-
quire our embassies and consulates to provide a 
useful, modern and effective service.
Actions
Management of the services provided by govern-
ment bodies abroad will continue to be improved 
and modernised.
The accreditation requirements for citizens resi-
ding abroad to access certain public services or to 
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exercise their rights will be simplified and standar-
dised.
Further technological modernisation will be ca-
rried out and e-administration facilitated in the 
Consular Registry and in the issuance of documen-
tation. 
Regarding the exercise of Spanish citizens' rights 
abroad, measures will be taken to ensure the grea-
test number possible can exercise their right to 
vote.
Relations between consular offices and Spanish 
Residents’ Councils will be promoted, as will colla-
boration with associations of Spanish expatriates 
and with care associations operating within our 
communities abroad, with the participation, too, of 
the Autonomous Communities. 
Special attention will be paid to individuals and 
groups who are especially vulnerable, by reason of 
age or health, and to all those in distress or diffi-
culty.
Improved communication and information will be 
provided to citizens needing assistance and pro-
tection, particularly in situations of special diffi-
culty. For this purpose, the capabilities of the Con-
sular Emergency Unit will be strengthened, and 
consular response mechanisms to emergencies 
will be streamlined and enhanced.
5.11. Promote Spain’s   
economic interests abroad
With respect to economic issues, trade, finance 
and support for internationalisation, external ac-
tion has a two-fold effect. On the one hand, the 
Foreign Service is employed in support of Spain’s 
economic interests. And on the other, the country 
derives economic benefits from our political rela-
tions, influence and presence in most countries of 
the world. These two aspects are complementary. 
Ultimately, the aim of this action is to defend and 
promote our economic interests in order to boost 
growth and job creation. And this will be achieved 
by enhancing and extending the internationalisa-
tion of our companies and by attracting foreign 
investment.
THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: THE 
ESSENTIAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
SECURITY AND DEFENCE
The NATO summit held in Lisbon in 
November 2010 approved the “Strategic 
Concept for Defence and Security” in order 
to address the challenges and threats arising 
within the globalised world of the twenty-
first century. Three essential tasks for NATO 
were defined:
• To execute the plans and provide the 
capabilities needed to ensure the collective 
defence of the NATO member countries; 
• To deploy the necessary political and 
military resources to contribute to managing 
any crisis that might endanger stability and 
security beyond its borders; and 
• To develop cooperative security 
arrangements with its partners, with 
countries and with international 
organisations such as the European Union 
that wish to enhance international security.
65 years have passed since the signing of 
the Washington Treaty, and NATO continues 
to be the most solid political and military 
alliance in modern history, on the basis of 
its defence of common values of individual 
freedom, democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law. It embodies the indivisible bond 
between the security of Europe and that of 
North America.
In a new and increasingly unpredictable 
international environment, in which we 
must face complex risks that threaten 
the international system based on agreed 
standards and principles, NATO symbolises 
the will of Europe and North America to 
defend our values and way of life through 
a comprehensive, integrated defence 
arrangement that ensures an effective 
response will be made, wherever and 
whenever it may be required.
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An outstanding element of the Strategy for Exter-
nal Action with respect to economic issues, trade, 
finance and support for the internationalisation 
of the Spanish economy field is provided by the 
Strategic Plan for the Internationalisation of the 
Spanish Economy, which is revised and published 
every two years by the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance, as a member of the Interministerial Group 
to Support the Internationalisation of Spanish Bu-
siness, and in consultation with the other minis-
tries with competences in external affairs, as well 
as with various government administrations and 
with the private sector.
Act 14/2013, of 27 September, to support business 
and its internationalisation, sought to promote a 
model of international mobility for Spain which 
would attract talent and foreign investment, thus 
contributing to economic growth. These goals 
were also set out in the Strategic Plan for the In-
ternationalisation of the Spanish Economy.
All countries pay careful attention to the interests 
of their companies abroad. And those with a solid 
tradition of business presence in the world have 
developed and implemented policies to support 
their companies, designing appropriate instru-
ments and providing them with the necessary re-
sources.
Spain’s economic weight in the world has increa-
sed exponentially in recent years. Our companies, 
which only two decades ago had a very limited in-
ternational presence, have expanded their inter-
national activities significantly both in volume and 
in geographic extension. Today, Spain has about 
150,000 exporters, almost twice as many as just 
twelve years ago.
The activity of Spanish companies abroad requi-
res strong and consistent support from our Fore-
ign Service. Whether they are bidding for public 
works and services contracts, or investing abroad 
to develop activities there through subsidiaries 
and branches, businesses require the assistance of 
our external network. Moreover, the intense flow 
of business travel generated by this activity makes 
special demands on this external network, which 
is also called upon to promote tourism, another 
important resource for our country. Providing ade-
quate resources for this network is a task that will 
be among our major concerns in the coming years.
The Ministry of Economy and Finance, through the 
Secretariat of State for Trade, is the government 
department responsible for supporting the inter-
nationalisation of Spanish companies. Additionally, 
and within their respective areas of competence, 
various ministerial departments and public bodies 
provide support for this process, including the Mi-
nistry of Industry, Energy and Tourism, the Minis-
try of Development, the Ministry of Employment 
and Social Security and the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food and the Environment, among others. The Mi-
nistry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation is respon-
sible, under the principle of unity of action abroad, 
for providing aid and assistance to our companies, 
as well as for defending Spanish economic inter-
ests abroad through our external network.
The defence of Spain’s economic interests abroad, 
furthermore, requires constant endeavours by our 
external representatives to preserve and enhance 
the image of our country and its perception. Ob-
viously, a country’s image is an important factor in 
its competitiveness, and can positively or negati-
vely affect the exports of goods and services, the 
entry of foreign investment, tourist arrivals, ac-
cess to international funding and the ability of our 
companies to obtain contracts for the provision of 
works and services abroad.
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Our priorities and objectives will be achieved by 
putting into practice a series of actions in a myriad 
of fields. The entirety of these actions are included 
in the Articles of The Spanish External Action and 
Service Act. This paper will examine in close detail 
those that are most relevant to a renewed external 
policy, either because of their immediate impact on 
this policy or their social or economic importance to 
our country. In many of these fields, due to the te-
rritorial structure of the State, these actions will be 
carried out in collaboration with the Autonomous 
Communities.
6.1. External action   
on defence
The Armed Forces are a fundamental instrument 
to Spain’s External Action. All modern States de-
sign their security and foreign policies with the 
knowledge that borders are increasingly important 
in terms of security and that the line dividing ex-
ternal and internal security is increasingly blurred. 
Threats and risks to Spain and its citizens fre-
quently begin far beyond our borders. The armed 
forces and their capacity for projection are thus 
crucial to our action.
The prime responsibility of the armed forces is 
national defence. Beyond this, they are increasin-
gly becoming the first and most effective instru-
ment for coping with situations of international 
instability and insecurity. Establishing necessary 
secure environments is a precondition to rebuil-
ding institutions and re-establishing civil society. 
The Spanish armed forces have undertaken this 
difficult task in recent years in different areas and 
regions, in operations comprising different inter-
national organisations.
The armed forces have also contributed to impro-
ving Spain’s image and prestige through numerous 
humanitarian operations, by mitigating the effects 
of disasters and solving especially difficult situa-
tions for our nationals abroad.
Defence contributes to external action by means 
of a set of increasingly close bilateral and multi-
lateral relations in military cooperation. This coo-
peration has significant political weight and de-
monstrates the quality of our armed forces: their 
technological know-how and ability to develop 
long term trust-based relationships with the mi-
litary of other countries. The Military Education 
Cooperation Programme, which has been ope-
rating since 1975, has strengthened mutual trust 
and cooperation between Spanish armed forces 
personnel and their counterparts in 62 countries 
in Europe, South America, Asia Pacific, the Midd-
le East and Africa. The Ministry of Defence plays 
an important role in extending defence diplomacy, 
through a Plan that forms an integral part of Spa-
nish external action.
As the Spanish Security Strategy points out, ar-
med conflicts can prompt other risks and threats 
both to Spain and the security of the internatio-
nal community on the whole. In an international 
community experiencing transition, these risks 
and threats are even greater. It is thus crucial to 
external action that national defence preserve the 
capabilities it needs to comply with its missions 
abroad. 
6. Actions
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GENDER VIOLENCE
EU Guidelines on the struggle against gender 
violence:
• Promoting gender equality and fighting 
against discrimination
• Data collection
• Elaboration of coordinated strategies
• Fight against impunity
• Victim access to justice
SPAIN’S COMMITMENT WITH 
THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED 
NATIONS
6.2. External action   
on human rights
The priorities above will be pursued through a set 
of actions:
1.-  Fight against the death penalty
The death penalty is a cruel, inhumane and degra-
ding punishment, contrary to the dignity of the in-
dividual; it is not a deterrent to criminal behaviour; 
and has irreversible consequences in the case of a 
judicial error.
In line with this commitment, Spain pushes for and 
participates in different initiatives such as the crea-
tion of the International Commission against the 
Death Penalty in 2010 and UN General Assembly 
resolutions calling for a universal moratorium on 
the use of the Death Penalty by 2015. Spain has 
also supported the recognition of the elimination 
of the death penalty in drug-related crimes in the 
Joint Ministerial Statement of the 2014 High-level 
Review and Action Plan on International Coopera-
tion to Counter the World Drug Problem.
2.- Fight against discrimination due to  
gender, sexual orientation or gender  
identity
The particular sensitivity given to this issue by the 
Spanish public and the Government has transla-
ted into very active and multilateral policies which 
seek the creation of instruments and institutions 
that fight against discrimination due to gender and 
gender violence and boost the effectiveness of 
those that exist, namely the United Nations Com-
mission on the Status of Women. 
As for the killing of women, Spain has supported 
the drafting of a recommendation guide for effec-
tive investigation into femicide crime, as well as the 
Protocol for Investigating Gender-related Deaths 
by the competent international organisations in 
the field. In matters of discrimination related to 
sexual orientation and gender identity, Spain sup-
ports the UN High Commission on Human Rights 
“Free and Equal” campaign. The conviction that 
sexual orientation and gender identity are part 
of human beings’ privacy leads us to promote the 
decriminalisation of relations between consenting 
adults in all countries throughout the world. 
Leaders
in the global ght for 
the abolition of the death 
penalty. Seat of the V World 
Congress (Madrid)
Active  
defense of women’s 
rights
Promotion 
of rights of handicapped 
people. Franklin 
D. Roosevelt Prize 2012
Innovators 
of human rights in the 
workplace. Biggest website in 
the World Pact
Signing 
of the main part of the treaties 
about Human Rights and 
keeping up to date with the 
presentations of reports
Protection 
of children
Amongst the rst countries to 
ratify the III Optional Protocol 
to the Convention of the 
Rights of the Child
Support
to the Oce 
of the UNHCR
Pushing
the recognition of the access 
to water and healthcare 
as a human right
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3.- Rights of persons with disabilities
The 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities marked a change in paradigm: 
from a vision where persons with disabilities were 
the object of treatment and in need of social pro-
tection, we have progressed towards a vision of 
this collective as titleholders of rights, capable of 
taking decisions and participating in those that 
affect them. Spain defends this perspective and in-
corporates it into its external action.
4-. The human right to drinking water  
and sanitation
Spain and Germany work jointly on an initiative 
within the United Nations and other internatio-
nal forums that fosters the recognition of the 
human right to drinking water and sanitation. As 
an outcome of this, the UN General Assembly re-
cognised this right as legally binding in July 2010. 
In November of 2013, again through Spanish and 
German initiative, a resolution was adopted in the 
General Assembly and the Human Rights Council. 
This was the first to be adopted by consensus, 
thus achieving the unanimity of the international 
community.
5.- Businesses and Human Rights
Business activity generates wealth, creates emplo-
yment and is an element of social progress. But in 
order to completely fulfil this role, it must also be 
socially responsible and one of the relevant issues 
in this domain is human rights and transnational 
business activity. It is one of the features of so-
called Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
Spain drafted a National Plan on businesses and 
human rights in line with the provisions set out 
by the European Union in its 2011-2014 Strategy. 
Furthermore, the Observatory for Social Respon-
sibility in Business has been a pioneer for drafting 
reports analysing human rights situations where 
Spanish companies can have influence.
The Spanish Strategy for Corporate Social Res-
ponsibility 2014-2020 was adopted by the Coun-
cil of Ministers on 24 October 2014. This Strategy 
aims to contribute to the sustainable development 
of Spanish society by promoting initiatives to fos-
ter competitiveness, economic growth, human de-
velopment and respect for the environment. It also 
includes measures to improve the image of Spain, 
at home and abroad, to strengthen the perceived 
confidence in our country and to respect and pro-
tect human rights.
FRAMEWORK OF THE FOURTH 
MASTER PLAN
1) International development agenda. Until 
2015, the Millennium Goals will be the basis for 
Spanish cooperation. Together with this and 
within the framework of the drafting of the 
Fourth Master Plan, we have initiated a process 
of reflection on the post-2015 Development 
Agenda.
2) Concentration process. Following different 
international recommendations, amongst them 
those of the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee and different evaluation processes 
which were carried out with a view to 
increasing aid impact and effectiveness, we are 
engaged in a process of sectoral, geographical 
and multilateral concentration.  
3) Regarding geography, preference is given 
to Latin America—particularly the Andean, 
Central American and Caribbean regions, 
and Northern Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, 
particularly the western region. Presence will 
also continue within Asia in the Philippines. We 
are reducing the number of countries where 
we will be present, based on criteria including 
the comparative advantage and added value 
compared to other cooperation programmes. 
In geographical terms, this concentration, 
prioritisation and differentiation will take place 
through strategic agreements called Country 
Association Frameworks (Spanish acronym 
MAP). To this end, these methodologies and 
guidelines were updated and adapted to 
the Fourth Master Plan and its orientations, 
with the aim of simplifying the process and 
optimising the lessons learned. The idea is that 
the drafting of the MAP be inclusive and follow 
aid effectiveness principles. 
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6-. Human rights advocates 
Human rights advocates are individuals groups 
or institutions who protect and defend human 
rights and universally recognised fundamental 
freedoms. Many times they find themselves un-
der threat or attack. They deserve our respect, 
admiration and solidarity.
The Human Rights Bureau of the Spanish Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation manages 
the programme, established in 1998, devoted to 
those defenders of human rights that are under 
threat and in high risk situations. By virtue of this 
programme, these individuals are guaranteed ab-
solute confidentiality regarding their identity. The 
Ministry collaborates in other shelter program-
mes for human rights advocates carried out by 
NGOs and Autonomous Community institutions 
(Asturias, Catalonia and País Vasco). Between 
2008 and 2013 this programme has protected 
over 80 advocates.
6.3. External action on   
development cooperation
Development cooperation is a public policy in itself, 
and one of the most important instruments of ex-
ternal policy. It expresses the Spanish people’s de-
sire for solidarity and their aspirations for a more 
just world that underlie our external policy. For 
development cooperation to be fully effective, it 
must be integrated into the framework of Spanish 
external action through a principle of development 
policy coherence.
Humanity faces the ongoing challenge of building 
a more peaceful, prosperous and just world in 
which all individuals have the opportunity to live a 
full life. Spain is a country with a spirit of solidarity 
that has always shown many gestures of generosi-
ty towards the poorest populations of the world. 
However, international cooperation is not only an 
act of generosity, it is also an investment in solida-
rity and in the future. We can only ensure our futu-
re if we also ensure that of all of those with whom 
we share a planet with limited resources.
Development cooperation changes with the 
transformations of the international communi-
4) Multilateral action will focus on the 
partners we have established in the Strategic 
Partnership Frameworks whose priorities 
converge with ours, as well as on other 
multilateral organisation that are considered 
to be strategic as regards to their leadership 
and vision and with which Spanish Cooperation 
has been previously working. Multilateral 
cooperation for this period will be guided by 
four priorities: concentration, effectiveness, 
mutual responsibility and participation.
5) Regarding concentration, emphasis has 
been shifted from sectors to outcomes. To 
this end, we will move forward in results-driven 
development management.
6) Regarding evaluation, efforts will be 
undertaken to strengthen existing capacities, 
increase the quality of evaluations and give 
them a more strategic focus, searching for 
a broader use of them in terms of feedback 
and their contribution to learning, greater 
transparency and accountability.
7) Lastly, development cooperation will seek 
alliances and synergies with all the players 
involved, especially civil society and the 
private business sector, boosting, as well, 
a decentralised model for effective, quality 
cooperation based on political dialogue and 
strategic alliances. Transparency will play an 
important role in benefitting both our citizens 
and development partners. In this direction, we 
have launched the Spanish Cooperation Portal 
for the entire cooperation area where commons 
interests can be included to share experiences 
and information (www.cooperacionespañola.
es). It has a link to a system which gathers and 
publishes information on Spanish Cooperation.
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ty and this must redefine the new development 
and sustainability agenda for forthcoming years. 
We face a new poverty map, a new international 
geopolitical and economic context, characterised 
by the greater weight of middle-income countries 
that make up 70% of the poorest populations in 
the world. 
Spanish Cooperation is forced to shape its parti-
cular profile and added value it can contribute to 
the countries of engagement, becoming better 
defined as strategic cooperation. This becomes 
necessary due to the persistence of poverty and 
increasing inequality; new challenges such as glo-
bal climate change; increasing migratory flow and 
growing insecurity in many areas of the world. 
Development cooperation policy also plays a key 
role in the achievement of Spanish foreign policy 
objectives. In this way it contributes to the buil-
ding of Europe, maintaining internal coheren-
ce and legitimacy before its citizens and affirms 
the European Union as a model global player; it 
gives an international projection of Spain as an 
advanced democracy, showing its contribution to 
a more democratic world with better institutions 
for international governance; it guarantees citi-
zens benefit from greater security, contributes to 
international peace and security; and it promotes 
an international environment of economic stabi-
lity. Lastly, it strengthens Spain’s international in-
fluence, especially in Europe, Latin America, the 
Mediterranean Basin and before world powers, 
contributing to more intense bilateral relations 
and active membership in the main organisations 
and international forums.
In this regard, our cooperation policy must be 
firstly agreed by consensus, meaning that it is ba-
sed on principles and elements that are accepted 
by all parties. Secondly, it must be a comprehen-
sive and coherent policy, and thirdly, an outwardly 
coordinated policy, meaning towards those of 
the European Union, the OECD and other insti-
tutions to which Spain belongs. Fourthly, it must 
be inwardly coordinated and include the efforts 
of Autonomous Communities, local corporations 
and private initiatives. Fifth and finally, it must be 
a cooperation policy that revolves around three 
central ideas: environmental sustainability, social 
corporate responsibility and good governance.
These features were already part of two key do-
cuments, one national and the other internatio-
nal. The former, the Congress of Deputies Sub-
committee “study on international cooperation 
perspectives for Spanish development” adopted 
in September of 2011 by consensus of all political 
parties and that latter, the Spanish Cooperation 
peer review issued by the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee, also in 2011.
Spanish Cooperation Guidelines
As stated in the Fourth Master Plan 2013-2016, 
the ultimate aim of cooperation is to contribute 
to human and sustainable development, the era-
dication of poverty and the full exercise of rights. 
This aim is expressed through eight objectives or 
directions:
1.- Consolidate democratic processes and the 
rule of law. Specific work in support of democra-
tic transition processes in North African countries, 
with special emphasis on better governance and 
management of the public sector in cooperation 
partner countries.
2.- Reduce inequalities and vulnerability to ex-
treme poverty and crises. Focused on mitigating 
food crises in the Sahel region as well as fostering 
policy on resilience, prevention and social protec-
tion for those most vulnerable to extreme pover-
ty.
3.- Promote economic opportunities for the poo-
rest of the poor. Push for policies that foster the 
creation of wealth and employment by promoting 
the country’s economic and business base, finan-
cial inclusion and greater insertion of developing 
countries in the international economy.
4.- Foster systems of social cohesion, with 
emphasis on basic social services. Spanish Coo-
peration boosts policies and programmes on edu-
cation, health, social services, food security, water 
and sanitation with a rights-based approach that 
fosters autonomy and dignity of individuals and so-
cial cohesion.
5.- Promote women’s rights and gender equali-
ty. As the hallmark of our cooperation, we work in 
favour of formal equality policies through the de-
velopment of legal equality frameworks, measures 
that drive true equality and female empowerment 
by combatting gender violence and seeking to eli-
minate all forms of discrimination, including multi-
ple forms that women and girls suffer—the most 
vulnerable amongst the poor.
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6.- Improve the provision of global and regional 
Public Goods. Peace and security, sustainable de-
velopment and environment, international econo-
mic and financial stability, global health, knowledge 
and culture are all global public goods. The promo-
tion of these is a fundamental pillar in international 
cooperation work with global institutions and in 
coordination with all countries. 
7.- Providing quality response to humanitarian 
crises. In compliance with internationally agreed 
humanitarian principles, Spanish Humanitarian Ac-
tion gives quality response based on humanitarian 
needs, prioritising the most vulnerable within a po-
pulation and a rights-based approach to protecting 
victims. 
8.- Build a global citizenry committed to deve-
lopment. Working with Spanish society and re-
newing its commitment to combatting poverty, 
development and belonging to a global body of 
citizens.
These objectives are fostered bilaterally in Spanish 
cooperation partner countries with preferential at-
tention to Ibero-America, particularly the Andean, 
Central American and Caribbean regions; North 
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, namely the west; 
and in Asia, the Philippines. Together with these, 
Spanish Cooperation will continue to work more 
effectively with international organisations, boos-
ting results-based development and aid effective-
ness, transparency, accountability and evaluation 
culture.
6.4. External action   
on taxation
The factors driving a transition towards a new in-
ternational community: globalisation, greater in-
terdependency and transmission and reception 
of information technologies, all translate into the 
proliferation of so-called tax havens and the faci-
litation of international operations of tax evasion 
and tax fraud. 
As with all problems that arise from globalisation, 
the most effective mode of action, and in many 
cases the only one, is through international coo-
peration. By virtue of this principle, external action 
on tax matters seeks most importantly bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation, efficient exchange of 
information and mutual assistance on combating 
fraud and evasion.
Moreover, external action on tax matters makes 
a considerable contribution to Spain’s economic 
interests by means of covenants signed by the 
Cooperation project in support of local agricultural 
production, financed by the AECID in Niger. 
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Ministry of Finance and Public Administrations to 
prevent double taxation, thus fostering a stable 
framework for Spanish investment abroad as well 
as foreign investment in Spain.
Actions
1.-Technical assistance provided by the Spanish tax 
agency to Colombia and El Salvador.
2.- Negotiation rounds and signing of double taxa-
tion agreements with Kenya, Bangladesh, Roma-
nia, Andorra, Taiwan, China, Colombia, Mozambi-
que, Guatemala, Puerto Rico, Jordan, Angola and 
Honduras.
3.- Participation in the MENA Governance Pro-
gramme of the OECD in North Africa and the Near 
East, and increased presence in Latin America 
through collaboration with the Latin-American 
Center for Development Administration. 
6.5. External action   
on justice
External action on justice matters helps combat 
terrorism, organised transnational crime and drug 
trafficking, as well as crime that requires interna-
tional cooperation to prevent perpetrators from 
escaping penal action.
Actions
a) International legal assistance and cooperation
This type of cooperation is indispensable to com-
bat criminality when it affects the sovereignty of 
more than one State. Its implementation requires 
the use of technical instruments to facilitate ma-
nagement and communication between the diffe-
rent players involved. It is necessary to improve the 
workings of existing international legal assistance 
networks by means of technological resources 
that can facilitate information exchange. The In-
ternational Legal Assistance Manual is also a mag-
nificent tool, one that can continuously be impro-
ved. In this area, the leadership of the Ministry of 
Justice, together with the Council of the General 
Judiciary and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, can 
play a decisive role without incurring in great costs.
b) Institutional relations and strengthening  
networks  
Institutional relations in the international sphere 
are an essential element to external policy. Many 
of these relations arise spontaneously, but others 
must be carefully planned and executed. In this 
sense, Ministry of Justice foreign offices must es-
tablish objectives in agreement with the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and in many cases with the Mi-
nistry of Home Affairs, with a view to strengthe-
ning our position and image abroad and defend our 
interests on matters of justice.
Today, there is an abundance of agreement and 
cooperation networks in the international justice 
sector: the Network of the Presidents of Supreme 
Judicial Courts of the European Union, the Euro-
pean Network of Councils for the Judiciary, the 
Ibero-American Judicial Summit, the Latin Ameri-
can Association of Public Ministries, the Conferen-
ce of Ministers of Justice of Ibero-American Coun-
tries (Spanish acronym COMJIB) and others. There 
is no doubt that these networks are currently bet-
ter organised, stronger and more dynamic in Latin 
American countries than they are in Europe, and in 
this sense, we can highlight the COMJIB, a struc-
ture which falls under the Secretariat-General for 
Ibero-America. This public-private project crea-
ting a foundation to promote Ibero-American legal 
culture, well underway and operating within the 
Ibero-American Community of Nations, and the 
IberRed (Ibero-American support network for in-
ternational legal assistance) are both highly useful 
instruments for Spain’s projection abroad. 
c) Relations with the European Union
The Ministry of Justice participates in the legislati-
ve processes that take place in the European Cou-
ncil, which are frequently of similar significance 
and impact as national processes. For this, it has 
a working structure at the offices of the Spanish 
Permanent Representation to the EU, something 
that is key to the success of our negotiations with 
the Council.
Together with this, Spain’s participation in Eurojust 
brings strengthens our  presence in the European 
Union legal configuration.
d) Support for development cooperation
In this area we strive to maximise available resour-
ces and seek synergies to have a presence in those 
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interesting multilateral institution projects where 
we are members or observers. Spain’s prestige 
acquired over the years in reform programmes and 
initiatives that strengthen legal systems in Latin 
American countries is something that must be un-
derscored as a relevant product of Marca España. 
Moreover, funds from European Union program-
mes, such as Eurosocial, are key in this sector.
6.6. External action   
on public security and home 
affairs
External action in this area, through international 
police cooperation, will include initiatives to pre-
vent and combat terrorism and other forms of or-
ganised crime, especially illicit trafficking in drugs, 
weapons and people.
International cooperation should also be extended 
to other aspects and areas of public safety such as 
the prison system, civil protection, road safety and 
support for victims of terrorism.
The aims of this Action can be grouped into five 
categories: the fight against terrorism, cybercrime, 
drug trafficking, irregular immigration, and coope-
ration in security matters, with the areas of prio-
rity cooperation being North and West Africa, the 
Middle East, continental Asia and Latin America.
The instruments of this Action are mainly bilateral 
agreements to combat crime, and the creation of 
joint committees and bilateral meetings. A particu-
larly important instrument, which often highlights 
the impact made by our contribution, is the invol-
vement of Spanish State Security Forces in inter-
national police cooperation activities at bilateral 
and multilateral levels.
a) Combatting international terrorism
Terrorism is one of the most serious threats to inter-
national peace and security. It violates human rights 
and liberties and attempts to destroy democracy 
and the rule of law. Terrorism is an asymmetrical 
threat whose development and actions are facilita-
ted in a more open and interconnected internatio-
nal community. International cooperation is thus the 
only way to check and eradicate it.
Through its own painful experience, Spanish society 
knows that terrorism is a crime that must be prose-
cuted through criminal justice systems and the gua-
rantees of due legal process. Combatting terrorism 
and the scrupulous respect for human rights are two 
mutually reinforcing and complementary objectives. 
Our experience drives us to the conviction that the 
only way to combat terrorism is by means of an in-
ternational strategy that encompasses all dimen-
sions of this threat, including the factors that feed 
radicalisation.
In alignment with this conviction, Spain’s objectives 
coincide with the four pillars of the United Nations 
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2006:
•	 Address	 the	 conditions	 conducive	 to	 the	
spreading of terrorism
•	 Push	for	measures	to	prevent	and	combat	it
•	 Increase	States’	capacity	to	prevent	and	com-
bat terrorism
•	 Ensure	 respect	 for	 human	 rights	 for	 all	 and	
the rule of law in the fight against terrorism
Spain’s action is equally guided by the general ob-
jective set out in the European Counter Terrorism 
Strategy of 2005: “Combat terrorism globally, while 
respecting human rights and creating a Union that is 
safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of free-
dom, security and justice”. To achieve this objective, 
the EU strategy is built around four ideas: prevent, 
protect, pursue and respond.
In addition to the commitments described in the UN 
and EU strategic documents cited above, preventing 
recruitment and combating radicalisation are priori-
ty concerns for international cooperation.
Finally, another priority objective, on which we 
place special emphasis, is assistance, defence and 
support for the victims of terrorism. This is first 
and foremost a principle element of justice. But at 
the same time, the continuation of the memory of 
the victims and their testimonies allows society to 
understand the story of suffering and horror that 
terrorism brings to individuals’ lives, with real na-
mes and surnames. 
b) Combatting organised transnational crime
The objective is clear: prevent the criminal activity 
of transnational crime rings and ensure that their 
members are brought to justice. The key to achie-
ving this is, again, international cooperation. Only 
close and transparent cooperation—something 
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that is not always offered by all States—will allow 
us to achieve this goal.
Our legal basis for the aforementioned coopera-
tion is the Convention against Transnational Orga-
nised Crime of 2000 and its three Protocols. Our 
objective is to achieve the adherence of the grea-
test number of countries possible to the Conven-
tion and its Protocols.
A second important angle is to take action against 
the financial resources of transnational criminal 
groups. This is a domain that has extraordinarily 
complex technical components whose ramifica-
tions go straight to the heart of the international 
financial system, and cooperation is hard to obtain. 
This is not only because of lack of will in some ca-
ses, but also the lack of technical capacity of many 
police and judicial systems.
Lastly, it is necessary to act on the increasingly 
strong connections that organised criminal groups 
establish with terrorist groups.
c) The worldwide drug problem
An effective strategy to address this complex pro-
blem must focus on supply and demand for these 
substances, both the familiar ones and emerging, 
psychoactive substances. We are looking at a ba-
lanced approach that is inspired by both the Eu-
ropean Union and Spanish Drugs Strategies and 
Action Plans. This corresponds greatly to the aspi-
rations expressed by many countries in other geo-
graphical zones, especially Latin America, to give 
new focus to the drug policies based not only on 
defence and security but also on human rights and 
public health.
We must underscore the importance of dealing 
with this problem from a global perspective ba-
sed on international cooperation at both bilateral 
and multilateral levels, with special consideration 
for the United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session (UNGASS) planned for the first months of 
2016. 
This is the philosophy behind the external action in 
this area, based on the United Nations Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs Political Declaration and Plan of 
Action. Our action seeks to consolidate the inter-
national regime based on different conventions.
Finally, the illicit trafficking in medicaments (and 
their falsification) is becoming increasingly pre-
valent, and is of great concern due to the harm 
caused to public health and to the owners of inte-
llectual property. At an institutional level, the Uni-
ted Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is crucial, 
as it aids in defining priorities and reaching con-
sensus for international community strategies. 
Spain maintains an ongoing and fluid working 
relationship with the UNODC. Lastly, given the 
importance of our pharmaceutical industry and 
Spain’s position as producer of medicines crea-
ted from opiate raw materials, we maintain a very 
close relationship with the International Narcotics 
Control Board. We remain strongly committed to 
supporting the health of international sport, and 
maintain close relations with the World Anti-Do-
ping Agency.
6.7. External action on re-
search, development and 
innovation
Scientific investigation, technology and circulation 
of knowledge embodied in innovation undoubtedly 
bring about economic growth, quality employment 
and resolution of society’s problems.
The Ibero-American region’s undoubted develo-
pment and the paradigm shift in the way interna-
tional cooperation takes place in middle-income 
countries, moving towards win-win cooperation 
models, turn our objective to progressing in R&D&I 
in those countries with conditions conducive to 
this type of collaboration.
Actions
1.- Support for implementation and development 
of public R&D&I policies that solidify national sys-
tems.
2.- Offer training excellence to scientists and te-
chnologists in our specialised scientific facilities, 
Public Research Institutions and through those ex-
cellence centres that have been classified with the 
“Severo Ochoa” distinction. 
3.- Invite the international scientific community to 
make use of our state-of-the-art scientific and te-
chnological infrastructure.
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4.- Promote and strengthen participation in bilate-
ral and multilateral R&D&I organisations, in Europe 
and elsewhere.
5.- Encourage Spanish participation in OECD 
R&D&I groups as an important means of contribu-
ting to the design of future research and innova-
tion policies.
6.- Joint participation in European projects, espe-
cially those which are part of the EU 2020 Horizon 
Programme.
7.- Cooperation between national and regional ins-
titutions and EU bodies to develop research and 
innovation strategies for smart specialisation, as 
a means of increasing the competitiveness of EU 
Member States.
8.- Scientific and technological collaboration with 
Mediterranean countries, especially in the context 
of organisations such as 5+5, the EU and the Union 
for the Mediterranean.
9.- Encourage and support the internationalisation 
of Spanish companies through R&D&I through 
specific awards and grants for this purpose. Provi-
de advice and funding for companies to participate 
in R&D&I projects in Europe.
10.- Promote sustained external technological ac-
tion to build an international reputation from the 
assets generated by the R&D activity of Spanish 
science and business. Increase international coo-
peration by these sectors with the most innovative 
actors in other countries. Promote investment mo-
bility to enhance the technological capabilities of 
Spanish companies, in Spain and elsewhere, con-
solidating and strengthening the role of the exis-
ting network of delegates in the Centre for Indus-
trial and Technological Development.
6.8. External action on  
economic, trade, financial 
and industrial issues 
and on support for the 
internationalisation of the 
Spanish economy
External action strategy on economic, commercial, 
financial matters and support for the internatio-
nalisation of the Spanish economy is determined 
by the Strategic Plan for the Internationalisation 
of the Spanish Economy. This Plan is drawn up 
biannually by the Ministry of Economy and Compe-
titiveness in the framework of the Inter-ministerial 
Support Group for Internationalisation of Spanish 
companies, with consultation from different admi-
nistrations and the private sector. The first Strate-
gic Plan for 2014-2015 was approved by the Coun-
cil of Ministers on February 28, 2014. It includes 41 
measures grouped into six major ideas.
The Agenda to Strengthen the Industrial Sector 
in Spain, approved by the Council of Ministers on 
11 July 2014, specifies two measures to support 
Spanish companies in the area of external action 
by business: support for the internationalisation 
of industrial companies and for market diversifica-
tion; and enhancing Spain’s capacity to defend the 
interests of these companies.
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE  
INTERNATIONALISATION OF 
THE SPANISH ECONOMY  
Six central ideas:
1) Improving conditions favourable to 
business and enterprise, seeking to pin-point 
and overcome regulatory barriers to our 
businesses’ competitiveness by encouraging 
and attracting investment at the same time.
2) Improve access to markets.
3) Facilitate businesses’ access to financing 
through a financial support system for 
efficient internationalisation.
4) Commercial promotion and support to 
enterprise.
5) Stimulate the culture of 
internationalisation and human capital 
and recognition of the importance of 
international projection and development of 
specialised human capital.
6) Support innovation.
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Campaign carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and Brand Spain, under the title 
“Spain, a country of excellence”, diffused by Spanish embassies and consulates.
GUIDELINES FOR COPING WITH 
UNCONTROLLED EMIGRATION 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
The Mediterranean is witness each year to 
thousands of people losing their lives in search 
of something as legitimate as a better future 
for themselves and their families. Manipulated 
and exploited by criminal organisations, they 
are taken on expeditions that many times end in 
tragedy. In the first half of 2014 alone, over twice 
as many immigrants died while trying to cross 
the Mediterranean as in all of the year 2013.
This problem—which will only increase in 
the future according to demographic and 
economic trends—is the responsibility of the 
entire European Union. Coastal countries, 
EU members, are the external border. They 
take on the greatest burden of the problem, 
including helping those who reach their shores 
in deplorable conditions. And illegal immigration 
targets not only coastal countries, but all of the 
countries in the European Union. 
Irregular immigration stems from instability and 
lack of perspectives in Southern countries. The 
development gap between the two shores will 
go on for years. One of the ways to close it is 
precisely through orderly immigration, guided to 
benefit individuals who migrate, but also benefit 
countries of origin and destination.
To this end, European institutions, particularly 
the Commission, must participate directly in 
efforts aimed at achieving a comprehensive 
management of migration issues that can only 
come about through a combination of decisions 
and measures for both the short and long term. 
This must especially involve the following:
1.- Lend financial support to those EU countries 
most affected by uncontrolled migration flows 
from the south Mediterranean.
2.- Improve the Union’s external borders, 
requiring greater support from Frontex and 
from all member States. The TRITON project is 
especially encouraging in this regard.
3.- Contribute to building the capacity of 
countries of origin and transit to control their 
borders, and retain irregular migration flows at 
the origin.
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This action strategy will be enhanced through in-
creasing cooperation between the Government 
and the Autonomous Communities, in order to 
make good use of the opportunities offered by the 
internationalisation of Spanish SMEs, deriving the 
greatest possible competitive advantage that each 
region can obtain in the different sectors of the eco-
nomy.
Actions
1.- The 41 measures set out in the 2014-2015 Stra-
tegic Plan for the Internationalisation of the Spa-
nish Economy.
2.- Whenever appropriate, incorporate a business 
aspect into all official visits abroad either by sen-
ding a business delegation, holding work meetings 
with Spanish companies established in the host 
country or organising meetings with authorities 
and business organisations from that country to 
promote Spanish business activity, aiding them in 
the projects they have undergone and collabora-
ting in the resolution of problems they may encou-
nter.
3.- Ongoing engagement of our external network 
in defending and supporting Spanish companies 
abroad. In this domain, we will continue to improve 
the effectiveness of the Embassies and Consulates 
located in areas where there is no physical Econo-
mic and Commercial Office, in close coordination 
with the Economic and Commercial Office that has 
jurisdiction in this area. This action will be comple-
mented by the convening of meetings and visits by 
accredited foreign ambassadors in Spain to leading 
Spanish companies in their respective sectors. 
This is a way for these companies to demonstrate 
their strengths and convey a stronger image of our 
country. This programme will be extended to other 
groups such as foreign media correspondents.
4.- Redeployment of our external network, taking 
into account the changes in the geographic distri-
bution of our economic interests abroad and the 
increasing needs of our companies in these mar-
4.- Fight against criminal networks that traffic in 
human beings and work especially closely with 
third countries.
5.- Decisive action on returns and readmissions, 
including forced returns, with full respect for 
human rights and the due process of law, in 
order to put an end to situations of irregular 
presence in European  Union territory.
6.- Support for countries of transit, enabling 
them to collaborate in the return of irregular 
migrants. Some international organisations, 
particularly the International Migrations 
Organisation, have programmes for assisted 
voluntary return that must be financially and 
institutionally supported.
7.- Enter into readmission agreements with 
origin and transit countries.
8.- Strengthen organised migration channels, 
through cooperation with countries of origin, 
with a view to preventing traumatic situations 
associated with irregular migration flows and 
guarantee an equilibrium between supply and 
demand in the labour market in countries of 
origin and destination.
9.- European Union migratory policy must 
be fully integrated into EU External Action. 
Migration policy priorities and objectives 
must be incorporated into the design and 
implementation of external policy. To this end, 
the coordination between member States, 
the European External Action Service and 
the Commission must make effective use of 
the instruments at the disposal of the Union, 
particularly regarding cooperation with third 
countries. The mobility agreements with 
Morocco and Tunisia must be adequately 
financed. Multilateral forums are of enormous 
importance, such as the Rabat Process and the 
Africa-Union Partnership for Migrations, Mobility 
and Employment.
10.- Continue to tackle the ultimate causes 
of migration, poverty, conflict and political 
instability, as well as the lack of respect for 
human rights. It is only by creating alternatives in 
countries of origin and transit that we are able to 
address the problem of non-regulated migration 
flow.
86
kets. A logical consequence of a strong expansion 
of our business activity abroad is a shift in weight 
towards certain countries depending on these in-
terests. The increased importance of our interests 
in Asia and Africa is especially significant.
5.- Close collaboration with the Marca España High 
Commission by our diplomatic representations 
abroad with the aim of improving our country ima-
ge.
6.- Support technology action abroad that is ca-
pable of creating an internationally recognised 
reputation for R&D assets generated by Spanish 
entrepreneurs and scientists; increase internatio-
nal cooperation in these sectors with the most 
innovative players of our country; and promote 
robust investment flows that help expand the te-
chnological capacity of Spanish companies inside 
and outside Spain.
6.9. External action on  
emigration and immigration
Globalisation is changing the characteristics of mi-
gration, increasing its impact on the economy, na-
tional security, society and culture. Migration policy, 
therefore, must be seamlessly coordinated with ex-
ternal policy.
Spain’s demographic problem must lead us to a 
proactive migratory policy, one that fosters qua-
lified immigration to contribute to a change in the 
productive model and serves to counter negative 
demographic trends. Additionally, we must perse-
vere in our policy on irregular immigration control, 
with the full respect for human rights and with the 
cooperation of countries of origin and transit. In this 
regard, we will continue to work within the contexts 
of the United Nations and in a special manner, the 
European Union. The coordinated management of 
the Union’s external borders is a key element of its 
immigration policy. Linking the concept of external 
border management with that of irregular immigra-
tion strengthens the cross-cutting, integrated stan-
dpoint required by this phenomenon. 
Cooperation with origin and transit countries for 
migration flows is a key element in the preventive 
and comprehensive approach of the external di-
mension of our migration policy. Certain mecha-
nisms are highly useful to this end, such as annual 
high-level meetings with Morocco, Mauritania and 
Algeria and cooperation in border control mecha-
nisms with priority countries. It is also necessary to 
continue to strengthen development cooperation in 
order to address the root causes of migration, espe-
cially in those countries on the migratory route with 
West Africa. Regarding multilateral cooperation, we 
highlight the importance of forums for political dia-
logue, especially those that fall under the European 
Union migratory policy, such as the Rabat Process 
and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Just as important 
is the active participation in instruments that boost 
synergies in political dialogue, migration and deve-
lopment, such as mobility partnerships.
6.10. External action   
on cultural issues
Cultural diplomacy is part of public diplomacy. As 
such, it stretches beyond governments and seeks 
to establish contact with institutions and people 
from diverse fields. Through this contact, language 
and culture are disseminated. It is one of the most 
genuine and profound ways of crossing borders.
One of the features that best defines Spanish in-
ternational identity is the wealth and plurality of its 
culture, its enormously valuable heritage that is re-
newed with each generation because of the works 
of its grand and internationally renowned creators. 
Spain is a cultural power with live linguistic diversi-
ty that must be conveyed abroad as a show of our 
extraordinary vitality. Equally, our common cultural 
heritage is signal to the entire world of our undoub-
ted cultural prestige.
But Spanish culture is not only Spain. Our history 
and language have led Spanish culture to trans-
cend borders and be open to the influence of other 
peoples. The European and Ibero-American dimen-
sions of Spanish culture must therefore be appro-
priately reflected in our cultural diplomacy.
Spanish language, with its rich historical back-
ground and mestizo heritage, is our main link to 
our community countries. It is an extraordinary ve-
hicle capable of taking Spanish culture to spaces 
that were virtually unexplored until now because of 
the thriving dynamism and the growing interest it 
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FORMAL EDUCATION IN  
SPANISH: A STRATEGIC GOAL
Universal promotion of Spanish is:
• Beneficial to the nation with a range of 
positive aspects.
• A project that begins with us, our initiative.  
How we carry out the strategy we select 
depends only on us, in contrast to so many other 
areas of our external action.
• A sure bet. Undertaking a task that nobody 
can or wants to do in your place is a guarantee 
of success. There is no competition nor 
justifiable mistrust.
• A target with tangible outcomes in economic 
terms and mobilises many domestic players, a 
large part of society. 
• A programme that can rally consensus.  
There are several dimensions to promoting 
Spanish learning abroad, and we can highlight 
two as the most relevant: teaching and the 
support of Spanish teachers, and furthering 
the learning of Spanish as a foreign language in 
other countries’ formal education systems. This 
second dimension has enormous potential.
Supporting Spanish teaching in non-university 
settings abroad is a main challenge for our 
external action. The decision to make Spanish 
language learning compulsory or optional in a 
formal education system immediately implies an 
exponential increase in number of students and 
teachers, meaning millions of new students and 
tens of thousands of new educators.
The clearest example and precedent is Brazil, 
whose government implanted compulsory 
Spanish as a second language in formal 
education systems. This is leading to a 
considerable increase in amount of students 
and teachers. The steps taken in Brazil or in 
the US have not been taken in Europe. This 
leaves promising potential for our continent, the 
south Mediterranean coast and other farther 
geographical regions.
We thus arrive at the conclusion that the most 
crucial and decisive cultural action abroad is 
to persuade third country governments that 
teaching Spanish as a first or second foreign 
language should be a priority given its global 
dimension. The launching points should be the 
closest, those within our European context. If 
countries such as Germany, Great Britain, France 
and Italy adopt these measures, a great part of 
the road can be paved.
INTERNATIONAL SPANISH  
LANGUAGE CERTIFICATION 
Increasing demand for Spanish in very 
different areas has demanded that the 
Instituto Cervantes and all those involved 
in its dissemination adopt strategies that 
include cooperation amongst Spanish speaking 
countries and the incorporation of information 
technologies.
The Instituto Cervantes, the Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México and the 
Universidad de Salamanca will soon launch a 
new online Spanish certification, applicable 
worldwide. This is a test that includes all 
variations of Spanish language and can be given 
in examination centres throughout the world. 
Promoters of this new certificate will be open 
to the incorporation of new partners, especially 
universities, Spanish academic institutions and 
those from Latin American countries that will 
contribute to improve and disseminate the 
system.
The new certificate will be agile and flexible, 
attractive features for those seeking 
certification not only in academic fields but also 
for professional use and general knowledge. 
This exam will fill the void that currently exists 
and serve as a great step in promoting the 
Spanish language, encouraging learning and 
creating training for more Spanish teachers. 
88
Instituto Cervantes
548
million people in the world speak Spanish
Second language in the world spoken as a rst 
language by native speakers and second international 
communication language
Spanish recognised as a working 
language in the United States
Clasificación del español
English,
French
ArabSpanish
Languages most used on social websites
Languages most used on internet
English
Chinese
Spanish
English
Portuguese
Spanish
Most studied languages 
as a foreign language in the world
English
French
Spanish
© Oficina de Información Diplomática  Diseño: Javier Hernández (www.nolsom.com)
Fuente: Instituto Cervantes, “El español: una lengua viva”. 
Informe 2014.
Proyección del español
Estudiantes de español en el mundo
2.332.311
France
554.595 
Italy
7.820.000 
United States of America
6.120.000
Brazil
519.660
United Kingdom
503.444 
Germany
399.105 
Sweden
235.806  
Ivory Coast
1.239.590 
Others
19.724.511
estudiantes de español 
en el mundo
The Instituto Cervantes 
has multiplied by 
fourteen the number of 
registrations in the 
period 1993-2013
By the year 2030, 
 7,5% of the world’s 
population will 
speak Spanish
In 2050 the United 
States will be the rst 
Spanish speaking 
country in the world
 858000 tourists 
visited Spain in 
2013 for study 
purposes
4
Middle
East 10
Asia -
Pacic
37
Europe
77
Instituto 
Cervantes in 
the world
12
Africa
6
North
America
8
South
America
Instituto Cervantes
548
million people in the world speak Spanish
Second language in the world spoken as a rst 
language by native speakers and second international 
communication language
Spanish recognised as a working 
language in the United States
Clasificación del español
English,
French
ArabSpanish
Languages most used on social websites
Languages most used on internet
English
Chinese
Spanish
English
Portuguese
Spanish
Most studied languages 
as a foreign language in the world
English
French
Spanish
© Oficina de Información Diplomática  Diseño: Javier Hernández (www.nolsom.com)
Fuente: Instituto Cervantes, “El español: una lengua viva”. 
Informe 2014.
Proyección del español
Estudiantes de español en el mundo
2.332.311
France
554.595 
Italy
7.820.000 
United States of America
6.120.000
Brazil
519.660
United Kingdom
503.444 
Germany
399.105 
Sweden
235.806  
Ivory Coast
1.239.590 
Others
19.724.511
estudiantes de español 
en el mundo
The Instituto Cervantes 
has multiplied by 
fourteen the number of 
registrations in the 
period 1993-2013
By the year 2030, 
 7,5% of the world’s 
population will 
speak Spanish
In 2050 the United 
States will be the rst 
Spanish speaking 
country in the world
 858000 tourists 
visited Spain in 
2013 for study 
purposes
4
Middle
East 10
Asia -
Pacic
37
Europe
77
Instituto 
Cervantes in 
the world
12
Africa
6
North
America
8
South
America
Instituto Cervantes
548
million people in the world speak Spanish
Second language in the world spoken as a rst 
language by native speakers and second international 
communication language
Spanish recognised as a working 
language in the United States
Clasificación del español
English,
French
ArabSpanish
Languages most used on social websites
Languages most used on internet
English
Chinese
Spanish
English
Portuguese
Spanish
Most studied languages 
as a foreign language in the world
English
French
Spanish
© Oficina de Información Diplomática  Diseño: Javier Hernández (www.nolsom.com)
Fuente: Instituto Cervantes, “El español: una lengua viva”. 
Informe 2014.
Proyección del español
Estudiantes de español en el mundo
2.332.311
France
554.595 
Italy
7.820.000 
United States of America
6.120.000
Brazil
519.660
United Kingdom
503.444 
Germany
399.105 
Sweden
235.806  
Ivory Coast
1.239.590 
Others
19.724.511
estudiantes de español 
en el mundo
The Instituto Cervantes 
has multiplied by 
fourteen the number of 
registrations in the 
period 1993-2013
By the year 2030, 
 7,5% of the world’s 
population will 
speak Spanish
In 2050 the United 
States will be the rst 
Spanish speaking 
country in the world
 858000 tourists 
visited Spain in 
2013 for study 
purposes
4
Middle
East 10
Asia -
Pacic
37
Europe
77
Instituto 
Cervantes in 
the world
12
Africa
6
North
America
8
South
America
Instituto Cervantes
548
million people in the world speak Spanish
Second language in the world spoken as a rst 
language by native speakers and second international 
communication language
Spanish recognised as a working 
language in the United States
Clasificación del español
English,
French
ArabSpanish
Languages most used on social websites
Languages most used on internet
English
Chinese
Spanish
English
Portuguese
Spanish
Most studied languages 
as a foreig  language in the world
English
French
Spanish
© Oficina de Información Diplomática  Diseño: Javier Hernández (www.nolsom.com)
Fuente: Instituto Cervantes, “El español: una lengua viva”. 
Informe 2014.
Proyección del español
Estudiantes de español en el mundo
2.332.311
France
554.595 
Italy
7.820.000 
United States of America
6.120.000
Brazil
519.660
United Kingdom
503.444 
Germany
399.105 
Sweden
235.806  
Ivory Coast
1.239.590 
Others
19.724.511
estudiantes de español 
en el mundo
The Instituto Cervantes 
has multiplied by 
fourteen the number of 
registrations in the 
period 1993-2013
By the year 2030, 
 7,5% of the world’s 
population will 
speak Spanish
In 2050 the United 
States will be the rst 
Spanish speaking 
country in the world
 858000 tourists 
visited Spain in 
2013 for study 
purposes
4
Middle
East 10
Asia -
Pacic
37
Europe
77
Instituto 
Cervantes in 
the world
12
Africa
6
North
America
8
South
America
NSTITUTO CERVANTES
SPANISH STUDENTS   
IN THE WORLD
ROJECTION OF SPANISH 
SPANISH     
CLASSIFICATION
89
THE INSTITUTO CERVANTES 
AND CO-OFFICIAL LANGUAGES
Within the Spanish government external 
action framework, the Instituto Cervantes has 
proven itself to be an essential instrument 
in the teaching of Spain’s diverse languages 
and in the spreading of knowledge regarding 
Spanish culture in all of its broad dimensions 
and plurality, as well as the common cultural 
heritage of all the Spanish- speaking 
community.
To this end, the Instituto organises general 
and specialised Spanish language courses at 
its centres, and courses in Spain’s co-official 
languages. At the beginning of each year, the 
Instituto Cervantes offers Catalan, Galician and 
Basque language courses along with Spanish 
and these take place where there is a demand 
for them. Collaboration comes frequently 
from the responsible organisations at the 
corresponding Autonomous Communities to 
organise the courses, such as Instituto Ramón 
Llull, Xunta de Galicia, Instituto Etxepare and the 
Instituto Navarro del Vascuence-Euskarabidea. 
Additionally, Catalan, Galician, Valencian and 
Basque languages count as merit credits in 
the “language knowledge” section for Instituto 
Cervantes personnel in their applications for 
promotions, transfers or new job posts.
Cultural activities are regularly scheduled at 
Instituto Cervantes centres related to Catalan, 
Galician, Valencian and Basque cultures such 
as lectures, congresses, exhibitions, film series, 
concerts, readings and more. There are also 
libraries devoted to authors of these languages 
with special collections of their works.
With regards to activity in Spain, we highlight 
a project that has made a dynamic comeback: 
the Encuentros en Verines gatherings. In our 
literary culture, Verines is synonymous with 
meetings of the minds between writers and 
critics in Spain’s different languages. From 
1985, there has been a yearly gathering of 20 
to 30 writers in Spain’s different languages at 
the Casona de Verines in Pendueles (Asturias). 
The main objective of these Encuentros has 
always been to foster dialogue and intellectual 
exchange. For this, writers from all areas and 
languages in Spain are invited to debate on the 
state of Spanish humanities and their diverse 
genres, with different approaches from each 
author’s particular viewpoint and personal 
experience. In 2013, institutions representing 
our languages—Instituto Cervantes, Institut 
Ramon Llull, Consello da Cultura Galega 
and the Instituto Vasco Etxepare—were 
incorporated into the academic coordination 
of the event, reinforcing the initial vocation 
of the Encuentros: promoting ties between 
Spain’s cultures and enhancing three decades 
of amassed creation, exchange and dialogue.
Celebration of the Spanish Language Day outside the Instituto Cervantes in Madrid.
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arouses in new fields. We have before us a unique 
opportunity to boost the spreading of the langua-
ge throughout the world, hand-in-hand with other 
Spanish speaking countries.
Cultural manifestations taking place abroad are in-
creasingly varied. A growing number of activities 
promoted by cultural diplomacy are related to less 
traditional fields, yet these are fields in which Spain 
has a great deal to offer such as design, architectu-
re and gastronomy. However, more emphasis must 
be placed on science, projecting a more solid image 
of the country abroad. Cultural manifestations are 
linked less and less to borders and are increasingly 
independent of governments and public institu-
tions. The Internet and information technologies 
allow individuals from any part of the world to en-
gage in cultural dialogue.
Traditionally, cultural diplomacy has focused on the 
use of culture to project a certain image and obtain 
public and economic benefits in its relations with 
other countries. Today this approach is not enough. 
Bi- and multi-directional relations have influence 
and messages are less homogenous in nature. In 
traditional models of cultural diplomacy, govern-
ments assumed practically all functions. Today, ci-
vil society takes on more of a key role and broader 
space, where persons or institutions—frequently 
partnered with those of other countries—propose 
and develop cultural programmes. In a highly de-
centralised international society, actions carried out 
by independent players do more for the image of 
a country than those that are directly produced by 
that country’s government.
Actions
1.- Presentation and dissemination of our cultu-
ral reality, both historical heritage and contempo-
rary creation in the broadest array of fields. Spain 
has few instruments as convincing as its heritage 
and creative output to fulfil the aforementioned 
priority of external policy that the Spanish External 
Action and Service Act describes in its preamble: 
“strengthen international presence and reinforce 
its image in the world.”
 
2.- Projection of Spanish as an international 
communication language. The demand for our 
language is increasing. This means more and bet-
ter certification and teacher training is needed. 
The following actions should be taken in this re-
gard: expand the activity of Instituto Cervantes, 
encouraging its strategy of forging alliances with 
Latin American and European countries, and agre-
ements with universities and other types of insti-
tutions that facilitate infrastructure; strengthen 
the Spanish as a Foreign Language (DELE) diploma 
as an official certification; launch new formulas for 
certifying knowledge of Spanish language; stren-
gthen relationships with public and private acade-
mic institutions; and supporting the activities of 
Education Councils and other education offices 
abroad controlled by the Education Ministry.
It is equally necessary to place the proper empha-
sis on the Spanish community abroad who wish 
to maintain their cultural and linguistic ties with 
Spain. An aspect of very special importance is the 
role played by the cultural associations abroad es-
tablished by many Spanish provinces, and the sup-
port these associations receive from the corres-
ponding Autonomous Communities.
3.- Projection of Spain’s languages. Cultural ac-
tion abroad with respect to the cultures of the Au-
tonomous Communities and the co-official langua-
ges – Catalan, Basque, Galician and Valencian – is 
granted high priority in the promotion and dissemi-
nation of Spanish culture in its different forms and 
languages. We are working to achieve a greater in-
ternationalisation of Spanish culture, fostering the 
presence of our cultural creators and industries on 
the international scene, and facilitating the pre-
sence of this sector in international events. In this 
task, a balance must be maintained between the 
different forms of artistic expression produced in 
the Autonomous Communities, to produce a true 
reflection abroad of our nature, that of a country 
with an extraordinary cultural wealth, which is the 
product of its cultural diversity.
On a multilateral level, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Cooperation collaborates to boost 
Catalonia’s presence and cultural actions within 
the UNESCO system. In June 2014 a new Memo-
randum of Understanding was signed between 
UNESCO and the Generalitat de Cataluña, under 
the aegis of the Ministry, which had and continues 
to have the decisive support of the Spanish Per-
manent Delegation to UNESCO.
4.- Anniversary commemorations. In forthcoming 
years several anniversaries will be commemorated 
which will aid in projecting a fresh image of Spain 
in the world and strengthening ties with zones of 
great interest such as the US and Pacific Asia. 2015 
marks the 200th anniversary of the completion of 
the Manila Galleons and the 450th anniversary of 
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the founding of Saint Augustine, the first city of 
the United States. In 2019, we will commemorate 
the 500th anniversary of the kick-off of the first 
round-the-world voyage (1519-1522), all of them 
advantageous moments to present Spain as an 
engine for globalisation; and in 2016, we comme-
morate the 4th centenary of Miguel de Cervantes’ 
death.
5.- Multilateral consultations, especially with 
UNESCO, to address global education and cultural 
challenges. UNESCO is the appropriate framework 
for consultation in areas such as management and 
protection of heritage in a broad sense—material, 
immaterial, underwater, natural—a sector in which 
we occupy an exceptional position.
6.- Support for internationalisation of our cultu-
ral and creative industries, industries of evident 
added value that provide over twice the average 
number of jobs as other creative sectors. These 
have an important impact on other industries such 
as tourism, fashion and luxury items. Actions are 
undertaken that strengthen the promotion of al-
ready consolidated markets while at the same time 
intensifying promotion where public support is still 
needed to overcome certain barriers, namely in 
such promising markets as those in large Asian and 
African countries. In addition, we also support our 
creators in their contacts abroad in their efforts to 
launch co-productions.
7.- Further penetrating the Latin American cul-
tural scene is a priority objective. All institutions, 
under the coordination of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Cooperation, must work towards this 
end. Several of the Secretariat-General for Ibero-
America’s main success stories are linked to cul-
ture and its industries; it is necessary to continue 
to advance in this direction and cover new ground.
8.- Cultural diplomacy, in terms of cultural pro-
motion, cultural cooperation and cultural promo-
tion for development, as part of our cooperation 
policy, continuing human resource development 
programmes in the cultural sector and redirecting 
the efforts made in past decades, evolving from 
the restoration and use of material and immaterial 
heritage towards programmes based on knowled-
ge transfer – a direction that is more appropriate 
to new circumstances, especially in Latin America.
9.- Coordination and projection of an image of 
unity in external cultural action The Ministry of 
Education, Culture and Sport and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, together with its 
dependent organisations, Instituto Cervantes and 
AECID, are working jointly to promote Spanish 
language and culture in their respective domains. 
Spanish Embassies and all of their technical sec-
toral offices ensure unified and coordinated dis-
semination, with all of the benefits this brings to 
Marca España and the positive consequences—be 
they educational, diplomatic, trade, tourism or 
otherwise—that contribute to the better develo-
pment of Spanish society and international rela-
tions.
10.- Strengthening of public-private alliances. 
The priority geographical axes, besides the tra-
ditional ones of Europe and Latin America, are the 
United States and Asia, which are viewed as new 
frontiers full of opportunities. In the USA, looking 
beyond the Hispanic community, we seek to re-
ach the American public in general and to extend 
Spanish culture through the Instituto Cervantes 
network, the educational action abroad of the Mi-
nistry of Education, Culture and Sport and that of 
other centres.
With regards to Asia, we look towards emerging 
markets that frequently require institutional sup-
port. An example to keep in mind is the film indus-
try where a co-production agreement has just been 
made with India and another is being negotiated 
with China. Regarding language, there is enormous 
potential. Special mention must be made of the 
Philippine effort to introduce our language broadly 
into the education system for which guidance and 
consulting services will be provided.
6.11. External action   
on education
Education for students beyond our borders fulfils a 
role that is important to making Spain known and 
creating and strengthening international relations 
of friendship, based on educational and cultural 
bonds for the present and the future. 
Actions
1.- Teaching subjects from the Spanish education 
system in other countries through existing public or 
private Spanish institutions.
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2.- Implementing or maintaining diverse collabora-
tion formulas with foreign learning centres to incor-
porate specific content from our education systems 
into theirs.
3.- Signing of agreements and conventions between 
Spanish education systems and those of other cou-
ntries to facilitate the mobility of teaching staff and 
students.
4.- Dual degree programmes. In a scenario of globa-
lisation in which mobility, technology and language 
learning constitute the three essential elements of 
the educational process, these programmes allow 
students to reap the educational benefits of both 
systems. Moreover, degree holders will benefit from 
an intercultural dimension and mobility at the hig-
her education level 
Together with this, we introduce a methodology 
based on AICLE (integrated content and language 
learning). In our external educational action this is 
applied to both dual degree programmes as well as 
Spanish programmes imparted in foreign centres 
and allows for learning of the language and the non-
linguistic subject at the same time.
5.- The internationalisation of our universities that 
already participate in European, Latin American 
and other geographic regions can serve to foster 
dialogue with universities and institutions respon-
sible for higher education in new areas and in new 
countries. The way to strengthen the international 
presence and image of our higher education system 
is by driving this momentum of mobility and teacher 
and student exchange programmes, consolidating 
the recognition of degrees and quality certifica-
tions, and implementing new international dual de-
gree programmes.
The Strategy for the Internationalisation of Spanish 
Universities, designed by the Ministry of Education, 
Culture and Sport, is an executive plan based on spe-
cific actions to enable Spanish universities to obtain 
a prominent position on the international stage by 
presenting attractive, competitive educational pro-
grammes; another goal of this Strategy is to con-
solidate a strong, internationally attractive univer-
sity system that promotes the inward and outward 
mobility of the best students, teachers, researchers 
and administrative and service staff, promoting high 
quality education, the value of Spanish as a langua-
Publicity campaign carried out in Asia by the 
Secretary of State of Tourism.
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ge of higher education and the internationalisation 
of training programmes and of R&D&I activities.
This Strategy will underpin Spain’s position as a 
benchmark for international higher education in 
Spanish, highlighting the advances made in hig-
her education in recent decades, and presenting 
Spanish language as an asset with which to better 
position ourselves in an international environment 
of global competition for talent and for knowledge-
related investment.
6.- Support for the Education Councils, whose main 
purpose, in the countries in which they are located, 
is to strengthen relations in the education context, 
to promote and manage the Spanish educational 
action and to make Spanish language and culture 
more visible to teachers and students in the formal 
education system.
6.12. External action   
on sport
Sport is a powerful and indispensable instrument 
in Spain’s external promotion. A successful model 
in the world of sport generates external action and 
makes a very significant media impact.
The Spanish model of sport is acknowledged 
worldwide to be highly successful. The results 
achieved by our athletes not only have positive 
consequences in the context of sport itself and 
in brand images, but also extend into many other 
areas, such as education, health, social and gender 
equality, the integration of persons with disabili-
ties, tourism, industry. Above all, it plays a vital role 
as an engine of innovation and economic develo-
pment.
Actions
1.- Signing Memoranda of Understanding and de-
signing a time frame for cooperation between Spa-
nish sporting institutions (particularly, the Sports 
Council) and foreign ministries with responsibili-
ties for sports affairs, to facilitate partnership ac-
tivities in this field and the transfer of knowledge 
and experience to other countries.
2.- Facilitating visits to Spain by senior sports offi-
cials from other countries, to acquire information 
about the Spanish sports model and for training in 
how to administer it effectively.
3.- Visits to Spain by technical staff, architects and 
the managers of sports facilities to examine at first 
hand our Centres of Sporting Excellence and Te-
chnical Studies.
4.- Direct actions to favour sporting cooperation in 
Spain, by enabling training visits by sports coaches 
and athletes from other countries.
5.- Actions to favour sporting cooperation abroad, 
by creating and supporting sports schools provi-
ding joint educational activities.
6.- Training activities for technical staff, scientists 
and sports directors, enabling stays in Spanish fa-
cilities and centres, attendance at training courses 
and the organisation of or collaboration in courses 
and seminars, at home or abroad.
7.- Travel abroad by Spanish teams, as the best 
qualified ambassadors of our sport and of Spain.
8.- The organisation of elite sports events, wel-
coming athletes, technical staff and officials from 
around the world and placing Spain’s image in the 
global media
9.- The development of sports tourism in Spain, 
both for spectators at advertised events and for 
those taking part in any of the innumerable possi-
bilities, especially outdoors and in natural surroun-
dings.
6.13. External action   
on tourism
Each year over one billion people travel abroad as 
tourists. In economic terms this represents 9.5% 
of the world’s GDP. One out of eleven jobs in the 
world is generated by tourism.
Spain is world leader in this gigantic industry. It is 
the second country in tourism revenues, third in 
number of international tourists and the first ho-
liday destination in the world. Maintaining this star 
position is going to be a great challenge. It is one 
of the most important branches of activity in the 
Spanish economy in terms of GDP ahead of cons-
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truction; real-estate, professional, science and te-
chnology professions; and information and com-
munication.
These figures, both worldwide and national, make 
tourism a fundamental element to external action 
strategy. The tourism industry is undergoing pro-
found changes for such different reasons as new 
technologies that are changing the value chain, 
processes of marketing and sales, and consumer 
behaviour. An increasing number of international 
destinations compete in this market, with offers to 
an increasing number and variety of potential tou-
rist segments. 
The diversity of culture, climate, food and other 
aspects of life in Spain should be highlighted to 
enhance Spain’s appeal to foreign tourists. In this 
respect, an issue of crucial importance is the ne-
cessary collaboration with the corresponding 
department in each Autonomous Community in 
order to reduce the industry’s dependence on sea-
sonality and to provide tourism services with grea-
ter added value.
Actions
1.- Promoting the Spanish image as a tourist des-
tination abroad. In mature countries, the main 
suppliers of tourists to our country, the strategy 
consists in making the broad diversity of tourism 
products our country has to offer known, with a 
view to reaching new segments of the population. 
Moreover, in those markets that are emerging in 
a tourist sense, the strategy consists in positio-
ning Spain as a tourist destination where it is less 
known as such.
2.- Strengthening bilateral and multilateral rela-
tions in the tourist sector. Spain must increase the 
exchange of knowledge and experiences with stra-
tegic partners in line with bilateral economic and 
trade relations. With regards to multilateral orga-
nisations with competencies in tourism, institutio-
nal relations and the transfer of knowledge will be 
strengthened. 
3.- Lending assistance to Spanish tourism busines-
ses and entities in their international activity. We 
will support the internationalisation of Spanish 
tourism enterprise through a specialised assistan-
ce service that will support them in their interna-
tional activities. 
4.- Strengthening the Spanish tourism brand ima-
ge. Tourism is a fundamental facet of Marca Espa-
ña, and with this in mind, we will undertake actions 
to strengthen the tourism dimensions of the brand 
as a key element in the comprehensive quality 
brand image of the country.
The principle instrument for supporting these ac-
tions is the Instituto de Turismo de Spain (TurS-
pain) Strategic Marketing Plan. 
Health transport in the heliport of the Central 
Hospital of Asturias.
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6.14 External action on the 
environment and climate 
change
As we have stated previously, the reference fra-
mework for these issues is the United Nations and 
our natural framework for action is the European 
Union.
Action on the environment
1.- There are nearly 500 international conventions 
on environmental issues. We will promote better 
governance to strengthen synergies and prevent 
instruments from overlapping and ensure com-
pliance with them.
2.- Political support for the process with active 
participation in governmental bodies and interna-
tional conventions conferences.
3.- Progress in achieving the targets from the Aichi 
Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity; move forward 
in negotiations on the legally binding instrument 
on mercury and other dangerous chemical subs-
tances.
4.- Support coherence and synergies in negotia-
tions on the environment and the Post-2015 De-
velopment Agenda, aiding to address the environ-
mental challenges—such as loss of biodiversity, 
water scarcity and combatting atmospheric pollu-
tion, amongst others—that hinder the eradication 
of poverty and sustainable development.
5.- In the context of the European Union, boost 
joint actions over the Natura 2000 network so 
that it is viewed as an external European network, 
and connect it to environmental initiatives already 
underway, such as habitat banking.
6.- Regarding water: intensify international coo-
peration, establish and fortify collaboration fra-
meworks and exchange of experience both in 
multilateral and bilateral contexts. At the United 
Nations: the role water plays in the sustainable 
development goals agenda and in development 
cooperation. In the Mediterranean: through the 
5+5 Dialogue; in Asia: with countries such as Uzbe-
kistan, Kazakhstan and others, in the Near East; in 
Latin America through the Ibero-American Confe-
rence of Water General Directors (CODIA).
Action on climate change
1.- Political support for international processes to 
combat climate change with an active participa-
tion in the Summit organised by the UN Secretary 
General.
2.- Progress in negotiations towards a new inter-
national agreement on climate change that must 
be adopted in 2015, at the Paris Summit, and enter 
into force in 2020.
3.- Give importance to coherence and synergies in 
climate negotiations and those related to the Post-
2015 Development Agenda, enabling them to cope 
with the challenges that climate change poses to 
reaching the eradication of poverty and sustaina-
ble development.
4.- Cooperation with third countries and institu-
tions to further develop international carbon tra-
ding markets.
5.- Support the negotiation process for a new 
energy and climate change framework within the 
European Union. 
6.- Strengthen Spain’s presence in the Ibero-Ame-
rican region by maintaining the momentum of net-
works such as RIOCC (Ibero-American Network of 
Climate Change Bureaus) and in other areas of in-
terest through an appropriate use of cooperation 
resources.
7.- Active presence in international forums where 
Spain can convey the relevance of its role in com-
batting climate change.
6.15. External action   
on health
External action on health focuses on health secu-
rity, health protection, healthcare for citizens and 
the support this sector can lend to others: food 
and agriculture, and tourism, and more. This falls 
under the umbrella of policies created within the 
European Union, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and other international bodies. 
The globalisation of health risks of human, animal, 
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food, environment and other origins demands in-
ternational collaboration for their detection and 
control. Spain adopted the Who International 
Health Regulations and thus has a commitment to 
announce health risks that may be of international 
interest and to have in place response-ready struc-
tures and mechanisms for them.
Food security and global food markets also re-
quire an international collaboration framework 
to maintain the security standards reached in the 
European Union, coordinate the response to food 
emergency situations and advance in transmission 
technologies and information management.
Non-communicable diseases are the first cause of 
mortality and morbidity in all countries, making it 
a prime item on the health agendas of the United 
Nations, European Union and States.
In the area of drug monitoring, we will strengthen 
cooperation, collaboration and communication 
amongst health authorities to develop standardi-
sed actions, transfer knowledge and information 
technology to boost prevention and combat the 
falsification of drugs and related fraud.
The National Transplant Organisation (ONT) has 
brought Spain to the forefront of world figures on 
organ donation and transplants and has allowed 
many countries to boost their figures by imple-
menting the Spanish Transplant Model. The va-
lue of this on an international cooperation level is 
evidenced by the fact that the ONT was awarded 
the Príncipe de Asturias International Cooperation 
Award in 2010, and shortlisted for the “Marca Es-
paña Ambassador” prize in 2013.
The health sector has a supporting role in other 
sectors, such as the internationalisation of the 
food sector, food export, quality control of medici-
nes and the cosmetic sector and healthcare enter-
prises that foster health tourism. 
Actions
- Active participation in European Union and 
WHO forums in preparing for and responding to 
health crises, in setting out food regulations and 
researching food risks. Promoting the values and 
experiences from the European food security sys-
tem in Ibero-America.
- Collaboration with the European Commission 
and especially countries neighbouring Spain in the 
functioning of cross-border healthcare.
GAS. ELECTRICITY.   
INTERCONNECTIONS. 
THE NEED FOR MORE EUROPE
Spain has two gas pipelines that connect 
with Algeria: the Maghreb Pipeline through 
the Straight and the Medgaz Pipeline through 
Almeria, which carries or has the capacity to 
carry 20 bcm/year. Together with these is 
the Larrau pipeline (France) with a capacity 
of 5.2 bcm/year.
Additionally, Spain has seven regasification 
plants: Bilbao, Gijón, Ferrol, Huelva, 
Cartagena, Sagunto and Barcelona, with a 
total capacity of 67.1 bcm/year. The plants 
operate only at 20% capacity due to the high 
prices of liquefied natural gas in the Far East, 
making Algerian gas more profitable.
Spain’s total gas import capacity is 92.3 
bcm/year. Current consumption rates are 
around 30-31 bcm/year.
This means that the Spanish gas grid 
would be in conditions to re-export around 
50 bcm/year to Europe, the equivalent 
of approximately 40% of what Russia 
supplies. By reinforcing connections with 
Algeria, this figure could even increase by 18 
bcm/year, according to Enagas estimates. 
This possibility is currently barred because 
of insufficient connections with Franc, and 
further on to the rest of Europe.
Regarding electricity, the interconnection 
capacity between Spain and France is 
one of the lowest in the European Union. 
Current installed production capacity is at 
1.4% and peak load is at 3.33%. This installed 
production capacity can reach 2.7% once the 
work is finished on the Santa Llogaia-Baixas 
connection. If the interconnection were to 
be made through the Bay of Biscay, Spain 
would reach an interconnection ratio of 6.1% 
of installed production capacity in 2022. 
This figure is still far below the 10% targets 
established by the European Council. In 
fact, in 2020, Spain will be the only country 
on the European continent to not reach this 
target. 
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mayor parte de los Estados de la Unión Europea. 
Por ello, los objetivos españoles en este ámbito 
encajan  con los europeos, definidos en torno a los 
conceptos de seguridad, sostenibilidad y competi-
tividad.
El mundo está cambiando y el contexto en materia 
de energía también. Las novedades más importan-
tes se han dado en la explotación de combustibles 
fósiles no convencionales (gas de esquisto, petró-
leo de esquisto bituminoso y arenas petrolíferas). 
La “revolución del esquisto” ha generado gran-
des expectativas de que Estados Unidos llegue a 
la autosuficiencia en materia energética a medio 
plazo. En Europa - por razones técnicas, políticas 
y de sostenibilidad - semejante evolución es muy 
improbable y, en cualquier caso, no resolverá la si-
tuación de dependencia exterior, ni de Europa, ni 
de España.
España importó en 2012 más de las tres cuar-
tas partes de la energía que consumió. La crisis 
económica, y la evolución del modelo productivo 
español hacia actividades con menor intensidad 
energética, han facilitado que la tasa de depen-
dencia exterior baje desde máximos superiores 
al 80%, pero es imposible revertir totalmente la 
situación. Aunque sea posible reducir la tasa de 
dependencia a través del desarrollo de recursos 
propios - carbón, renovables - y primando la efi-
ciencia energética, esta reducción siempre será 
muy costosa. Por lo tanto, la prioridad seguirá 
siendo la diversificación de  proveedores y de 
fuentes de energía, que minimice nuestra vul-
nerabilidad. Esto exige un constante acompaña-
miento diplomático, dirigido a facilitar acuerdos 
con los países proveedores y la tarea de las em-
presas españolas del sector, así como el análisis 
- Lead joint actions in the European Union on 
non-communicable diseases, lifelong active aging 
and leadership in the area of nutrition and physical 
activity. 
- Active participation with the WHO and the Eu-
ropean Union in drafting an action plan for health 
personnel to foster a sustainable workforce in Eu-
rope. 
- Maintain leadership in Europe and the rest of 
the world in donation and transplant of organs, 
tissues and cells through active collaboration with 
the European Commission, the Council of Europe, 
the WHO and the Ibero-American Network and 
Council on donations and transplants. 
- Consolidate a collaborative model for drug sec-
tor institutions with Ibero-American countries. 
- Forge a working group to internationalise the 
health sector, established within the framework of 
the 2014-2015 Strategic Plan for the Internationa-
lisation of the Spanish Economy. 
6.16. External action   
on energy
España ha sido, tradicionalmente, muy depen-
diente del exterior en materia energética, como la 
Model railway of the future high speed Talgo train 
line between Mecca and Medina (450 km long).
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de la situación de los productores, que permita 
adelantarse a posibles perturbaciones en el sumi-
nistro y minimizar riesgos.
No obstante, la gran paradoja en materia de se-
guridad, e incluso sostenibilidad, es la ausencia de 
una Europa de la energía. No tener un mercado 
europeo energético integrado aumenta la vulne-
rabilidad en el aprovisionamiento de los Estados 
miembros, y entorpece una mayor eficiencia ener-
gética. La ausencia de una política energética eu-
ropea dificulta así la consecución de los objetivos, 
en los que están anclados los objetivos españoles. 
En este sentido, que la Unión Europea avance en 
la integración energética es una prioridad. La in-
tegración de España en los mercados eléctrico y 
gasista europeos es clave para nuestra compe-
titividad y también facilitará la diversificación de 
aprovisionamiento, la respuesta a posibles per-
turbaciones súbitas en el mercado energético que 
puedan afectar tanto a España como a Europa, y la 
mejor integración de las energías renovables en el 
sistema energético.
El desarrollo de las interconexiones (véase recua-
dro) con el resto de Europa permitiría aprovechar 
todo el potencial español como puente energético 
entre África y Europa y posibilitaría ejercer la so-
lidaridad con Europa en caso de crisis energética. 
Por todo ello la creación de un mercado energético 
europeo integrado es crucial para el futuro ener-
gético de España.
España es puntera en energías renovables y debe 
seguir apostando por ellas. Un elemento esencial 
de esta apuesta es alcanzar un adecuado nivel de 
interconexión al mercado europeo. Desde la acción 
exterior se debe fomentar este objetivo y acom-
pañar la expansión de las empresas del sector, a la 
vez que se empieza a considerar la nueva variable 
geoestratégica que supone el encauzar la explota-
ción de energías renovables en regiones vecinas 
como el Norte de África.
Actions
1.- The creation of a European energy market in 
the European Union, and in the short term, electri-
city and gas interconnections.
2.- Bilateral actions in special interest markets 
such as Northern Africa, the Near East and emer-
ging suppliers such as Sub-Saharan Africa.
3.- Supply security. Risk analysis of supply zones 
and/or Spanish business investment and diploma-
tic support to Spanish enterprise.
4.- Sustainability and climate change emphasising 
Spain’s image as a key country in renewable ener-
gies.
6.17. External action   
on infrastructure and  
transport
The objectives for external action on matters of 
infrastructure are:
•	 Reinforce	 participation	 in	 European	 Union	
Common Transport Policy, defending Spain’s inter-
ests in relevant matters such as Trans-European 
Transport Networks (TEN-T) and the Connecting 
Europe Facility, specifically designed to promote 
growth, employment and competitiveness through 
investment in infrastructure.
•	 Further	 relations	 with	 other	 key	 countries	 in	
matters of infrastructure, transport and housing.
•	 Intensify	 institutional	 participation	 in	 interna-
tional organisations, specialised forums, high level 
and bilateral meetings both in the context of minis-
tries and on the part of Grupo Fomento entities, in 
order to guarantee the defence of Spanish inter-
ests.
•	 Boost	Spain’s	connectivity.	A	fundamental	ob-
jective is guaranteeing Spain’s connections with 
the rest of the world both in terms of passengers 
and goods given its importance to the tourism sec-
tor; facilitating Spanish business relations abroad 
and fostering the export of products, ensuring 
Spain’s presence in the great international stream 
of merchandise.
•	 Promote	 Marca	 España	 (Brand	 Spain)	 and	 in	
the same vein, the excellence of its transport in-
frastructure. This type of initiative not only bene-
fits country image but also that of the businesses 
that comprise Grupo Fomento and Spanish enter-
prise on the whole.
•	 Support	the	internationalisation	of	our	private	
businesses with special focus on small and mid-si-
ze companies—those that have the most difficulty 
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branching out beyond our borders.
The following actions are underway:
1.- Participation in high level meetings and official 
and State visits abroad and those held within the 
external action framework 
2.- Actively contribute to decision making proces-
ses for European Union Common Transport Policy
3.- Bilateral meetings. By means of contacts with 
other governments or through the embassy net-
work, emphasis is being placed on the signing of 
Memoranda of Collaboration in areas where the 
experience and know-how of Spanish public and 
private businesses is tantamount. This opens 
doors to participating in infrastructure projects in 
these countries.
4.- Relations with neighbour countries: France and 
Portugal. Relations with France and Portugal in 
matters of cross-border transportation infrastruc-
ture are essential to ensure Spain’s connectivity to 
the rest of Europe. In this framework, emphasis 
must be placed not only on the aforementioned 
high level meetings but also on frequent contacts 
and meetings on all levels of the Ministry of Infras-
tructure and the public business entities related to 
them. 
5.- Multilateral relations. Highest level participa-
tion in diverse multilateral forums (Sectoral Mee-
tings of Ibero-American Ministries of Infrastruc-
ture in the framework of Latin American Summits 
of Heads of State and Government, Western Me-
diterranean Ministers of Transport (GTMO), Union 
for the Mediterranean (UPM) and international 
forums and international level conferences (Rio + 
20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable De-
velopment, Annual Spain-US Council Forums, Pa-
nama-European Union Forum and the 1st Mexico-
European Union Forum). Moreover, we participate 
regularly in International Organisation meetings 
which are fundamental in a sector as international 
in scope as transport.
6.18. External action   
on employment and social 
security
The mobility of people is one of the key factors 
shaping the world today, within an increasingly glo-
balised economy. Exit flows from Spain are mainly 
comprised of foreigners who, having previously 
migrated to our country now decide to return to 
their country of origin. These movements also in-
clude Spanish citizens, either born in this country 
or who have acquired Spanish nationality through 
residence in Spain. The counterpart of these out-
flows is the arrival of new immigrants, together 
with Spanish citizens returning to this country.
In this context, it is essential to support the em-
ployment and social security rights generated, 
through employed or self-employed activities, by 
contributions made to social security systems in 
different countries. In the current context, inter-
national coordination is needed to recognise these 
labour rights and social benefits.
In this respect, the EU has created its Europe 2020 
strategy to promote employment and social pro-
tection within a space in which people can move 
freely. In the coming years, Spain and its EU part-
ners must address the challenge of reducing unem-
ployment, especially among our young people, 
and to do so, we will continue to participate in all 
Community initiatives in this direction, both those 
already being applied, such as the Youth Employ-
ment Initiative and the associated Youth Guaran-
tee, and those which may be established in the fu-
ture to help this or other population groups.
Furthermore, Spain is ever more strongly com-
mitted to supporting international organisations 
in safeguarding the rights of workers and emplo-
yers and in developing the concepts of ‘decent 
work’ and ‘quality employment’, proposed by the 
International Labour Organization, a tripartite UN 
agency, of which Spain has been a member since 
its foundation in 1919. Since June 2014, and for the 
next three years, Spain again has a seat as a non-
permanent member of the ILO’s Governing Body 
and of the Committee on Freedom of Association, 
and is called upon to make a resolute contribution 
to its activities. Another major presence in this 
field is Spain’s participation in the committees and 
working groups of the Council of Europe (Euro-
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pean Social Charter and European Code of Social 
Security), the OECD (DELSA Committee) and the 
European Union.
Spain is aware of the importance of conducting 
external actions regarding cooperation in the field 
of employment and social security, as part of the 
international effort to achieve the Millennium De-
velopment Goals, since it is impossible to concei-
ve a democratic, fair society without a framework 
that guarantees labour rights and that protects the 
population.
In accordance with this belief, Spain strongly sup-
ports the concept of Decent Work and the Social 
Protection Floor (i.e., a statutory minimum level 
of social protection) proposed by the ILO. We are 
working with this multilateral organisation in the 
dissemination and implementation of internatio-
nal standards in the workplace and to eradicate all 
forms of discrimination in access to work and in 
employment conditions. Moreover, for many years, 
Spain has been actively collaborating with the ILO 
on programmes to combat child labour and the ex-
ploitation of young people in the workplace.
In this context, Spain proposes the following ac-
tions in the area of employment and social secu-
rity:
1. To promote compliance with the objectives of 
the Europe 2020 strategy, with particular empha-
sis on initiatives to promote youth employment.
2. To take an active part in international initiatives 
to combat undeclared employment and to combat 
fraud in the field of social and employment issues.
3. To encourage cooperation and multilateral and 
bilateral technical support for projects to publicise 
and promote the concepts of Decent Work and the 
ILO Social Protection Floor.
4. To strengthen our multilateral position in in-
ternational forums such as the G20 and the Ibero-
American summits through active participation via 
the exchange of best practices between countries 
and the design of strategies to promote job crea-
tion, especially for young people.
5. Within the EU, to enhance the coordination of 
national policies for employment and social pro-
tection, with particular regard to national social 
security systems.
6. To reinforce the network of bilateral agree-
ments on social security that Spain has made with 
other countries, through the conclusion of new 
agreements and the review of those in force that 
need to be adapted to current legislative and social 
circumstances.
7. To support the work carried out by the Natio-
nal Institute for Safety and Health (INSHT) within 
the EU Council (Social Affairs Group), the EU Ad-
visory Committee on Safety and Health at Work 
and, especially, the European Agency for Safety 
and Health at Work (EU-OSHA), based in Bilbao, 
and in which the INSHT participates as a member 
of the Governing Board, and also as administrator 
of the Spanish Network and as national Focal Point 
for the European OSH Network.
8. To strengthen development cooperation 
through the exchange of information and techni-
cal assistance. These relationships are often esta-
blished under cooperation agreements or memo-
randa of understanding. One of the most active 
areas in this regard is that of the social economy, 
given Spain’s status as an international reference, 
regarding both its highly advanced cooperative 
sector and also its development of a regulatory 
framework for the development of this sector. 
9. To maintain a fluid dialogue with international 
observers who offer their analysis and views of the 
labour market, which is such an important element 
for investors, for the proper functioning of the 
euro area and for the country’s image. In this res-
pect, we highlight tests made of the labour market 
by bodies such as the European Commission, the 
IMF, the ECB and the OECD.
10. To promote contributions to further the Euro-
pean project in the field of employment. Notable in 
this regard is the participation of the Spanish Pu-
blic Employment Service (SEPE) in the European 
Network of Public Employment Services, whose 
main objective is to encourage cooperation bet-
ween Member States in the fields of employment 
and comparative learning, thus contributing to the 
Europe 2020 strategy and to the implementation 
of EU policies and strategic measures in this area.
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6. 19. External action on 
agriculture, food and fishing 
External Action in agriculture, food, fishing and 
environmental issues will focus on the promotion 
of products and services supplied by the Spanish 
food, agriculture and fishing sectors, on opening 
up new markets for them and on working to re-
move trade or regulatory barriers, taking into ac-
count the targets specified in governmental food 
and fisheries policy and the commitments made 
in accordance with EU strategies. External Action 
will also seek to promote international action on 
environmental questions and to benefit Spanish 
products and services in this field.
The agriculture, food and fisheries sectors have 
maintained the broadly favourable trend that be-
gan in 2009. The trade surplus has increased by 
36.3% since 2012, from €5.75 billion to €7.84 bi-
llion. This sector plays an important role in Spanish 
foreign trade, with agricultural and food sales ac-
counting for 16.2% of total exports and for 12% of 
imports. Furthermore, without the contribution of 
this sector, Spain’s structural trade deficit would 
be 32% greater. With respect to the magnitude 
of foreign trade in this sector, taking into account 
the relationship between production and rates of 
employment (Spanish Institute of Statistics 2012), 
and the financial value of exports in 2013, it has 
been calculated that 33% of the employment in 
agriculture, livestock farming, forestry and fishe-
ries (around 249,000 people) and 21% of the em-
ployment in the production of food, beverages and 
tobacco (around 86,000 people) correspond to 
export-led activities.
The agriculture, food and fisheries sectors have 
great export potential, thanks to the quality and 
variety of these products. The strategic lines for 
the internationalisation of these sectors make it 
clear that external action should provide support 
in this respect, through the technical work of agri-
cultural and commercial advisers, in promoting the 
opening up of new markets, in improving trade re-
lations in mature markets and in other promotional 
activities. 
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Bilateral relations are and will continue to be a fun-
damental pillar of external policy. The priorities and 
objectives set out can only be achieved through the 
correct management of these relations in which a 
great deal of human and material resources are in-
vested. Many times what is sought after in a multi-
lateral forum is only attained after several bilateral 
arrangements are made in the capitals of the coun-
tries in question. In order to provide proper, effecti-
ve assistance to our citizens abroad, we must have 
a permanent presence and good relations with the 
local authorities on all levels of third country gover-
nment. Traditional operations of diplomacy, infor-
mation, negotiation and representation are more 
necessary now than ever—although they have 
changed considerably—and reach their full poten-
tial in bilateral relations.
The nature of these relations is changing with the 
upsurge of non-governmental and non-administra-
tive centres of power and influence. These are ca-
pable of establishing new relationship models that 
diverge from traditional pathways and creating new 
partnerships with countries or groups of countries 
to act in other regions of the world. The numerous, 
intricate relations that Spain has with all countries 
across the world must adapt to these shifts.
7.1. Europe
Bilateral relations with our European Union part-
ners are indispensable to seeking the higher goal 
of European integration. Intense and permanent 
bilateral relations foster dialogue and deep unders-
tanding on different positions. They usher in the 
comprehension that facilitates the achievement of 
our interests in European institutions and pushes 
the EU’s own interests forward. We are thus driven 
to strengthen bilateral relations with our European 
partners, especially those with whom we already 
engage in strategic relations: Germany, France, 
Italy, Poland, Portugal and Romania.
These are long-standing bilateral relations with 
staunch historical backgrounds that stretch over 
and above the objective of European integration. 
Given their intense nature, these relations long ago 
surpassed the public realm; they go far beyond the 
official, and take a place in our respective societies 
as true engines of mutual interaction. The types 
of relations we maintain with the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands and the rest of the EU member 
States have legal frameworks incomparable to any 
other bilateral relations. Needless to say, Spaniards 
in these countries are not what we would call fo-
reigners in international relations, nor are their 
nearly 500 million citizens considered to be fore-
igners here in Spain. 
These relationships may require the drafting of 
plans to address some common interest issues—
interconnections with France, for example—but 
there is no need for a foreign policy strategy to 
address them. For quite some time the best stra-
tegy has been to let European societies, including 
Spain’s, define their preferences in mutual rela-
tions. 
Beyond EU borders, the European continent has 
countries and regions that are highly important to 
Spanish external policy.
Russia is the most important neighbour and is a 
strategic partner to the European Union. In inter-
national politics, relations between neighbours are 
never exempt from difficulties. By virtue of their 
7. Geographic spaces
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nature, they will always have a certain potential for 
conflict that doesn’t exist in relations with coun-
tries out of proximity. Nevertheless, if the efforts 
and the will are there to reach understanding, the-
se relations can be much firmer, much richer and 
have great potential for growth.
Not only is there this existing neighbourly po-
tential with Russia, but Russia is also a strategic 
partner. As a relevant player in the international 
community and permanent member of the Secu-
rity Council, Russia has the capacity to contribute 
in a positive manner to solving many international 
problems ranging from global issues to conflicts 
in which their interests may be very important to 
reaching solutions. The European Union wishes 
to work with Russia to solve many of these global 
problems and many of these conflicts, especially 
those that most directly affect both parties due to 
geographic proximity.
In recent years, Moscow has made decisions and 
engaged in actions that have made it hard to truly 
realise the full potential of relations between two 
neighbours as important as Russia and the Euro-
pean Union. Among these actions is, most recently, 
the annexation of Crimea, which is a violation of 
international law, as is any change imposed on bor-
ders and without explicit agreement between the 
countries involved. Russia’s attitude in the com-
mon neighbourhood—particularly in the Ukraine 
conflict—has lead to considerable distancing in re-
lations with the European Union that can only have 
undesirable consequences for all.
Spain has always been and is still party to a rela-
tionship with Russia which allows to exploit the 
enormous potential for mutual benefit we have 
previously described here. Both Russia and the 
European Union have much to gain in this type of 
relationship. To achieve this, each party must have 
a basic understanding of the other’s attitude, espe-
cially regarding respective neighbourhoods. Spain 
can only comprehend one model in which the le-
gitimate interests of all are respected, one whose 
utmost priority is the progress and welfare of all 
countries in the region. We will continue to push 
this idea to improve Russia-European Union rela-
tions. We do so with the conviction that Russia will 
always be, necessarily, part of the solution.
Within this framework, Spain wishes to work 
towards achieving a more solid relationship with 
Russia. Spain has the capacity and aspirations of 
King Juan Carlos together with the President of Russia Vladimir Putin, in the Russian State Prize award 
ceremony, the most prestigious in the country, awarded to the King in 2012 for his humanitarian deeds and 
his role during in the Spanish Transition.
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UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN- 
EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS  
Ukraine is a sovereign country with the full right 
to decide its status freely among nations. This 
is Spain’s departure point. From this stance, 
we inevitably understand and incorporate 
Russia’s special sensitivity which derives from 
diverse factors such as the strategic value that 
Ukraine has for Russia and, in turn, Russia has 
for Ukraine; a strong emotional value; economic 
weight; and human closeness among a large 
part of respective societies. 
The European Council strongly condemned 
“the unprovoked violation of Ukrainian 
sovereignty and territorial integrity by 
the Russian Federation” at the same time 
indicating that “The European Union's and the 
Russian Federation's common objective of 
a relationship based on mutual interest and 
respect of international obligations needs to be 
promptly restored.”
The essential elements of this approach are:
•	 Preservation	of	Ukraine’s territorial 
integrity, something that is in no way 
incompatible with Russia’s legitimate interests 
in Crimea, by redefining the status of Crimea 
within Ukraine. 
•	 Constitutive processes with the 
constitution reform of 2004 incorporating the 
aspirations of greater autonomy of the regions, 
especially those of the east. 
In the framework of a new closer relationship 
with Russia, based on the former points, the 
European Union could consider the following:
•	 Showing	Russia	that	the	Eastern	
Partnership is not conceived nor applied as a 
zero-sum game, but is based on an approach 
of collaboration and understanding with Russia 
as well, and nurtures a space for shared values, 
prosperity and stability.
•	 Formalising	EU	relations	with	the	Eurasian	
Economic Union, starting with a joint analysis 
of the compatibility between the Partnership 
Agreement and the Free Trade Agreement on 
the one hand and the Eurasian Economic Union 
on the other.
•	 Advancing	in	the	facilitation	and	
liberalisation of visas as the best way 
to improve direct contact and mutual 
understanding between Russian and EU 
citizens. In the same vein, EU-Russia dialogue 
must be held on human rights issues, the main 
beneficiary of which is civil society itself.
 
•	 Negotiating	imaginative	ways	for	Russia	
to participate in operations for managing the 
EU crisis. Giving third countries who have the 
capacity to make substantial contributions—
as is the case with Russia—a greater role in 
managing these operations.
•	 The	third	energy	package,	which	demands	
the separation between exploration, production 
and commercialisation phases is not negotiable. 
It is part of a minimal attempt at making energy 
policy more European. This is not, however, 
incompatible with negotiations on flexible 
points.
Regarding NATO/Russia, full implementation 
of the activities and meetings developed within 
the NATO-Russia Council framework before 5 
March must be pursued: diplomatic dialogue, 
joint NATO-Russia operations on Syria’s 
chemical disarmament, among others. This 
Council should be able to convene Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs at the request of one of its 
members, when s/he deems that a situation 
with potentially serious implications for the 
security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area 
exists.
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being a key partner in the modernisation process 
of the Russian economy mapped out by its leaders. 
We also aspire to further strengthen the ties bet-
ween both societies which have only recently be-
gun to know each other better.
Ukraine is a relevant neighbour to the European 
Union, the most prominent member of the Eas-
tern Partnership, and with whom Spain wishes to 
increase the quality and content of bilateral rela-
tions.
We must put our weight behind the establishment 
of substantive contractual relations with the Euro-
pean Union. The signing of the Eastern Partnership 
is the first step in this direction. The democratic 
orientation and opening of Ukraine to Europe that 
was defined following the May 2014 elections have 
paved the way to the political, legal and economic 
reform Ukraine needs in order to procure a futu-
re of prosperity and stability. These measures will 
also enable the implementation of the Partnership 
provisions.
Ukraine is a country with enormous potential and 
capacity to overcome the ponderous political diffi-
culties it currently faces. The EU must play a fun-
damental role in this undertaking. This is the con-
viction guiding Spanish policy. 
We have a strategic relationship with Turkey on 
political and economic levels and we support its 
process of accession to the European Union. In line 
with the Spanish position on accession, the sup-
port for Turkey’s admission is based on strict com-
pliance with the conditions established in the so-
called Copenhagen Criteria and on the European 
Commission progress reports. Spain’s active sup-
port from the inside is made manifest in our mem-
bership to the informal “Friends of Turkey” group.
Spain and Turkey co-sponsored the Alliance of Ci-
vilizations that is now within the United Nations 
system, and both are also part of a small group of 
countries with which Spain holds an annual sum-
mit. Thus we can see how in terms of political, eco-
nomic and regional Mediterranean vision, Turkey is 
a strategic partner to Spain.
We will continue to firmly support the European 
perspective on the Western Balkans in the fra-
mework of the criteria established at the Euro-
pean Council of Copenhagen in 1993, at Madrid in 
1995, and the Stabilisation and Association process 
agreed at the European Council of Thessaloniki 
2003. The layout of the process consists in the sig-
ning of Stabilisation and Association agreements 
between the EU and each country. These will be 
beneficial to them in terms of customs, trade and 
Pre-Accession Assistance, providing that they 
take the reform measures necessary to adapt to 
European standards, obtain candidate status and 
ultimately negotiate EU membership. A country 
with the regional importance and weight of Serbia 
must move forward in its European aspirations. An 
improvement in the perspectives of Albania will 
also contribute to regional progress and stability.
Spain has intensified contact and promoted closer 
relations to Europe with the Eastern Partnership 
countries—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia 
and Moldova. In this regard, we follow two guiding 
principles: firstly, the need exists to respect the 
options that each country chooses regarding the 
EU; secondly, the relations must develop within the 
European Neighbourhood Policy Initiative (ENPI) 
framework.
Georgia and Moldova are the countries that have 
shown the greatest commitment with the EU fo-
llowing the signing of their Partnership Agree-
ments in June 2014. Spain will continue to inten-
sify contact with these countries, a policy we will 
ramp up in the future, to cement bilateral relations 
and increase closeness to Europe. 
The South Caucasus is a relevant region because 
of its geostrategic location; its status as a neigh-
bour of the European Union; the existence of 
long-standing conflicts—South Ossetia, Abkhazia, 
Nagorno-Karabakh—which require ongoing inter-
national attention; and in terms of energy—both 
because of the wealth of its reserves and as a tran-
sit zone. Our objective is to achieve reform and de-
mocratic development of the Caucasus States and 
boost the pro-European option within its external 
policy. Spain has special interest in continuing to 
strengthen relations with Armenia and Azerbai-
jan. A diplomat has been seconded in the latter 
within the deployment agreement framework with 
the EU. 
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GIBRALTAR 
The Gibraltar dispute is an anachronistic 
vestige of dynastic conflicts of the Ancien 
Régime. Britain’s sovereign claim derives 
exclusively from the cession of territory 
included in Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht, 
with the following characteristics:
•	 cedes	only	the	town	and	castle	of	Gibraltar,	
together with the port, fortifications, and forts 
thereunto belonging.
•	 the	Spanish	Crown	has	a	preferential	right	
to recover this territory in the case the Crown 
of Great Britain decides to grant, sell or by any 
means to alienate therefrom the propriety.
The isthmus was not ceded by Spain to the 
United Kingdom in the Treaty of Utrecht, and 
always remained under Spanish sovereignty. 
Spain has pointed out that the mere continual 
British occupation (Britain erected the Fence 
in 1909) does not comply with the requisites 
of International Law for the acquisition of 
sovereignty. In this manner, Spain deems 
that the occupation of the Isthmus is illegal 
and contrary to International Law. Regarding 
territorial waters and air space, Spain does 
not recognise any other spaces belonging to 
the United Kingdom than those included in 
Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht.
Gibraltar is a colony, the only colony existing 
in Europe. Since 1963, Gibraltar has been 
included in the list of territories subject to 
decolonisation within the scope of action of 
the United Nations Special Committee charged 
with examining the situation regarding the 
implementation of the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples (Committee of 24). Only the UN 
can decide when the decolonisation process 
of Gibraltar has been completed. Until that 
moment, Gibraltar will remain on the United 
Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories.
Gibraltar’s colonial status undermines 
Spain’s territorial integrity and is completely 
incompatible with Resolution 1514 (XV), 
paragraph 6, of 1960, on general decolonisation. 
In the case of Gibraltar, the UN has not 
recognised its right to self-determination.
The Spanish government has urged the 
United Kingdom to resume, as quickly as 
possible, bilateral negotiation on questions 
of sovereignty, which has been interrupted 
for too many years. The Prime Minister 
reiterated this call in his address to the United 
Nations General Assembly of September 2012 
and did so again before the same Assembly of 
September 2013.
The question of Gibraltar must be resolved 
through bilateral negotiations between Spain 
7.2. Mediterranean and the 
Near East
The Mediterranean is more fragmented today than 
it ever has been. This hinders the task of finding 
adequate political and economic responses to the 
region’s problems and obliges a reflection on what 
way to approach this strategic priority for Europe 
and Spain.
The southern rim of the Mediterranean also bor-
ders the Near East. This region is suffering the 
most meaningful, volatile and complex changes 
ever since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Even 
beyond the revolutions of the Arab Spring and the 
critical repercussions it had in key countries such 
as Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, the Levant and the 
lands of the Tigris and Euphrates are experiencing 
tensions that feed a growing sectarian schism. Fre-
quently motivated by interests, this schism is espe-
cially occurring between the Sunni and Shia, with 
the most drastic scenarios taking place in Syria and 
Iraq.
The importance and scope of these facts and 
their geopolitical impact cannot be underestima-
ted, although we are still unaware of the concrete 
effects they will have in the medium and long term. 
Three cornerstones that are crucial to any political 
architecture: borders, the role of the State, and the 
equilibrium that has maintained regional stability, 
are all being carefully considered. And all of this is 
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and the United Kingdom, uninterruptedly 
recommended by the UN since 1965. These 
negotiations must take into account the 
interests of the people of the Colony. The 
United Nations call to resolve the controversy 
through bilateral negotiation gave way to the 
Lisbon Declaration of 1980, which was later 
furthered by the Brussels Declaration of 1984, 
in which Spain and the UK laid the foundations 
for a new negotiations process focused on 
solving all of the differences around the Rock, 
including subjects regarding sovereignty. 
This process, which took the name of the 
Brussels Process, began with an initial meeting 
in Geneva in February of 1985. At this same 
time, land communications through the Fence, 
which had been interrupted in 1969, were fully 
re-established. Since the end of negotiations 
on co-sovereignty in 2001 - 2002, the United 
Kingdom refuses continued participation in the 
cited Brussels Process.
The negotiation on issues of sovereignty is, 
as the United Nations states, exclusively a 
matter between the governments of Spain 
and the United Kingdom. This does not 
preclude, evidently, the consideration of the 
interests of the peoples of Gibraltar and also 
those of the Campo de Gibraltar.
Together with the bilateral negotiation on 
sovereignty, we are attempting to reach 
an agreement with the United Kingdom 
on a regional cooperation scheme, focused 
exclusively on issues that directly affect the 
cooperation between inhabitants on either side 
of the Fence. This new scheme envisages the 
participation of, in addition to Spain and the 
United Kingdom, local Gibraltarian authorities 
and that of the competent Spanish regional 
authorities in each case. 
Gibraltar is a territory that, under current 
legislation, is considered a tax haven.
Gibraltar in the EU
Gibraltar is not part of United Kingdom 
territory but rather, under Article 355.3 
of the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union, a European territory for 
whose external relations a Member State is 
responsible, the United Kingdom. 
Community law is applicable in Gibraltar 
with some exceptions, among which are those 
envisaged in the UK Act of Accession, which 
exclude Gibraltar from the Common Customs 
Tariff, the Common Commercial Policy, the 
Common Agriculture Policy, the Common 
Fisheries Policy, and the obligation to collect 
the Value Added Tax (VAT). 
Gibraltar is not in the Schengen Space. 
occurring simultaneously. The future also depends 
on how negotiations unfold regarding Iran’s nu-
clear programme, something that will have reper-
cussions across the region.
New power balances and bilateral and regional 
relations are being forged in this context. These 
conflicts that have always had great geostrategic 
and symbolic significance are being compounded 
by fresh questions for the region’s future.
The Israeli-Palestinian situation is the paradigm for 
these conflicts. The peace process will continue to 
be pivotal for stability in the region, but it is no lon-
ger the only key to solving the region’s problems.
In such a vast and diverse region, each new source 
of instability has its specific causes, but it also has 
common elements with the rest. 
Firstly, demography. In the whole of the Near East 
and North Africa, young people between fifteen 
and twenty-four years of age account for around 
one- third of the total population. Many of these 
youth have a certain level of education and access 
to new technologies, but are hard-pressed to find 
outlets for their personal and family projects that 
allow them reasonable hope for a better future. 
This is partly an economic issue, in some countries 
whose labour markets are incapable of accommo-
dating the continual supply of workforce that is in 
many cases over-qualified. But the backlash of this 
is deeply political and it is only in the political fra-
mework that it can be resolved. Young people lack 
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hopes for a future within the system, prompting 
protests and claims against a political class that 
has not been able to address their agendas nor 
their concerns. And the economic markers have 
not improved. 
The second common point is the manifestation of 
exclusion of identities. We must recognise that the 
identity issue is fruit of the political manipulations 
of social demands that have nothing to do with re-
ligious or cultural differences. They have been used 
to deflect possibilities for change. Against this bac-
kdrop, the sectarian rift has already reached se-
rious proportions, endangering the region’s future.
Islam as a source of political legitimacy, a source 
of law and a fundamental feature of the identity 
of groups and individuals, is a constant throughout 
the region. That is not the problem. In no way. The 
conflict appears when the region’s States and po-
litical movements manipulate deeply rooted reli-
gious sentiment. Social and economic demands 
have been presented as demands from this or that 
group to undermine their legitimacy. The political 
debate has been abducted by the powers interes-
ted in defining it in religious terms instead of terms 
of citizenry or legitimate social, economic or poli-
tical interests. Moreover, many of the region’s cou-
ntries have incorporated the promotion of their 
version of Islam into their foreign policy.
Just as we have seen the cultural repercussions 
of globalisation in the first part of this paper, from 
all over the world have responded to globalisation, 
seeking refuge in identity itself, a defence mecha-
nism against the fear of dissipating into something 
unknown that indeed seems to escape our control. 
In this region, this nearly global phenomenon has 
accentuated the identity problem.
All of these elements have configured a political 
culture in which it is hard to encourage consen-
sus. The dominant groups will at a given moment 
consider themselves the absolute victors and lose 
sight of the utility of negotiating, of engaging with 
minorities or allowing for alternation. At the same 
time, this feeds the sectarian rift, as the rest of the 
groups feel increasingly excluded from the system 
and believe that the solution consists in group ac-
tion to obtain the power quota they are due. To-
gether with this type of functioning, we find other 
societies in the region who value dialogue and pea-
ceful negotiation as a way to harness diversity and 
the political tug of war.
The combination of demographic numbers that 
are not absorbed into the economic system and 
political behaviour that does not favour inclusion 
paints a picture of uncertainty. The region is en-
meshed in a great wave of instability and harbours 
the greatest potential for conflict since the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire, or in other words, since the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement and the territorial organi-
sation decided after World War I. The centralised 
power of the States that was created at the time 
seems to be withdrawing. The results of this are 
porous borders and weak territories in the face 
of sectarian group action. The civil war in Syria 
and the appearance of ISIL—Islamic State of Iraq 
and Levant—are merely symptoms of an acute 
ailing that is extremely hard to address. It is true 
that grand jihadist projects failed in the past. But 
their recurrent appearance from the 1990’s to now 
shows the enormous fragility of the regional sta-
tus quo.
The Maghreb
The wave of changes and readjustments that were 
unleashed in the southern Mediterranean since 
2011 had an initial effect of leaving the region in 
a more fragile state. Only Tunisia, Morocco and 
Algeria with their more orderly processes and 
unquestionable success, have been able to guide 
themselves with a large amount of consensus. Fo-
llowing different paths, revolution and reform, they 
are achieving results that Europe and especially 
Spain must support with firmness and the neces-
sary means.
These changes have not translated into progress 
in cooperation with neighbouring States, which 
would boost the economic growth of all involved. 
Moreover, the weakest players in the region also 
show growing fragility even in controlling their 
own territory. If the southern rim of the Medite-
rranean is separated from Europe by a sliver of 
water, the Maghreb has its own southern border, 
an ocean of sand which is porous and increasin-
gly more permeable to the influence of the other 
side, the Sahel. The increasing interdependence of 
the Maghreb and Sahel and their problems will be 
one of the region’s far-reaching issues in the near 
future. In the Sahel, conflicts derived from the ar-
bitrariness of borders, demographic growth, sec-
tarianism and the lack of States truly designed to 
integrate their citizens are currently raging to the 
forefront with violence and volatilising the bur-
geoning scene of instability in this vast region so 
close to Europe.
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Northern Africa, particularly the Maghreb, is a 
strategically key region for Spanish external ac-
tion. Due to its geographic proximity, political and 
cultural relevance, economic and commercial po-
tential and the existence of considerable Maghreb 
communities in Spain, the stability and prosperity 
of this southern Mediterranean zone are paramou-
nt for our country. Spain has its eye on some of 
the developments that affect us in many ways. We 
must be present and involved. A new strategic re-
flection on this pivotal zone must lead to new fo-
reign policy options with the perpetual conviction 
that only by arbitrating solutions in favour of the 
two shores will we be able to tackle one of the 
most complex issues facing the international com-
munity to come.
Spanish policy supports reform, stability and subs-
tantial relations rich in content with each country 
in the region. Also worthy of mention among the 
objectives for the region is the encouragement 
of economic diplomacy that is reaping excellent 
rewards. Spain has already become, in a short span 
of financial years, the first trade partner with Mo-
WESTERN SAHARA
The Western Sahara question is still a very 
sensitive issue to the feelings, interests and 
values shared by Spaniards. External policy 
defined to manage this question must take 
this into account, as well as the international 
community framework constructed to 
resolve it. For all of these reasons, Spain 
maintains a firm commitment to seek 
a just, lasting and mutually acceptable 
political solution that envisages the free 
determination of the Western Sahara people 
in the framework of the United Nations.
As a member of the Group of Friends, we 
maintain an active commitment to said 
solution. Spain defends the central role 
of the United Nations in the resolution of 
the conflict and supports efforts of the 
successive personal envoys of the Secretary 
General of the United Nations. 
Spain puts forth its commitment of solidarity 
with the Saharawi people and of continuing 
to be the first bilateral donor of humanitarian 
aid.
.
The King of Morocco, together with the King and 
Queen of Spain, during their meeting in the royal 
palace of Rabat (Morocco), in July 2014. 
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rocco and Algeria. In the case of Tunisia and Mauri-
tania, our objective is to maximise the potential of 
growing economies, governments and people who 
know the quality of our businesses and products.
Spain is making an effort to develop the neighbour-
hood policy within the European Union and solidify 
a distribution of European funds among the south 
and east neighbourhoods guided by the principles 
of differentiation and needs that govern this policy. 
Another regional goal is to foster Spanish langua-
ge, which can benefit from the historical ties and 
increasing interest our southern neighbours have 
for our language. In security matters, stability in 
the Western Mediterranean is a shared interest. 
For this reason, Spain proposes continuing to de-
velop ongoing cooperation on Defence and Home 
affairs through both bilateral programmes and 
multilateral formats, among which we underscore 
the 5+5 Dialogue for the Western Mediterranean. 
In the case of Morocco, our great southern neigh-
bour and indispensable partner, the common will 
of our Governments is to continue enhancing the 
excellent bilateral relations and extend them into 
new arenas. Aware that close proximity can crea-
te occasional differences, the common objective 
is to continue to create a closely knit relationship 
and intertwined interests that iron out these diffe-
rences and keep them in their correct proportion 
so that they don’t damage the relationship on the 
whole. There is a will that seeks to deepen the mu-
tual understanding and dialogue that is already clo-
se between the Royal Households, Governments, 
other institutions and members of civil society. In 
addition to high level meetings that serve to solidi-
fy the Strategic Partnership and identify new areas 
for collaboration, we wish to solidify this expansion 
into other areas such as parliamentary and entre-
preneurial. 
Spain supports and will continue to support Mo-
rocco in its reform process begun in 2011, as well 
as in its drive to become a strategic European 
partner. We take on board ongoing cooperation 
in the struggle against the common threat of te-
rrorism, particularly in the face of shared concern 
about fighters returned from international scenes 
such as Syria and Libya. On migration matters, the 
plan is to continue to implement a comprehensive 
policy both in bilateral and regional contexts such 
as the Rabat Process, and support Morocco in its 
enforcement of new migration and human rights 
policy.
To Spain, Algeria is considered to be a strategic 
partner, and this can be seen in the political, se-
curity and economic arenas. In this sense, Spain 
seeks to solidify the recent years’ trend of exchan-
ge of visits and consolidate new areas for coo-
peration that benefit from the regular convening 
of high level meetings. Aware that the will of the 
country is to carry out political and economic re-
forms, which, in the case of the latter tend towards 
economic diversification, Spain proposes suppor-
ting Algeria in these processes and contributing 
to the country’s prosperity. In economic matters, 
Algeria is a constant and reliable partner in ener-
gy supply—something especially noteworthy in an 
international context under heavy tensions in this 
regard. Spain also seeks to continue to strengthen 
ties on counter-terrorist cooperation. Spain has 
the same objective of fostering exchange between 
entrepreneurs, students and tourists, and in an or-
derly fashion, migration flow. The gradual forging 
of a mutually beneficial relationship between Alge-
ria and the European Union is another of Spain’s 
objectives.
Tunisia is progressing in an exemplary fashion in 
response to the legitimate democratic aspirations 
of its people, despite the internal and external 
obstacles that the process encounters. Spain wis-
hes to respond to the new situation and political 
courage of the Tunisian authorities by reinforcing 
the bilateral relationship. We wish to foster poli-
tical dialogue and develop sectoral agreements. 
Aware of the vital importance that economic de-
velopment has for democracy to triumph, Spain 
proposes searching for new investment and trade 
opportunities that will make both of our countries 
grow. Similarly, we will collaborate to face the new 
terrorist challenge that threatens the people and 
can influence their political process. We firmly sha-
re support for Tunisia’s close relationship with the 
European Union. This will be the axis of our action.
Spain was an early partner when Libya began its 
transformation in 2011 and we observe with con-
cern the deterioration in security, with all its do-
mestic, regional and international implications. We 
also see the difficulties in terms of the construc-
tion and implementation of an inclusive political 
model. For these reasons, Spain will contribute to 
the international community commitment to the 
stabilisation of the country. To this end, we will 
continue to support operations to bolster border 
security and European Union coastal monitoring. 
Our special envoy to Libya will contribute to the 
international support of political players’ efforts 
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to seek consensus. Libya must go back to being 
a partner of prime importance for Spain and the 
European Union in trade, investment and energy 
supply, as soon as it finds its path of stability and 
institutionalism.
Mauritania is a neighbour and reliable and stable 
partner. The objective is, therefore, to continue 
building on the content contained in close and 
historical relations. In this vein, beyond political 
dialogue and excellent cooperation on migration 
and security issues, Spain seeks to contribute to 
the development and the economic growth of the 
country not only through traditional development 
cooperation—an area where it continues to be a 
priority country—but also through an economic 
diplomacy that boosts a greater presence of our 
businesses and local economic growth.
In the context of the European Union, Spain will 
continue to contribute to the development of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy with Southern 
Mediterranean countries, which also includes 
countries of the Near East. Spain will promote the 
convergence of regulations and policies with Com-
munity acquis, with the objective of establishing 
a neighbourly space of shared values through the 
Partnership Agreements, their respective Action 
Plans, Mobility Agreements and commercial agre-
ements.
Regional integration of the Maghreb and the de-
velopment of the Arab Maghreb Union will contri-
bute to the region’s peace and prosperity. For this 
reason, Spain seeks to continue working actively 
within formats that foster this integration, such as 
the Western Mediterranean Dialogue that gathers 
together the five Maghreb countries and the five 
northern Mediterranean countries: Portugal, Spain, 
France, Italy and Malta. In this 5+5 Forum context, 
Spain will continue to further the initiative with Al-
geria to draw up a water strategy for the Western 
Mediterranean, and the launching with Morocco of 
support for mediation in the Mediterranean.
Near East
Spain’s policy towards the Near East seeks cons-
tructive relations rich in content with the region’s 
countries. The first condition in this direction is to 
contribute to solution-seeking initiatives for the 
complex problems which afflict the region. But 
beyond this, there is space and opportunity to ex-
plore more promising arenas for bilateral relations. 
Both positions are mutually nourishing. Conflict 
resolution must include the development of the 
enormous potential that exists: dynamic markets, 
countries that have reached great levels of pros-
perity and have ambitious development plans, and 
Conference on Stability and Development in Libya, 
held in the Palace of Viana in Madrid in September 
2014.
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are home to thousands of talented young people 
who are keen to undertake personal and business 
projects.
Our natural framework for action to solve the 
region’s conflicts is the European Union and in 
general, with peace-seeking countries. The serious 
crises in Syria and Iraq and the persistent Israeli-
Palestinian conflict demand solutions, not only 
because of the destabilising repercussions they 
can have for our own countries—radicalisation, 
terrorism, mass migrations—but because our own 
collective conscience demands it. Spanish citizens 
feel close to the Arab world and feel their pro-
blems and suffering with special intensity. And this 
is felt in harmony with admiration for the initiative 
and vitality of the Israeli people.
Constructive opportunities invite us to take special 
note of relations with Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United 
Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Oman, with whom 
Spain has very cordial relations, inspired by the 
friendship ties that bind respective royal families. 
All of these countries have received several high le-
vel visits in recent years. This includes a tour made 
by King Juan Carlos I in the last weeks of his reign. 
The international spirit and technological excellen-
ce of Spanish businesses is a perfect compliment to 
the development plans of these countries. We wish 
to go further, however, and explore all of the areas 
of bilateral relations—political, economic and com-
mercial—as well as cultural, scientific and university 
cooperation. The objective is to progress towards a 
comprehensive and consolidated relationship.
SYRIA, IRAQ 
In this paper’s section on the Near East, we 
point to the deep underlying causes and 
the recent background of situations such 
as those in Syria and Iraq. The lack of will or 
the incapacity to forge effective States, the 
systematic policy of identity exclusion and the 
sectarian use of Islam, create the breeding 
ground in which a small fraction of al-Qaeda 
can become what has come to be called “the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Levant”. But these 
fanatical fighters were only able to grow 
to their current size in a milieu of a Sunni 
community in Iraq having legitimate feelings 
of exclusion towards a central government 
in Baghdad which were fed by sectarian and 
biased policies.
Confronted with a three-dimensional conflict—
political, military and humanitarian—the 
solution must emanate, as always, from within; 
from the political recomposition of a country 
comprised of various communities that can 
only be legitimately governed if all of them 
participate.  We have seen this before. As 
in the case of the Near East, regions where 
different identity groups coexist, mix and 
overlap, the attempt to build homogenous 
identities leads inexorably to ethnic cleansing, 
massive violations of human rights and the 
integrity of minorities. What is occurring in Iraq 
with Christians and other religious faiths is a 
good example of this. And in such a situation, 
challenging borders is yet another recipe for 
disaster and violence.
The solution must be an Iraqi one, but it will 
not be achieved if there is no international 
diplomatic system that includes the Arab 
countries, led by the League, as well as the non-
Arab countries of the region such as Turkey and 
Iran.
In Syria, the underlying reasons are the same, 
aggravated by a regime that has shown 
overwhelming examples of cruelty towards 
the civilian population and an incapacity for 
dialogue that seeks a political solution. And that 
is again, the only possible solution.
For these reasons, regarding the Syrian crisis, 
Spain has focused on three central ideas:
•	 Defence	and	promotion	of	a	political	
solution to the conflict
•	 Close	contacts	with	the	Syrian	opposition
•	 Contribute	to	mitigate	the	humanitarian	
emergency
The second strand of action, focusing on urging 
the opposition to construct a cohesive political 
front, has translated into several meetings on 
Spanish soil.
If the grim outlook of the region begins to lift, 
Iraq and Syria will no doubt be the first theatres 
in which this historic trend shift will take place.
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Yemen is facing a combination of political crises 
and conflicts between communities that is preven-
ting the results of a national dialogue process to 
solidify. Spain will continue to support this dialo-
gue.
In Syria, we base our strategy on three principles: 
the commitment to the democratic aspirations of 
the Syrian people, the urgency of coping with the 
humanitarian tragedy that threatens an entire ge-
neration of Syrians, and the conviction that only a 
political solution can bring peace and reconcilia-
tion. We will be guided by these principles as we 
work with our EU partners in promoting inclusive 
dialogue among all of the relevant forces on the 
Syrian political scene with a view to the configu-
ration of a new order that can only be democratic. 
This means neutralising terrorist groups which, in 
supposed pro of legitimate democratic demands, 
use violence as a means of reaching objectives 
that are in complete opposition to them. We will 
continue to work with the moderate opposition, 
whom we have always welcomed with hospitality 
and support, with the AECID “Masar” programme 
as a key instrument. In humanitarian matters, we 
will continue to allocate funds to help mitigate the 
grievous situation.
Similar objectives underlie our strategy towards 
Iraq: only a united, stable, sovereign and fully in-
dependent Iraq can fulfil the role of moderator 
in the Near East. It is called to this task because 
of its tradition as a great Arab nation and the po-
tential of its vast territory rich in natural resour-
ces and its diverse and enterprising society who-
se majority seeks to live in peace. Iraq should not 
be a chessboard where external forces battle out 
their differences, nor where radical groups try to 
realise their delusions of totalitarian utopias, but 
a country that owns its own destiny and is able to 
act as a stabilising pole. To this end, territorial in-
tegrity must necessarily be preserved and civil and 
constitutional pacts must be forged that can admit 
the different communities coexisting therein. The 
aspiration of building homogenous entities from 
an ethnic, religious or cultural standpoint leads to 
ethnic cleansing and a spiral of violence, injustice 
and irredentism.
We will continue a policy of supporting stability, 
institutional consolidation and social coexisten-
ce in Lebanon, which shelters a huge number of 
Syrian and Palestinian refugees.
Moreover, we will continue to cultivate the tradi-
tional friendship with Jordan, based on the clo-
se relationship between the royal families, which 
underlies our country’s support to Jordan in ma-
naging the serious challenges it faces, such as ta-
king in refugees and the threats posed by radical 
groups.
The solution to the Palestinian question based on 
two States able to coexist in peace seems clear to 
all, yet negotiations stagnate over and over again. 
Spain has always defended the position that only 
the parties can come to a lasting agreement, but 
the so-called “peace process” cannot go on inde-
finitely. There is a time factor that moves against 
peace and if a solution is not soon found, the con-
flict will continue spewing its negative effects, with 
increasing virulence, across the region and beyond. 
Spain will continue to urge the parties to persevere 
in the dialogue and will partner with third parties 
of good will to encourage negotiations; but in a 
process that continues unjustifiably, Spain will not 
hesitate to support, in concert with its European 
Union partners, initiatives aimed at dissuading the 
parties from adopting unilateral measures that 
potentially endanger the goal of a negotiated so-
lution, two states living side by side in peace and 
security.
Furthermore, we aspire to continue strengthening 
our bilateral relations with Israel on political, eco-
nomic and cultural levels; and strengthening links 
between our country and the Israeli people, and 
especially with the different Sephardic commu-
nities. Nurturing the Sephardic dimension of our 
identity is an act of historical justice and a new 
base for relations with the dynamic Israeli society 
and with Jewish communities abroad.
Because of its political, economic, demographic 
and cultural importance, what occurs in Egypt 
has immediate repercussions in all the Arab and 
Muslim world. For these reasons, stability in this 
country is a fundamental and inescapable objec-
tive. This stability will nevertheless only be long-
lasting if it is accompanied by political channels 
open to the participation of all citizens. It is likewi-
se paramount to aid Egypt in attaining a level of 
development and growth that will guarantee a 
hopeful future for the abundant and growing 
young population. Spain will encourage the Egyp-
tian authorities, and aid them when necessary, in 
the adoption of necessary structural reforms that 
are compatible with the demands of stability and 
social justice.
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Regarding Iran, we will continue to lend political 
backing to an agreement to prevent nuclear pro-
liferation. We wish to participate in a progressive 
normalisation of Iran’s relations with the rest of 
the world. An Iran that is fully re-integrated into 
the international community will be a stabilising 
element and once again be a relevant economic 
partner for Spain.
In the regional multilateral circle, we continue 
supporting our interpretation of the Mediterra-
nean not only as a border, but as an integrated spa-
ce; this is fundamental for promoting extremely 
necessary regional integration and it complements 
bilateral relations. This can only be possible with 
the active participation of the European Union. To 
this end, our first efforts will be to continue to de-
fend and reinforce the southern area of the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The creation of 
the informal group of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
of European Mediterranean countries, MED, pro-
vides us with a highly operative consultative fra-
mework for working towards this goal.
The reflection on the ENP shows that Euro-Medi-
terranean cooperation can continue to be a valid 
instrument with potential—even if in need of some 
adjustments—to cope with the region’s challen-
ges, a region in which Europe has the capacity to 
make a positive impact. Innovative approaches will 
be necessary that will be able to deliver not only 
instrumental responses but strategic and flexible 
ones as well. In this context, it is considered of fun-
damental importance to continue supporting in-
terregional cooperation and promoting the active 
participation of the Autonomous Communities in 
this field.
The Barcelona-Union for the Mediterranean 
Process, after completing a profound institutio-
nal reshuffle, has solidified into an operative ins-
trument to develop projects and serve as a plat-
form to coordinate synergies and complementary 
exchanges with other institutions and cooperation 
frameworks.
Spain, together with Morocco, will continue to pro-
mote a Mediterranean mediation initiative that 
will set itself squarely within the UN and the Group 
of Friends of Mediation. The SGUN reports on me-
diation encourage its support on a regional level 
and a mediation culture is especially necessary in 
this turbulent region. 
Together with this, we will continue to promote 
NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and the OSCE 
Mediterranean Partners Initiative as frameworks 
for trust-building and promoting stability, peace 
and security in the Mediterranean Basin.
7.3.  Latin America and the 
Caribbean
Latin America is an upwardly mobile region of po-
litical stability, economic prosperity driven to take 
on a role in the emerging world. Its power, dyna-
mism and firm footing in global economy and tra-
de make it one of the regions of greatest potential 
around the globe. At the same time, it is a region in 
which diversity and blending have always been the 
norm, on a continent that gave the world the term 
and the ideal of “mestizo” heritage.
Since the end of the Southern Cone dictators-
hips and the civil wars in Central America, a poli-
tical transformation of great magnitude has taken 
place in Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
Democracy is the norm in practically all countries, 
electoral outcomes are respected and destabili-
sing processes or attempts to derail democracy 
have been strongly condemned unanimously. In 
parallel, institutions have become stronger, there 
has been a balanced and efficient management of 
public finances and inclusive social policies gea-
red towards reducing poverty and inequality have 
been created. 
The region’s countries also share weak points and 
challenges, many of them common to other re-
gions: sustainability of economic models, inequa-
lities and polarisation of societies, insecurity or 
vulnerability to natural disasters.
Economic development and political stability have 
shifted the weight of the region on the world scale. 
With its sights on asserting its voice on the global 
stage, Latin America is moving towards regional 
and subregional integration through different for-
mulas whose common denominator is the identi-
ty and diversity of each country. In addition to the 
more consolidated mechanisms—OAS, MERCO-
SUR, SICA—others have more recently formed—
CELAC, UNASUR, the Pacific Alliance. All of these 
configure a scene of variable geometric configu-
rations where processes—some more ideological 
and others more practical—coexist.
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With a GDP of approximately seven trillion USD in 
terms of purchasing power parity, seven times the 
GDP of Spain, Latin America and the Caribbean 
rank fourth in the world economic space behind 
the European Union, US and China. Latin America 
is the largest food producer in the world and third 
largest electrical energy producer. Twenty-six cou-
ntries in the region are middle income, five are high 
income—Chile being the most relevant—and only 
one, Haiti, is low income.
Nevertheless, Latin American economies face a 
new phase still prone to risk, deriving from the 
decrease in trade volume, moderation of raw ma-
terial prices, and the uncertainty of global finan-
cial and monetary conditions. All of the countries 
face structural challenges to reaching sustainable 
growth, such as diversification of productive pat-
terns, the increasing role of domestic demand, ad-
dressing fiscal reform systems that foster the full 
emergence of middle classes and reducing the fla-
grant inequalities in distribution of wealth that still 
exist. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
has also pointed out the need to return to the path 
of reforms on matters of infrastructure, education, 
market competitiveness, equitable tax systems 
and development of labour markets, while stabili-
sing regulatory institutions that foster investment.
Despite the continuous increase of investment 
flows towards Latin America in recent years, its vo-
lume is not enough to cover the investment needs 
of the region, where some countries have chronic 
deficits. Thus, despite the efforts carried out for 
some time by members of Mercosur (Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela), Paci-
fic Alliance Countries (Chile, Peru, Colombia and 
Mexico—Spain has observer status), have proven 
to be more agile in establishing trade agreements 
with the US and European Union. This is also the 
case of Chile and Peru with China, and the former 
have also built a partnership with twelve Asian 
countries including Japan and South Korea.
Furthermore, sustained growth and the solid eco-
nomic policies of the last decade have improved 
the lives of millions of people. Across the region, 
which comprises a population of nearly 600 mi-
llion people, the situation of the poorest has seen 
notable improvement. The number of people in 
situations of extreme poverty has lowered by half 
and more than 50 million people have exited extre-
me poverty. The poverty rate decreased from 42% 
in 2000 to 25% in 2012, while the population con-
sidered to be middle class increased from 22% to 
34% in the same period. In 2011, for the first time in 
history, the number of middle class people surpas-
sed the number of poor.
After intense waves of protests in the 1990’s, citi-
zen groups have begun to step outside the strictly 
official framework and into the centre of commu-
nity organisation and State action. The new midd-
le classes demand social changes, recognition of 
civil rights and guarantees in terms of essentials 
such as security and rule of law. In this regard, we 
highlight the constitutional and legal recognition 
of indigenous, African and migrant identities that 
were invisible in the public sphere until recently.
As we have already pointed out, one of the challen-
ges facing the continent is security. The disturbing 
situation of some Central American and larger La-
tin American countries, security problems with evi-
dent ties to drug trafficking and organised crime, is 
one of the region’s most onerous problems.
Latin America must also face serious environmen-
tal challenges. Some of these are fruit of informal 
settlements in border zones, while others are the 
result of inappropriate management of natural 
resources. Moreover, the region suffers from the 
negative impact of global climate change which is 
jeopardising the prospects for sustainable deve-
lopment, especially as regards its biodiversity and 
agricultural productivity.
Nevertheless, the aforementioned challenges to 
economic development and political stability have 
changed the world’s image of Latin America and its 
clout on the global stage. The region, with the ex-
ception of some countries, has won respect for its 
reliability and stability; the Latin American States, 
in their diversity, have become indispensable part-
ners for lending legitimacy to multilateral systems. 
Latin America has a much greater presence in the 
world: three countries are G20 members, two are 
OECD members, and Brazil is now the seventh lar-
gest economy in the world. Mexico is also rising 
considerably. Consequently, Latin America has a 
clear will to play a more active role in internatio-
nal dynamics in matters as diverse as multilateral 
negotiations on climate change, sustainable deve-
lopment, issues related to world economy and the 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
In this general framework, Spain has made quali-
tative progress in what is already a permanent and 
fluid political collaboration with Latin America and 
the Caribbean, manifest in frequent institutional 
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contacts. We are moving forward in an annual plan-
ning of minimums regarding trips made by Spanish 
authorities to Latin America. In the opposite sense, 
our Embassies are encouraging an increase in visits 
to Spain by Latin American Chancellors and minis-
ters in sectors that are important to our country.
Regarding investment, we will establish a Wor-
king Group as part of the Interministerial Working 
Group for the Internationalisation of Spanish Com-
panies. This Working Group will function as an ob-
servatory, providing updated information, ongoing 
risk assessment and periodical follow up of exis-
ting disputes that will allow for a more efficient 
response to the challenges at hand. An inventory 
of available resources for internationalisation and 
investment support will be established for Spa-
nish companies. We will continue to work towards 
consistency between these measures and develo-
pment cooperation instruments when implemen-
ting the provisions of the Spanish Cooperation 
Master Plan. This commission must also promote 
the use of Spain as an entry point for Latin Ame-
rican business into the European Union, Maghreb 
and Near East markets.
The bilateral relationship existing with Mexico 
is the most developed in an institutional sense, 
through the Binational Commission with high le-
vel, intense official visits flowing in both directions. 
We enjoy good rapport and understanding in the 
Ibero-American Conference framework, with the 
forthcoming Ibero-American Summit taking place 
in Mexico, and have a shared vision on the future 
of this entity. 
In forthcoming years, our external policy must 
solidify and intensify our strategic relations with 
Mexico. We must update the content of the stra-
tegic partnership agreement; increase bilateral 
dialogue; create a bilateral programme for talent 
mobility allowing for professionals, scholars and 
researchers to move between countries; imple-
ment agreements between the Foreign Relations 
Secretariat of Mexico and the Instituto Cervantes 
for the teaching and promotion of Spanish, pin-
pointing those centres in both countries that can 
be shared; agree on the joint opening of Embassies 
in third countries and the exchange of diplomatic 
officials in Embassies or in central services.
Brazil requires an individualised strategy. Spain 
must specialise relations with Brazil, enhancing its 
standing. Despite the intense economic interde-
pendency between the two nations, there is a de-
ficit in matters of political relations; these have not 
yet reached their full potential and we must com-
pensate this imbalance in forthcoming years with a 
boost in bilateral political relations. To this end, the 
strategic partnership agreed in November of 2012 
must be updated. Due to Brazil’s global dimension, 
the bilateral agenda must also begin to incorporate 
items from international and multilateral agendas.
The Instituto Cervantes, the Spain-Brazil Council 
Foundation and Spanish enterprise and communi-
cations media are instruments that can be deplo-
yed in fostering mutual understanding and trust 
for solidifying and improving bilateral relations.
Lastly, we must move forward with Brazil in a bi-
lateral framework for talent mobility, something 
that Brazil deems of great importance and has ex-
pressed in its Science without Borders program-
me and its call to hire foreign doctors. We must 
avoid partial approaches and agree on a global 
framework that will include the interests of both 
countries. Furthermore, Brazil is a country with a 
federal structure, and therefore, Spanish external 
policy actions must be carried out not only before 
the Brazilian central Government but also the fe-
derating units.
The strategic partnerships we have with six cou-
ntries of the region: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Co-
lombia, Peru and Mexico, have already fulfilled 
their original objective of strengthening bilateral 
relations and must now also serve as a framework 
for political coordination on global and regional 
issues and global projection. The joint effort will 
target concrete objectives, stressing new aspects 
of the relations such as innovation, strategic eco-
nomic sectors, and talent mobility. The Strategic 
Partnership Agreements must embody all aspects 
of our relationship and include the active participa-
tion of all departments of the administration.
Argentina has the greatest number of Spanish 
residents in Ibero-America, while Spain is home 
to the largest community of Argentinians in Eu-
rope. Trade and investment has gone down from 
the figures reached in former decades, but Spain 
is going to continue backing Argentinian develo-
pment and large Spanish companies have an im-
portant presence in domestic markets. We will pay 
special attention to the situation of our busines-
ses, including SMEs. Spain is especially interested 
in solving the problems derived from the pesifi-
cation of Spanish pensions, which affects some 
23,000 Spaniards. 
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In the cultural sphere, we will pursue and impro-
ve relations, launching negotiations for new coo-
peration agreements on cultural, educational and 
degree recognition issues. Regarding cooperation, 
the Fourth Master Plan for Spanish Cooperation 
2013-2016 envisages the finalisation of the bila-
teral Spain-Argentina programme, giving way to a 
new phase of dialogue and cooperation with the 
proposal of the signing of a New Generation of De-
velopment Agreement.
Regarding Colombia, relations have gradually re-
ached a strategic perspective for the two coun-
tries. In this framework, which can only improve, 
the possible signing of a peace agreement with the 
main guerrilla forces in the country will launch us 
into seeking an important role in the post-conflict 
phase: through cooperation—the mobilisation of 
human and financial resources bilaterally; via Euro-
pean Union project implementation; and through 
Spain’s participation in the possible deployment of 
international missions, supervising military aspects 
of the peace agreements. The strategic partners-
hip agreement must be updated to accommodate 
this new scenario.
We have achieved high level political talks and bi-
lateral relations with Peru. We already have a stra-
tegic partnership in place which has been updated 
with an agile mechanism of policy agreement that 
is reaching its objectives of strengthening the bi-
lateral relations. Moreover, Peru was the first cou-
ntry with whom we signed a declaration of intent 
to draft an ambitious agreement on talent mobili-
sation. Peru will also continue to be a top recipient 
country for Spanish cooperation, since, despite its 
growth and middle income status, it still has poc-
kets of underdevelopment that must be addressed 
through our cooperation action in harmony with 
the Peruvian authorities. Lastly, Peruvian eco-
nomic progress and dynamism warrant the esta-
blishment of instruments that foster investment, 
including the negotiation of a double taxation 
agreement.
Chile is highly advanced in its political and eco-
nomic processes and a country with whom we 
have optimal bilateral relations. Regarding the fra-
mework for a bilateral dialogue mechanism, the 
following will be tabled: the inclusion of Chile in 
the talent mobility programme; overcoming the 
existing obstacles for the recognition of academic 
degrees; the identification of AECID-AGCI triangu-
lar cooperation programmes; and the cooperation 
on defence with special emphasis on possible joint 
peacekeeping operations.
Uruguay is an important partner in the new coo-
peration scheme with the countries of the region 
and with whom we propose increasing bilateral re-
lations, although because of its development, it is 
no longer a cooperation recipient country.
In Venezuela, the existence of a large Spanish po-
pulation and the fact of our historical, cultural and 
economic ties make it necessary to maintain a 
forward-looking political dialogue, in order to en-
The Spanish Prime Minister greets the President 
of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, during her official visit to 
Madrid in November 2012.
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hance our bilateral relations and to resolve existing 
disputes with companies and individuals.
In Paraguay, the presence of Spanish companies 
and the good state of our bilateral relations pro-
vide an excellent basis on which to improve our 
political relationship. This country has one of the 
highest rates of economic growth in Latin Ameri-
ca. Accordingly, the present bilateral framework to 
encourage investment, which has operated under 
a reciprocal investment protection agreement sin-
ce 1996, should be complemented by a successful 
outcome to the present negotiations for a conven-
tion on double taxation.
The solution to the business disputes with Bolivia 
is going to allow us to intensify our political dialo-
gue and agreement in multilateral forums. Bolivia 
will continue to be a priority country for Spanish 
cooperation and we will work with the Bolivian Go-
vernment to ensure the best conditions for Spa-
nish investment. Moreover, we hope that Bolivia 
will ratify the Hague Convention on the interna-
tional recognition of public documents to ensure 
faster legalisation of documents for Bolivian resi-
dents in Spain.
Ecuador has great interest in finalising the tran-
sition from traditional cooperation to one more 
focused on the transfer of knowledge. We must 
finalise the necessary agreements with Ecuador 
to facilitate this transition, which will strengthen 
bilateral dialogue. As the largest Latin American 
community in Spain, we maintain fluid communi-
cation channels with Ecuador that allow for the 
best management of the specific problems of the 
Ecuadorian community.
The Dominican Republic is a special focus coun-
try for bilateral dialogue due to its recent mem-
bership to SICA, its proximity to CARICOM, and 
its inclusion in the European Union list of Africa-
Caribbean-Pacific group of States. Spain will con-
tinue to defend before the European Union, in the 
context of development cooperation (EDF funds), 
the Dominican Republic’s special situation of vul-
nerability given its proximity to Haiti.
In Central America, Spain backs the intensifica-
tion of regional integration such as the Central 
American Integration System (SICA), and es-
pecially the Central American Security Strategy. 
The Spain-SICA Fund will be maintained and we 
will work towards fixing Spain’s observer status 
in the SICA. Central America will continue to take 
a preferential seat in Spanish cooperation efforts 
especially in the three countries of the so-called 
the northern triangle: Guatemala, El Salvador 
and Honduras.
Organised crime and the lack of citizen security 
has negative effects on human development, eco-
nomic growth, consolidation of democracy and 
rule of law in these three countries and makes it 
necessary to watch these problems closely both 
from bilateral and regional perspectives. Nica-
ragua will also continue to be a priority country 
for Spanish cooperation. Costa Rica and Panama 
are showing high rates of economic growth and 
the presence of Spanish businesses is growing 
and consolidating. Relations with these countries 
who are on the road to membership in the Paci-
fic Alliance, must have more political content and 
address issues regarding talent mobility. A joint 
declaration is already in place with Panama that 
will open the door to reaching a broader political 
dialogue, a model that may also be extensible to 
Costa Rica.
CUBA 
Relations between Spain and Cuba are of 
special sensitivity to the peoples of both 
countries. Our relationship with Cuba has 
an internal dimension that goes beyond 
questions of foreign policy. Many Spanish 
men and women are engaged with the 
situation in Cuba and with the bilateral 
relationship.
Dialogue with the Cuban people, with the 
authorities and with the opposition has 
always been fluid and should remain so in the 
future. Moreover, economic relations with 
Cuba, especially in the field of tourism, have 
always been very important.
The European Union recently decided 
to explore the possibilities of reaching a 
bilateral agreement with Cuba, as explicitly 
foreseen in the Common Position adopted 
in 1996. This agreement would include a 
“democratic clause” requiring scrupulous 
respect for human rights and the recognition 
of political pluralism.
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Regarding the English-speaking Caribbean, we 
can highlight the re-launching of relations with 
the Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States and improvement on relations with cou-
ntries with traditional Spanish presence such as 
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago. In this sphere, we 
can note the political dialogues held on European 
Union and United Nations affairs, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation’s participation in 
the latest CARICOM Ministers of External Affairs 
meetings, and the Spain-CARICOM meeting held 
in Antigua. With regard to Haiti, Spain is one of the 
largest donors contributing to its reconstruction, 
stabilisation and democratisation and we will con-
tinue our commitment to rebuilding the country.
7.4. The Transatlantic   
relationship
The transatlantic relationship is the second of 
our natural priority areas in the Americas. Our 
relationship with the United States is a bilateral 
one that is solid and rich; it takes place within 
the European Union framework, where it reaches 
an economic breadth that is unparalleled in the 
international community; thirdly, it is a security 
relationship, bilateral under the Atlantic Alliance 
framework and one that is crucial to our safety 
and welfare. The transatlantic relationship has 
always been one of the fundamental pillars of our 
external policy and will continue to be so in this 
emerging world. This also an increasingly balan-
ced relationship and Spain can and must contri-
bute more to improve it in all areas.
The United States continues to be an important 
political and economic partner, a principle ally in 
our security and defence scheme, and a country 
in which Spanish heritage and the influence of the 
Hispanic population blend and generate opportu-
nities that we must maximise. This is one of the 
elements around which we can structure our pre-
sence on the Asian continent.
The transatlantic anchor
Our relationship with the United States enables us 
to project our external action as a European coun-
try with American vocation in the broadest sense 
of the word. It is a priority in which points to the 
following objectives:
1) Improving political relations so that they re-
flect the richness of our bilateral relations. To this 
end, we will strengthen bilateral contact with all 
levels of the American administration, both at the 
federal level and with those States that are most 
appropriate in terms of achieving our objectives; 
with their legislations; their businesses; think tanks 
and powerful civil societies, in which the Hispanic 
communities are highly visible. 
2) Economic relations are reaching important 
magnitudes, both in terms of trade and inves-
tment. We can boost these relations by increasing 
cooperation on intellectual property protection; 
fostering cooperation in education, science and 
technology; and collaboration on energy securi-
ty, especially in the field of renewables. It is im-
portant to note the relevant role of the Spain-US 
THE ATLANTIC SPACE
Although the Pacific region receives a 
great deal of attention due to its economic 
strength and dynamism, the Atlantic Basin 
is also a major stage in globalisation where 
Spain plays a significant role.
The Atlantic space, with its four shores 
reaching Europe, North America, Africa 
and Latin America, is an increasingly 
interconnected subsystem. Its trade and 
investment flows surpass those of the 
Pacific Basin. Additionally, the Atlantic has 
political cohesion that pivots around the 
shared commitment to democracy. It is also 
a unique meeting point for the North/South 
and for growing South/South interaction. 
Common challenges facing the four shores 
are: environment, fight against poverty, 
commerce, energy and drug trafficking.
Spain must optimise its strategic location 
in this space, manifest in its presence in 
relevant institutions of the North and its 
cultural proximity to the South, which 
positions us in unparalleled conditions to 
contribute to development cooperation in 
an integrated Atlantic framework and to 
encourage the South/South cooperation 
needed to ensure growth and stability in the 
entire region.
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Council Foundation and its Forums in these mat-
ters.
3) Boost relations on defence matters. We have 
a responsibility towards western security and a 
role to play in the Atlantic Alliance. These must be 
the starting points in a fruitful relationship on the-
se matters with the United States, a country with 
whom Spain shares strategic interests. The base 
is the 1988 Convention between the Kingdom of 
Spain and the United States of America on Defen-
ce Cooperation.
4) The European Union’s relationship with the Uni-
ted States is the most important of its strategic 
relations. In the reshaping of our current world, 
the transatlantic relationship takes on increasing 
weight and can be perceived by the international 
community as one of the most solid anchors of 
peace, security and international cooperation. For 
these reasons, we must continue to strengthen 
these relations. It will be especially important in 
the long and medium term to include a treaty esta-
blishing a Transatlantic Partnership for Trade and 
Investment.
This agreement will increase trade and investment 
flows and bring along with them competitiveness, 
economic growth and the creation of jobs in Euro-
pe and the US. It will also serve as a guideline for 
a regulatory framework on international exchange 
that favours EU interests. Bilateral trade and inves-
tment sustain approximately thirteen million jobs 
on both shores of the Atlantic.
An exceptional and substantial relationship bet-
ween Spain and the United States is a perfect 
complement to this strategic relationship, taking 
into account the important benefits that both cou-
ntries can reap from an EU-US economic and trade 
partnership. This bond itself will also benefit from 
the interconnections with other free trade zones 
already underway, such as the North American 
Free Trade Agreement between the USA, Cana-
da and Mexico, and the Comprehensive Trade and 
Economic Agreement currently being negotiated 
between the EU and Canada.
Hispanic communities
Our objective is to boost Spanish language and cul-
ture in a country that is important for and open to 
our cultural action, Spanish as a second language to 
non-Hispanic citizens of the US. 16% of the US po-
pulation is Hispanic and this proportion could reach 
SPAIN-US FORUM 
This Forum, which incorporates civil society 
from both countries, provides an invaluable 
sounding board, reflecting the special, close 
nature of our bilateral relationship. HM King 
Felipe VI, who chaired the inauguration of 
the last meeting of the Forum (which, as he 
recalled, he had regularly attended previously, 
as the Prince of Asturias), summarised the 
content of this relationship. It is instructive 
to note the number of fields, issues and ideas 
mentioned in this brief statement. 
•	 The	contribution	to	making	our	common	
history more widely known, through events 
such as the 500th anniversary of the 
discovery of Florida by Ponce de Leon, the 
third centenary of the birth of Fray Junipero 
Serra, the forthcoming 450th anniversary 
of San Agustín, the first European city 
in the present-day continental United 
States, and the tribute to the figure of 
Bernardo de Gálvez, whose contribution to 
the independence of the United States is 
becoming increasingly better known.
•	 Increased	US	investment	in	Spain,	with	
growing economic recovery on both sides 
of the Atlantic. As King Felipe observed, 
“Spanish companies, which began their 
internationalisation in Latin America and 
then expanded through Europe and the 
Mediterranean, now seek global recognition 
in the US market. They are ready to compete 
with the best”.
•	 Cooperation	on	defence	to	strengthen	
mutual security. 
•	 In	the	field	of	education	and	science,	
the King recalled the Fulbright Commission, 
which received the Prince of Asturias Award 
for International Cooperation. 
•	 The	development	of	energy	markets	on	
both sides of the Atlantic.
•	 The	opportunities	offered	by	a	free	trade	
agreement for the creation of wealth and 
employment in the European Union and in 
the United States.
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30% by mid-century. The recently created Obser-
vatory for the Spanish Language and Hispanic Cul-
tures at Harvard University, in conjunction with the 
Instituto Cervantes network and both agreements 
signed with the North American Academy of Spa-
nish Language, and with the Secretariat for Exter-
nal Relations of Mexico, are the main instruments by 
which we will continue supporting the presence of 
Spanish language and culture in the United States. 
Together with these measures, we wish to promo-
te relations with the Hispanic community in the 
United States, increasing the knowledge about its 
various heterogeneous components and bringing 
them closer to the public. Our goal is to incorpo-
rate the Hispanic element in our relationships with 
the US. To this end, we will work in three directions: 
firstly, creating networks between Hispanic leaders 
in the US and their Spanish counterparts, secondly, 
with the Emergence of a Community: identity, lan-
guage, culture, market; and thirdly, by means of 
triangulation with Ibero-America.
The President of the United States talks with His 
Majesty the King during a meeting held in New York 
in September 2014.
7.5. Sub-Saharan Africa
There are 900 million people living in Sub-Saharan 
African countries in an ambiance of transformation 
and progression. A Sub-Saharan Africa beleague-
red by famine, armed conflict and the violation of 
human rights is giving way to another where eco-
nomic growth, democratic alternation and stability 
are beginning to be the norm.
The continent is increasingly turning its focus to 
purposes very different from the habitual ones pre-
dominated by negative images of violence, hunger 
and illegal emigration. African countries continue 
to be the least developed according to the Human 
Development Index and the region still has a high 
number of conflicts. But there is a new African rea-
lity. Many of the countries are in a transitional pha-
se characterised by intense economic growth and 
democratic governments. This has awakened new 
political, economic, commercial and investment 
interest on the part of strong international com-
munity players, particularly the European Union, 
Brazil, China, US and India. In the international me-
dia, in one decade, Africa has gone from being “the 
hopeless continent” to “the emerging continent”. 
Most Sub-Saharan African countries are pointing 
towards democratic systems. There are increa-
singly fewer authoritarian regimes and these are 
losing the support of other African States. The 
African Union has a policy opposing coups and 
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rial Guinea, the Sub-Saharan African country with 
which we have special human and historical ties. 
Our country has a renewed commitment to Africa. 
The Prime Minister participated in the EU-Africa 
Summit and spoke as the special guest in the Ma-
labo African Union Summit. This is a time-honou-
red commitment that was born decades ago with 
many countries of the region, in many cases star-
ting with their independence. It evolves with time 
and has accompanied us through our country’s 
transformations and especially, those of the Afri-
can continent.
Our relations with Africa are based on three fun-
damental pillars:
1. -Respond to the need for peace and security, 
supporting African solutions to African conflicts
2.- Contribute to the progress of democracy and 
human rights
3.- Promote an economic association between 
Africa and Europe that will place all its instru-
ments—from development cooperation to trade 
and investment—at the service of the growing 
prosperity of Africans.
Objectives
In Western Africa, particularly the Sahel, we 
seek stabilisation and development by means of 
an intense involvement of the European Union and 
Spain.
In the Gulf of Guinea we will continue to combat 
piracy, terrorist groups and illegal trafficking net-
works that generate chronic instability.
Similarly, our main concern is the consolidation 
of a security architecture in the African Horn to 
guarantee maritime safety in the Indian Ocean and 
the reinforcement of coastal countries’ own capa-
cities, especially in the case of Somalia.
We wish to enhance relations with Equatorial Gui-
nea both on economic and cultural levels. Dialogue 
with the authorities, based on mutual respect, will 
be focused around improving democratic pro-
gress and greater exchange between both of our 
peoples.
South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Nigeria, Ghana and Ethiopia are becoming more 
important on a regional, and in some cases global, 
unconstitutional regimes. Sub-Saharan Africa is 
consciously and assertively the owner of its own 
destiny and takes on full responsibility for its pre-
sent and future. In this regard, Africa seeks to 
guarantee its own peace and security and to this 
end, is building the African Peace and Security Ar-
chitecture (APSA). Furthermore, Africa promotes 
its continental and regional integration as a factor 
for growth, development and stability. Above all, 
Sub-Saharan Africa has been growing in a way that 
turns its most recent history on its head. In 2012, 
while the crisis in European countries reduced 
growth to zero, Sub-Saharan Africa grew by nearly 
5%. Six out of ten countries with the most growth 
in the last decade are in this region. And it needs 
and seeks direct foreign trade and investment to 
continue growing. 
In terms of natural resources, Sub-Saharan Africa 
has a great strategic advantage for attracting di-
rect foreign trade and investment. The region con-
tains practically all the types of natural resources 
existing on the planet and those most important to 
cutting-edge technology industries, such as coltan 
and uranium. However, its most important resou-
rce is its citizens. In an aging world, this continent 
has the youngest population on the planet. It is a 
population that is increasingly more educated. If 
there were only one reason that the future would 
be African, this would be it. The challenge is to give 
young Africans the opportunity to surprise the 
world with their creativity, energy and work. The 
challenge facing each of the Sub-Saharan African 
countries is to offer jobs to the millions of young 
people that will increase the world’s population in 
forthcoming years. The existence of a strong and 
firmly rooted private sector in Sub-Saharan Africa 
is the key to providing a response to these legiti-
mate aspirations of African youth.
Given Sub-Saharan Africa’s new circumstances, a 
paradigm shift has begun around how to promote 
growth and development. Although today several 
African countries depend on Official Development 
Aid to complement their budgets or improve the 
provision of some basic social services, there is a 
gradual shift to a stage of maturity in which the 
participation of private enterprise, commerce and 
investment will lay the foundations for develop-
ment. 
Spain is very aware of Sub-Saharan Africa’s pro-
gress. Part of our future is bound to Africa’s future. 
Spanish is recognised as an official language in the 
African Union and is the lingua franca in Equato-
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scale. This must translate into creating more solid 
bilateral relations. There are myriad opportunities 
in these countries for Spanish businesses becau-
se of stability and economic growth that must be 
optimised.
We will continue to support African regional inte-
gration processes, especially in the African Union 
and ECOWAS, excellent instruments for guaran-
teeing the peace, security and development of the 
continent.
Regarding migration policy, we wish to continue 
to develop a global focus that includes, in addition 
to combatting irregular migration, support for le-
gal migration and incentives for migration and de-
velopment policy.
The European Union has a comprehensive pro-
gramme of relations with Sub-Saharan Africa 
that includes areas that are extremely relevant to 
Spain such as peace; security; development; in-
clusive and sustainable growth; commercial and 
energy relations; regional integration; migration; 
environment and climate change. Our objective 
is to renovate this commitment and make it more 
ambitious and effective.
7.6. Asia-Pacific
In the first section of this paper, we spoke of trans-
fers of power and influence between States as one 
of the defining trends of the emerging interna-
tional community. Some of the key players in this 
trend are several Asia Pacific countries that are 
transforming long-standing high economic growth 
rates into greater capacity for influence. Asia Paci-
fic has already stepped into the 21st century as one 
of the gravitational centres of the world economy, 
recovering the leading role it had for centuries. 
This dynamism is felt by 60% of the world’s popu-
lation living in Asia.
Since the year 2000, Spanish policy towards this 
region has been guided by the Asia Plan. Nearly 
fifteen years later, the Plan has surpassed its two 
main goals: towards the region, to lay the solid 
foundations of Spanish presence; domestically, to 
draw public attention to Asia Pacific’s importance 
to our country. Now is thus the time to conduct ex-
ternal action towards Asia Pacific in a less centra-
lised manner and with a greater capacity to adapt 
to the changes which become more frequent and 
complex as this presence increases.
Objectives
1.- Step up Spanish presence in the principle cou-
ntries of the region, improving bilateral relations 
with these strategic partners. We will continue to 
Crew of the frigate “Cristobal Colón” participating 
in NATO operation “Ocean Shield” in Somalia in 
March 2014.
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as a strategic player in the region. Spain’s con-
cerns for the security and strategic influence in 
this region of the world are the same as those of 
our European partners. If the consolidation of the 
European Union as a strategic global player has 
always been one of Spain’s interests, this is parti-
cularly relevant in Asia Pacific. In this same vein, we 
must work towards a perception by the Asians as 
what we are, a key player in the design of European 
Union policy with a long-term bilateral interest in 
the region.
With this objective, Spain will promote the defini-
tion and update of the European Union strategy in 
the East Asia region and the agreement and up-
date of contractual frameworks, with the aim of 
encouraging its presence in Asia. Moreover, we will 
promote high level strategic dialogues, including 
aspects of security and defence, economic dialo-
gue and talks among civil societies with countries 
in the region. We will support the presence of the 
EU in Asia Pacific multilateral regional and subre-
gional forums, stressing the bilateral complemen-
tarity angle that is needed to forward our interests. 
This is where Spain must encourage negotiations 
already underway to finalise commercial agree-
ments between the European Union and Japan, In-
dia and ASEAN countries and on investments with 
China, so that they offer business opportunities to 
Spanish and European enterprise.
5.- Foster and participate in the burgeoning Latin 
America/Asia/Europe triangulation. Exchanges 
fix a more ambitious calendar of bilateral contacts, 
which in this region are not only excellent added 
value but are also the most efficient way for priva-
te players, including our enterprises, to gain entry 
and establish themselves there.
2.- Boost mutual understanding. The Asian reali-
ty is extremely complex, and fruitful relations and 
a future together cannot be based on a partial or 
erroneous understanding. It is also necessary to 
make Spain better known in Asia Pacific: our po-
tential, our capability. Public and civil society di-
plomacy instruments—Casa Asia and the Council 
Foundations—are essential in this regard.
3.- Promote mutual trade and investment. The 
main Asian countries are going to be the major 
contributors to the growth of the world economy 
in forthcoming years. The size of their markets 
makes them some of the most attractive. For this 
reason, the presence of our countries and attrac-
ting investment to Spain is a key element of the 
strategy’s priorities: Spain’s ongoing insertion into 
the international economy.
4.- Strengthen the role of the European Union 
Opening of the VII Spain China Forum with the 
presence of the Minister of Industry, Energy and 
Tourism and the Vice President of the Consultative 
Conference of China, Ma Biao, in 2013.
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between both shores of the Pacific are going to 
increase substantially and with them, strategic 
relations. Spain is already an observer country to 
the Pacific Alliance and is appropriately poised to 
participate in these developments and maximise 
the strategic, political and economic opportunities 
that will arise from them.
The continent’s diversity forces us to emphasise di-
fferent priorities on general objectives depending 
on the specific zone and country. We can mention 
five specific areas and countries:
1.- Central Asia. The five central Asian countries 
are members of the OSCE and growing interest 
points for the European Union and Spain. Their 
geostrategic placement between three countries 
of relevance—Russia, China and India—their vast 
energy resources and in a lesser and more tempo-
rary sense, their connections to Afghanistan, make 
this region a particular interest point for foreign 
policy. A prosperous, stable, democratic Central 
Asia would be an enormous factor to global sta-
bility.
Spain wishes to develop closer relations with cou-
ntries of great potential, having already carried 
out important operations with Kazakhstan with 
whom there is already underway a sustained ex-
change of visits at the highest level. The same can 
be said about Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In all 
of these countries there is also an interest in im-
proving the human rights situation, the only gua-
rantee of real progress and stability in the medium 
term. Kyrgyzstan is the country that has made 
most progress in human rights.
2.- In South Asia, India is a strategic partner and 
reference country, in which we wish to increase 
Spain’s presence in all domains. We will do this by 
means of periodical high level contacts, regular po-
litical and sectoral consultations and the signing of 
agreements that allow to optimise the potential of 
sectors such as the defence industry, technological 
and scientific cooperation, development of infras-
tructures and cultural relations.
3.- East Asia. Relations with China fall within the 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership framework. 
The priority is to intensify regular consultations 
in all areas, establishing a permanent dialogue. Bi-
lateral economic relations suffer because of acu-
te imbalances. In order to correct them, we must 
establish new air links and make the only existing 
connection more frequent. There must also be a 
greater deployment of our consular and commer-
cial offices. China beyond the capital is a priority 
in the external action redeployment of human and 
material resources. 
The launching in 2013 of the Japan-Spain Partner-
ship for Peace, Growth and Innovation has been 
an extraordinary measure for intensifying and im-
proving relations between the two countries. The 
Partnership addresses a wide spectrum of fields 
that range from political to security, economic, 
commercial, cultural and scientific and also includes 
the relations between both countries’ civil societies. 
It stands for the strengthening of the instruments 
that have existed until now and fixes modalities for 
CHINA IN THE WORLD: INTER-
NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The peaceful coexistence doctrine and its 
five basic principles have been the legal 
and political basis for China’s peaceful, 
extraordinary and ongoing development 
across three decades. At the close of the 
fourth decade, following the success of 
the Olympic Games, China has climbed 
rank in leadership and international 
visibility. The qualitative leap in taking on 
international responsibility came about 
in 2013 with the arrival of new leaders 
emerging from the XVIII Congress of the 
Communist Party, summarised in the 
project of becoming more involved in 
the international community and from 
within, lead a transformation process 
of the rules of engagement. For years, 
China has been invited to assume a 
responsibility proportionate to its economic 
and demographic presence in the world. 
Everything points to this invitation 
becoming obsolete in a short period of time.
This is good news. Although the experience 
is limited, we can see that when China is 
involved in conflict resolution, its mere 
presence, working side by side with other 
relevant countries, lends legitimacy and 
added effectiveness to the agreed solutions. 
Syria, Iran and North Korea are examples 
that show that with China’s cooperation, 
international cohesion is stronger.
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especially in the energy sector, infrastructure, shi-
pbuilding and in defence, with a close collaboration 
between the two countries’ naval forces and Spa-
nish participation in the building of new ships for 
the Australian Navy. The efforts are now focused 
on strengthening and updating the bilateral Action 
Plan.
contacts, consultation and agreement mechanisms 
with an established rhythm. This partnership will 
be in force for five years, until 2018, and will be re-
vised on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of 
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
between Spain and Japan. It is the roadmap for de-
veloping our bilateral relationship.
The Republic of Korea is a democracy that has be-
come Asia’s fourth economy and put its efforts into 
technological innovation and the development of 
a knowledge economy heavily invested in export. 
We must enhance political and economic relations 
to maximise the entry into force of the first Free 
Trade agreement between the European Union 
and an East Asia country. In its first year, it has 
meant an increase in European export to a country 
that has traditionally been a difficult market.
4.- South East Asia. We have historical and cul-
tural links with the Philippines. In recent years, a 
series of factors have been added to these that 
make our bilateral relations increasingly stronger. 
Among them, we can note the growing importance 
of contacts between our civil societies; the coinci-
dence of interests and objectives in multilateral fo-
rums; cooperation, as Philippines is the only Asian 
country that is a Partnership Country for Spanish 
Cooperation; and the growing presence of Spanish 
companies there.
Indonesia is an active member of the G-20, the 
most populated Muslim country in the world, plays 
a key role in ASEAN and has a strong economy. Our 
interest in this great country is to strengthen poli-
tical ties, increase number of agreements in mul-
tilateral forums based on matters of common in-
terest: inter-faith dialogue; combatting terrorism; 
reforming the global financial architecture in the 
G-20; strengthening cooperation in defence and 
increasing entrepreneurial cooperation.
Spain has a strategic partnership established with 
Vietnam since 2009 that is enabling us to improve 
relations and open new cooperation fronts. We are 
now focused on creating connections that will uni-
ted us, encouraging the presence of Spanish busi-
nesses in Vietnam and strengthening relations on 
defence matters.
5.- Pacific. Spain and Australia have a strategic 
partnership, the 2010 Action Plan, which is contri-
buting to a political proximity with regular and fluid 
contacts; an entrepreneurial proximity that trans-
lates in the presence of large Spanish companies, 
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Each policy, i.e., human rights, development coo-
peration, has its own instruments. Together with 
these are the traditional diplomatic instruments 
such as mutual visits, bilateral political contacts 
and multilateral meetings. But there are also others 
that are cross-cutting and when used, lend much 
greater effectiveness to external action. In some 
cases, these are instruments related to new reali-
ties in international relations and can bring in even 
greater added value.
8.1. Marca España
As early as the 18th century, Juan Pablo Forner 
warned that “Nearly all of Europe is today bubbling 
in a type of furore, each nation vying to elevate and 
enlarge its literary merit over that of its conten-
ders.” ('Oración apologética por España').
More than 200 years later, image has increased in 
importance. A good image depends largely on a 
country’s prestige in the international community, 
its capacity to influence and persuade and to serve 
as a political or social model. This involves having 
the capacity to shape other experiences; attract 
foreign savings that help to finance the economy; 
it improves the sales of goods and services and at-
tracts tourism as a destination country; all of this 
means that it influences a country’s potential for 
its economy to create employment.
Many countries have realised the truth in this and 
have launched initiatives to promote their image 
abroad. Spain launched a similar project in 2002, 
the Marca España (Brand Spain) Project. The mis-
sion was to show the country’s true face—econo-
mic potential, technological know-how, human ca-
pital and the clout of its multinational companies, 
to mention a few characteristics—and make it 
more consistent with its image or stereotype. 
Action Plans
The project is carried out by means of annual ex-
ternal action plans devised to promote Marca Es-
paña, and ministerial departments and public and 
private bodies with competence in this area con-
tribute to these plans.
In 2013, Marca España launched the first Action 
Plan in which sectoral and horizontal priorities 
were identified in fifteen countries or markets 
where 80% of our exports are destined, where 
tourists come from, and with whom we have reci-
procal investments. To develop this Plan, we pro-
posed including instruments such as an Internet 
portal; the external Embassy network; consulates; 
commercial offices; tourism bureaus; Spaniards 
abroad, foreign residents and visitors; and civil so-
ciety volunteers.
The second Marca España Plan of 2014 further de-
fines objectives and top priority action lines: public 
and economic diplomacy, language and education, 
culture and heritage, tourism, gastronomy, fashion, 
R&D&I, sport and armed forces. It introduces some 
novelties, noteworthy of which are in-depth study 
of our position in the principle international ran-
kings and indexes, both global and sectoral. De-
pending on the findings, Marca España has created 
a detailed cartography of our country’s strengths 
and weaknesses. Together with this, we are impro-
ving instruments for monitoring and assessment, 
incorporating the MESIAS system (Marca España 
Applied Intelligence and Follow-up System) to the 
8. Instruments
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Image of Spain Observatory of the Elcano Royal 
Institute to offer a disaggregated assessment and 
follow-up of each of the values or attributes of the 
Marca.
Improving the reality, improving the image
Although Marca España will bear its fruits in the 
medium and long terms, some findings—such 
as those from the Barómetro Imagen de España, 
conducted by the Elcano Royal Institute—show 
that the image is steadily recovering. The image of 
Spain abroad is thus good and has maintained sta-
ble in general terms despite the economic crisis, 
and is improving steadily. Nevertheless, there are 
still aspects of our country that give off an image 
that does not live up to reality, for example in cul-
tural heritage matters, technology and innovation 
and business leadership.   
8.2. Public diplomacy
In the first decade of the 20th century, international 
relations changed considerably. After WWI and the 
combination of secrecy and diplomatic incompeten-
ce which, among other factors, led to that tragedy, 
the international community pressed for the aboli-
tion of secret diplomacy and agreed to the publicity 
of international accords.
Information file produced by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Cooperation with the title “Spain, 
country of technology”. MENTAL MAP    
OF BRAND SPAIN
Fuente: ESIC / Programa MESIAS
His Majesty the King 
Sport 
Fashion 
Innovation 
Creativity 
Credibility
Design 
Cooking 
Patrimony (artistic) 
Lifestyle
Product quality 
Education 
Tourism
Health
History
Art and culture
Language
Kindness
Sympathy
Happiness
Cooperation
Armed Forces
Multinational Spanish 
comp.
Multinational comp. 
in Spain
Science/investigation
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In the early years of the 21st century, we are witnes-
sing a phenomenon that has previously been men-
tioned in this paper: the capacity that individuals 
have to influence; something that arises from the 
possibility they have of conveying their actions and 
opinions to audiences of hundreds of millions of 
people who can react by changing the course of the 
national or international political agenda.
These two developments, separated by nearly one 
century, are closely linked to public diplomacy. The 
first is known as the clear antecedent to public di-
plomacy: public opinion must have knowledge of the 
agreements forged between States. The second, 
closely tied to globalisation and the dissemination of 
information technology, has reaffirmed the power of 
public opinion and furthermore, the role of citizens, 
either individually or in groups, in the external sphe-
re. This leads to a variable geometric configuration 
of actors, a diplomacy of guided alliances. Alliances 
between and with citizens, alliances with busines-
ses, civil society representatives and relevant players 
on the international scene. It is not only our public 
opinion but that of others on the outside that can 
also have a bearing on our policy.
In this context, as we have observed with Marca Es-
paña, public diplomacy is an instrument of utmost 
importance. It promotes and encourages interests 
towards third country public opinions; it fosters 
mutual understanding and the establishment of 
alliances in the medium and long term, with a view 
to obtaining greater influence in the world. Commu-
nication, alliances and influence are thus the three 
essential strands of public diplomacy.
Public diplomacy is indeed a very important asset 
to bolster the power to influence and persuade that 
we have previously mentioned. Our country’s image 
is strong because of our long history, our language, 
our artists, sports persons, chefs, fashion designers, 
our citizens. We have an ample network of public 
diplomacy instruments that range from the Institu-
to Cervantes, the Casas network, Cultural Councils, 
the Fundación Carolina, the Council Foundations 
and the Spanish International Cooperation Agency 
itself. It is a beautiful job coordinating the interests 
we wish to defend and the values we seek to convey 
among all the players involved in the management 
of Spain’s image; together we are able to influence 
the citizens of other countries’ perception of Spain.
We have at hand several public diplomacy tools. Two 
in particular have gradually become excellence mar-
kers outside our borders. 
The Casas
Initially created in the 1990’s, the six public diplo-
macy Casas are instruments of first rank (see ta-
ble). They join together three singular features. 
Firstly, they are an example of cooperation bet-
ween administrations, as all of them include the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and 
respective Autonomous Community and City Cou-
ncils. Secondly, they enable a closeness to be rea-
ched with civil society representatives from Spain 
and abroad. The Casas have gradually become in-
ternational reference centres on certain matters. 
Finally, they offer a broad scope of activities by 
uniting cultural events and economic diplomacy 
actions.
CASA HEADQUARTERS(S) YEAR OF 
  FOUNDATION
América Madrid 1992
Asia Barcelona y Madrid 2001
Árabe Madrid y Córdoba 2006
Sefarad-Israel Madrid 2006
África Las Palmas  2006
Mediterráneo Alicante 2009
The goal is to continue to improve in this direc-
tion, working with more concrete objectives; unite 
cultural and economic diplomacy; support Marca 
España, place more emphasis on public-private co-
llaboration and foster new forms of communica-
tion. The idea is for each Casa to carry out useful 
activities for citizens and businesses that have an 
impact in the media and engage in greater collabo-
ration among themselves.
The Council Foundations
The Council Foundations are private entities that 
are supported, coordinated and managed by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. They 
are an instrument for public-private collabora-
tion in which businesses, cultural and educational 
agents and other figures from civil society join 
efforts with the central administration and regio-
nal and municipal councils to further their legiti-
mate interests in certain countries.
The pioneer foundation was established with the 
United States, followed by others with Japan, 
China, Russia, Mexico, India, Australia and Brazil. 
All of these countries are essential to our external 
policy. All of them have accredited professionals 
on their boards, especially those from business, 
economic and financial spheres, whose contribu-
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tions have added to the improvement of the exis-
ting Council Foundations (see table). 
COUNCIL FOUNDATION YEAR OF CREATION
España-Estados Unidos 1997
España-Japón  2001
España-China  2004
España-Rusia   2008
España-México  2008
España-India   2009
España-Australia 2010
España-Brasil  2011
Our aim is to support them and examine the possi-
bilities of creating others in our countries that are 
key to our external action. 
Think tanks
More than ever before, the world we face is confi-
gured as a knowledge society in which the capaci-
ty to influence is nourished by the power of ideas. 
Spain has its own elaborated vision of the world 
and poised to make substantial contributions to 
the international strategic debate. Together with 
this, there are various centres of thought in Spain 
which, although small in number, are working on 
international questions, bringing a great deal of 
quality, independent reflection to all the big issues 
concerning external policy. We must harness this 
potential to better define our guiding policies.
In this respect, we propose the possibility of 
drawing up a collaboration programme together 
with think tanks, aimed at incorporating them more 
closely and on a more regular basis in the medium 
and long term planning of external policy. 
8.3. Diplomatic information 
and digital diplomacy 
In order for it to be effective and coherent, external 
policy must go hand-in-hand with adequate com-
munications efforts that will carry it to society and 
the media. There are a variety of goals embodied 
in this task, such as explaining the content of our 
foreign policy and making public our assessments 
of international actions that need to be known; 
providing quick response, allowing our partners 
and allies to know on what topics we take a public 
stance and what the content of this stance is; and 
provide detailed and extensive information to citi-
zens who need it on diverse topics related to their 
jobs or travel safety. All of these are part of the 
higher objectives of diplomatic information: pro-
viding Spain with a globally recognisable and well 
defined identity.
His Majesty King Juan Carlos in the opening 
ceremony of Casa América on the 25 July 1992, in 
the presence of Heads of State and Government 
who took part in the II Ibero-American Summit held 
there.
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Diplomatic communication 
Transparency in external policy requires the appro-
priate dissemination of what external action does, 
its strategies, priorities and objectives. To this end, 
we will improve on the tasks of:
• Conveying useful and precise information to 
the media
• Analysing Spain’s presence in foreign media 
and studying how it is dealt with. In consequen-
ce to this, if necessary, take actions to correct 
the views that blur a proper projection of Spain 
in concrete countries. 
• Serving citizens, providing useful information 
to Spanish citizens who are travelling or living 
abroad, and to foreigners interested in our cou-
ntry: travel alerts, country profiles, and others.
• Give more coverage of our foreign policy 
through a solid presence in social media. 
Communication with our representations 
abroad 
The economic crisis and its repercussions in Spain 
are frequently accompanied by a distorted and 
Image of the information campaign “Travel safe”, 
developed on social networks by the Diplomatic 
Information Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Cooperation. 
partial perception abroad of Spain’s real situa-
tion, something that has negative effects on our 
country’s image. In this context, it becomes espe-
cially necessary to improve communication and 
emphasise this as one of the basic tasks of our Em-
bassies. The Communications Plan for Diplomatic 
Missions, Permanent Representations and Consu-
lar Offices has allowed us to pin-point best prac-
tices and improve outreach instruments. This will 
be complemented by better online communication 
training and digital branding for those in charge of 
our representations’ online presence.
The Internet and information technologies are 
instruments used to obtain the objectives of ex-
ternal policy. Digital diplomacy carries with it great 
opportunities to influence; it allows direct and fre-
quent address to broad audiences; it allows the re-
ception of opinions, suggestions and information 
that was previously out of the reach of those in 
charge of external policy. 
We will continue to support improvement of new 
information and communications technologies, 
seeking a communications policy that revolves 
around interaction with citizens and civil society. 
Strengthening digital diplomacy equals better ser-
vice for citizens. The proof of this is the constant 
increase in hits and interest in the official adminis-
tration sites on the social networks.
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8.4. Parliamentary   
diplomacy
Relations, exchanges and interaction between re-
presentatives of the popular vote is a key dimen-
sion to external policy. Parliamentary diplomacy is 
a fundamental instrument that incorporates the 
defence and projection of Spain’s interests with 
the added value of reflecting a greater range of so-
cial sensitivities and policies. For these reasons, we 
wish to submit to the consideration of the Cortes 
Generales the joint drafting of a parliamentary di-
plomacy plan to improve our external policy.
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This paper contains an analysis and as a conse-
quence of it, a reorientation of external action. The 
essence of this response is that the economic, so-
cial and institutional regeneration of our country 
requires greater internationalisation of Spanish 
society. In this vein, our new strategic reflection 
takes citizens and their projection abroad as its 
springboard. Our conclusion is that providing our 
citizens with a more advantageous position to 
maximise the opportunities of globalisation is the 
great challenge of a renewed external policy.
To reach this objective, diverse reorientations have 
been examined in terms of certain policies, topics 
and geographies. We have also identified the need 
to make better use of some instruments that are 
particularly appropriate for this new approach.
However, beyond these actions, there is an impera-
tive to undertake two more substantial reforms:
•	 Firstly,	it	is	necessary	to	reform	some	aspects	
of the decision making process, particularly tho-
se that reinforce coordination on external action 
issues, the role of the Prime Minister and the 
quality of democratic oversight of this policy.
•	 Secondly,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 redeploy	 human	
and material resources at the service of external 
action, situating our diplomatic, consular, com-
mercial and cultural action network closer to the 
new centres of power and influence in the world.
9.1. Strategic planning
The decision making process in external policy 
goes from including strategic planning of the policy 
to the assessment of results and necessary over-
sight by the Cortes Generales.
In an uncertain and complex world, external policy 
strategic planning has fresh importance and must 
be built on more solid foundations. To this end, 
we will strengthen resources at the service of this 
planning process and the collaboration with our 
country’s think tanks. With this goal in mind, we will 
establish cooperation programmes and the sup-
port that will provide these programmes with what 
they need to continue. Lastly, we will also seek the 
collaboration of non-governmental businesses and 
organisations that have a certain trove of experien-
ce, knowledge and interest in certain geographic 
zones or on issues that are particularly relevant to 
external policy.
9.2. The Foreign Policy  
Council 
Globalisation—the most complex feature of the 
international community—and a decisive will to 
internationalise Spanish society, both determi-
ne an enormous variety of actions abroad. These 
emanate from the most diverse bodies of diffe-
rent public administrations and from civil society. 
All of this demands a closer, more continuous and 
effective coordination.
Moreover, this variety of international actions and 
its increasingly high impact on the domestic situa-
tion make it necessary for the Council of Minis-
ters to be more deeply involved and in particular, 
at its head, the Prime Minister. The growing role 
9. The external policy   
 system: Resources
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of heads of State in international relations is the 
logical and desirable consequence of the greater 
importance that these relations have acquired for 
the welfare, security and stability of a country.
For all of this, we need a structure within the deci-
sion making process that will unite this dual need 
for greater and more efficient coordination and 
integration of the diverse players and at the same 
time, give better consulting and support to the 
Prime Minister. The body that is most appropriate 
to carry out these functions is the Foreign Poli-
cy Council. The Council was created in 2000, and 
although it has scarcely been used, it is the most 
effective framework for undertaking the tasks 
stated and indeed boost and support the external 
policy decision making process.
The Spanish External Action and Service Act officia-
lly established this body and defined it in Article 38:
 
"The Foreign Policy Council is an advisory body 
that provides support to the Prime Minister in his 
functions of direction and coordination of Foreign 
Policy."
This body, together with the Executive Council of 
Foreign Policy defined in Article 39 of the Act, will 
be the primary forum for reflecting on, debating 
and adopting the most important decisions regar-
ding our external policy.
9.3. Evaluation and   
democratic oversight   
of external action
The diversity of actions carried out abroad calls for 
close monitoring to ensure efficiency and coordi-
nation. For this, we will establish target criteria to 
evaluate the different fronts. This criteria will be 
presente d in the framework of the forthcoming re-
view of the External Action Strategy, in accordance 
NEW LEGISLATIVE   
FRAMEWORK
The Spanish Act which grants authorisation 
for Spain’s ratification of the 2012 Treaty on 
Stability Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union.
1. Spanish External Action and Service. 
The Spanish External Action and Service Act 
2/2014, of 25 March regulates, for the first 
time, State external action and organisation, 
with the inclusion of the multitude of 
bodies which, by virtue of the Constitution, 
project their activity abroad: Autonomous 
Communities, local entities and constitutional 
bodies.
Regulation of the Diplomatic Career, approved 
by the Council of Ministers of 25 July, 2014.
2. Treaties and other international 
agreements. For the first time, complex State 
action regarding international conventions 
is systematically regulated. This regulation 
establishes a difference between International 
Treaties that are reserved for the National 
Government and other international 
agreements that can also be entered into 
by the Autonomous Communities. This was 
approved by consensus by the Council of 
Ministers on 25/10/2013. The bill is currently in 
parliamentary process.
3. Total prohibition of anti-personnel mines. 
Legislation was adapted to the Convention 
on Cluster Munitions that entered into force 
in August of 2010. It is pending in the Cortes 
Generales.
4. Reform of the Obra Pía de los Santos 
Lugares de Jerusalén. The Obra Pía de los 
Santos Lugares de Jerusalén, is a public body 
under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Cooperation, regulated by a law from 1940 
that is behind the times and currently the 
source of doubt and controversy. The draft bill 
was approved by the Council of Ministers of 
17/01/2014. 
5. Agreements on International Treaties and 
other issues. In 2012, 156 Agreements were 
approved and in 2013, 125.
6. Measures for the future. Draft bill on 
immunities
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with Article 35 of the Spanish External Action and 
Service Act.
As we have shown in the first section of this paper, 
external policy is a policy of the State. Reaching 
consensus between different political powers is one 
of the essential elements of this policy. An external 
policy that enjoys this majority support in Spanish 
society is a more stable, predictable and therefore 
more reliable policy for our partners, allies and the 
international community on the whole.
Majority support can only come about through clo-
ser cooperation between the diverse parliamen-
tary forces on important external policy decisions, 
and a more continuous oversight of government 
action on these issues. Part of the functioning of 
the renewed external policy will be a commitment 
to accountability on a more regular basis to the 
competent bodies of the Congress of Deputies and 
the Senate. 
Improve the democratic nature of the  
configuration of Spain’s external intentions.
Placing citizens at the heart of external policy de-
mands greater citizen participation in the process 
of configuring external intention. In this renewed 
external policy, political parties and citizen organi-
sations of diverse walks of life must play a more re-
levant role. This will translate into more legitimate 
and democratic external action.
DOING MORE WITH LESS
The most practical and realistic way of doing 
more with less is by searching for synergies. 
According to the Spanish Royal Academy 
definition, synergy is an action of two or more 
causes whose effect is greater than the sum 
of the two individual effects. In other words, it 
means attaining more with the same, or in this 
case, less budgetary resources. 
This is what external action does to reinforce 
the deployment of staff, extend development 
cooperation and increase the activities of 
the Instituto Cervantes. Seeking and finding 
synergies with countries and organisations is 
the fruit of a foreign policy that has cultivated 
relationships and mutual understanding to the 
degrees necessary to effect continual action that 
obviously goes far and beyond mere technical 
agreements.
Deployment abroad. Spanish diplomats use EU 
Delegations in Azerbaijan, Yemen, Myanmar and 
South Sudan. Others use their own offices in the 
Gambia and in Monrovia.
A Memorandum of Understanding is being 
drafted with Mexico to effect an exchange of 
diplomats that will allow to temporarily deploy 
Spanish diplomats in Mexican embassies such as 
those in St. Lucia and Guyana. 
Development cooperation
A) Delegated cooperation, where Spanish 
Cooperation undertakes projects with third-
party financing such as with the European Union 
or third countries. Projects of this type costing 
over 125 million Euros are underway in Africa 
and Latin America.  Projects costing a total of 40 
million Euros, which include the Philippines, are 
in preparation stages.
B) Triangular cooperation, where Spain works 
with another country to carry out a project in a 
third country.  These projects also take place in 
key cooperation recipient areas, Africa and Latin 
America.
Instituto Cervantes. Collaboration between 
the Instituto Cervantes with Ibero-American 
embassies and other institutions in these 
countries has contributed to maintaining a 
quality cultural programme in the Instituto 
centres themselves, even after cutbacks were 
effected in their cultural programme budgets. 
For this reason, 65% of activities taken place 
at the Cervantes centres in 2012-13 had Ibero-
American content.
Furthermore, collaboration agreements with 
the Instituto Cervantes centres in Mexico, 
Colombia and other Ibero-American countries 
multiplied the Institutes’ operations capacity— 
without having to increase resources—to 
reach common objectives of all collaborating 
institutions: promoting Spanish language and the 
disseminating cultural manifestations expressed 
in Spanish.
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To reach this objective, we will work with political 
forces, non-governmental organisations and think 
tanks to define proposals in this realm.
9.4. Human and material  
resources redeployed
One of the greatest assets to Spanish external ac-
tion is its deployment abroad. Currently, Spain has 
118 bilateral Embassies, ten representations in in-
ternational organisations, 88 Consulate Generals 
and four Consulates. Nearly six thousand people 
are working at the service of citizens in this net-
work abroad. The professional calibre and devotion 
of these State officials and the insertion of these 
representations in respective local societies—some 
of them with centuries old traditions—constitute 
External Action’s most highly prized asset.
The prevailing trends in the international communi-
ty stated at the beginning of this paper, especially 
the shifts in power and influence and the vitality of 
certain countries and regions in the world make it 
indispensable to redistribute human and material 
resources at the service of external action. We un-
derscore the need for redeployment of and quali-
tative change in diplomatic activity, which currently 
focuses on managing networks such as the tradi-
tional relations with authorities and civil societies.
Efficiency and impact are the criteria that must 
guide this redistribution. In many cases, the objec-
tive will not be as much to enhance bilateral rela-
tions with a certain country as the presence and 
insertion into megacities and regions of special 
interest or where there are large numbers of Spa-
nish residents. In others, the purpose will be priori-
tising some particular facet of external action such 
as cultural, commercial or consular assistance.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND COOPERATION 
BUDGET
FOREIGN NETWORK
Personal
Presupuesto
5.718
workers, both labour force
and civil servants
1.246.825,53€
Distribution between work force and civil servant
3.387
work force
2.331
Civil servant
2.840      
men
2.878
women
Distribution between home and abroad
4.364
Abroad
1.354
Home
630      
men home
724
women home
2.210      
men abroad
2.154
women abroad
6,25% 
General services
55,43%
Diplomatic and 
consular action
38,32%       
international 
cooperation
20,50% Development 
cooperation
17,73% Internal transfers 
0,09% Cooperation, 
promotion and 
diffusion of 
culture abroad 
53,72% State action abroad
1,70% Diplomatic action in the 
European Union
6,10% Management 
and general 
services of 
Foreign Affairs
0,15% Investigation 
and develop-
ment of the 
information 
society
Civil Servant personnel
1.519
Other bodies
812
Diplomats
1.248      
men
1.083      
women
Red exterior
118
Bilateral 
embassies
10
Missions to 
International 
Organisations
183
Consular 
oces
2014 budget data
Personal
Presupuesto
5.718
workers, both labour force
and civil servants
1.246.825,53€
Distribution between work force and civil servant
3.387
work force
2.331
Civil servant
2.840      
men
2.878
women
Distribution between home and abroad
4.364
Abroad
1.354
Home
630      
men home
724
women home
2.210      
men abroad
2.154
women abroad
6,25% 
General services
55,43%
Diplomatic and 
consular action
38,32%       
international 
cooperation
20,50% Development 
cooperation
17,73% Internal transfers 
0,09% Cooperation, 
promotion and 
diffusion of 
culture abroad 
53,72% State action abroad
1,70% Diplomatic action in the 
European Union
6,10% Management 
and general 
services of 
Foreign Affairs
0,15% Investigation 
and develop-
ment of the 
information 
society
Civil Servant personnel
1.519
Other bodies
812
Diplomats
1.248      
men
1.083      
women
Red exterior
118
Bilateral 
embassies
10
Missions to 
International 
Organisations
183
Consular 
oces
2014 budget data
137
PERSONNEL OF MINISTRY  
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
COOPERATION
Personal
Presupuesto
5.718
workers, both labour force
and civil servants
1.246.825,53€
Distribution between work force and civil servant
3.387
work force
2.331
Civil servant
2.840      
men
2.878
women
Distribution between home and abroad
4.364
Abroad
1.354
Home
630      
men home
724
women home
2.210      
men abroad
2.154
women abroad
6,25% 
General services
55,43%
Diplomatic and 
consular action
38,32%       
international 
cooperation
20,50% Development 
cooperation
17,73% Internal transfers 
0,09% Cooperation, 
promotion and 
diffusion of 
culture abroad 
53,72% State action abroad
1,70% Diplomatic action in the 
European Union
6,10% Management 
and general 
services of 
Foreign Affairs
0,15% Investigation 
and develop-
ment of the 
information 
society
Civil Servant personnel
1.519
Other bodies
812
Diplomats
1.248      
men
1.083      
women
Red exterior
118
Bilateral 
embassies
10
Missions to 
International 
Organisations
183
Consular 
oces
2014 budget data
REDEPLOYMENT IN   
EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES 
2014/2015
A) Central and South America
• Mexico: Reinforce presence in Guadalajara 
through the appointment of a diplomatic 
officer as Consul General.
• Peru: Number of diplomatic staff has been 
increased at the Embassy in Lima with the 
incorporation of an Embassy Secretary, thus 
giving the Embassy four diplomatic officers. 
This measure reflects the growing economic 
and political ties with Peru.
B) South East and South Asia
• Myanmar: Assignment of a chargé d’affaires 
to Rangoon, who will carry out their work at 
the EU Delegation thanks to a MoU signed 
with the EU.
• India: The New Delhi Embassy diplomatic 
staff has been reinforced with the edition of a 
new diplomat, an Embassy Secretary, taking 
the number of diplomats there to six.
C) Maghreb
• Algeria: Diplomatic staff of the Embassy in 
Algiers has increased by one new diplomat, 
Embassy Secretary, raising the number of 
diplomats to four.
 
D) Europe
• Germany: The diplomatic staff of the 
Embassy in Berlin has added one new 
diplomat, Embassy Secretary, raising the 
number of diplomats to seven.
E) Caucasus
• Azerbaijan: In Baku, a diplomat has been 
assigned as chargé d’affaires and will carry out 
his duties at the EU Delegation facility.
F) Closing of representations: Proces-
ses of closure have begun for the Consu-
late Generals of Valença do Minho and Vila 
Real de Santo Antonio, in Portugal. Justifi-
cation for this measure is the reduction of 
consular activity in both representations.
G) Perspectives for 2015
Redeployment activity will continue in 2015, 
will a special focus on the Asian continent.
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INFORMATION AND   
COMMUNICATIONS   
TECHNOLOGY 
AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND COOPERATION 
(MAEC)
Deployment of the Visa Information System 
in 90 consular offices. VIS implements an 
automatic procedure in the Schengen space 
that includes handling of fingerprints and 
photographs. This interaction takes place in real 
time between Consular Offices, the National 
Authority (central services) and the European 
VIS Agency (Strasbourg).
Extension of operations of the Visa 
Information System (VIS) and the Spanish 
system for long-term visa arrangements 
(SIVICO II) for consular offices. Launching of 
subsystems for the National Visa Authority and 
for arrangements of long-term visas with access 
for other designated authorities.
Partial VoIP phoning. All representations have 
at least 3 VoIP terminals. For the representations 
that have these means, the phone calls made 
from any telephone to Central Services are free 
of charge and calls to Spanish landlines and 
mobile devices have a reduced cost. Additionally, 
MAEC Central Service landline calls made to 
any number at a representation are also free of 
charge. The savings in 2013, still with a partial 
deployment, is estimated to be €800,000. 
Installation of centralised systems 
for videoconferencing.  This allows for 
videoconferencing between Central Services, 
representations abroad and other General State 
Administrations and bodies or businesses via the 
Internet, i.e., the UN.
Deployment of a new diplomatic IP courier 
service in the diplomatic missions.
Deployment of the ACID encryption system 
of the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
in 33 diplomatic missions.
Creation and implementation of a work-site 
secure Internet navigation system, meaning 
an enormous increase in security.
Finalise the electronic signature on 
cryptographic key cards.
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The international sphere, just as in any sphere whe-
re human beings relate, is complex, prone to chan-
ge, uncertain and unforeseeable in all of its dimen-
sions. These factors have only intensified since the 
end of the Cold War and the bipolar system. This 
proves that we are in a moment of transition to a 
new international system, based on the defining 
elements that we have examined here, one that is 
multipolar, more interdependent and more globali-
sed. But this system is still far from being defined 
in its entirety.
The future of our country not only depends on the 
final shape this transition takes, but also on how it is 
managed. A country with the size, importance and 
international vocation of Spain can and must have 
an influence on this process. Spanish society has of-
ten shown its preference for a certain model of in-
ternational relations, has expressed its convictions 
regarding how the international community should 
be organised and what values and principles must 
underpin this organisation. But not only have we a 
clear and articulate idea of what an emerging inter-
national community should be like, but also how to 
approach the tensions and conflicts that inevitably 
mark all transition, and what our country’s place is 
in these difficult situations.
In order to have an influence, not only must we 
have a clear idea of what international community 
we desire, what role Spain—and now more impor-
tantly, what Spanish citizens—are to play; we need 
a strong and broad-based consensus on these 
points.
This External Action Strategy seeks that consen-
sus. We launch an in-depth and articulate debate 
on the reasons that should lead us to agree on and 
equip ourselves with an explicit new strategy, on its 
content and operational consequences regarding 
every aspect of external action. 
The Strategy is included in an extensive paper, 
longer than usual for this type of document. We 
consider the detail and even the reiteration to be 
necessary in order to shape our thinking on the 
imperative reorientation of external action. It will 
take considerable time to fully implement, it must 
exist in harmony with domestic action and respond 
to global changes that we can only now glimpse. It 
is not enough to merely list a set of measures and 
goals to initiate a movement of this calibre. An en-
tire narrative of whys and wherefores is needed. 
In this paper, we have attempted to answer these 
questions.
“The measures stipulated in the Strategy and in 
its accompanying Action Plan will be implemen-
ted to the extent of budget possibilities and that 
of the personnel available to the different de-
partments involved, and will be subject to the li-
mits established in the Budget Act adopted each 
year.”
10. One final reflection
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